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 Abstract 
The issue of price deregulation in the downstream oil sector of Nigeria 
through gradual subsidy withdrawal has generated a heated debate in 
the country with the government claiming that it will guarantee long term 
stability in product, supply and price. This will translate into economic 
growth and development. Others, especially the organised labour, claim 
that deregulation will lead to higher product prices, higher cost of 
production, and cut of jobs and will bring about recession in the 
economy. Therefore, this thesis employs Vector Auto regression Model 
using Variance Decomposition, Impulse Response Function and Granger 
Causality tests to assess the effect of price deregulation through gradual 
subsidy withdrawal in the downstream oil sector of Nigeria on four 
macroeconomic variables which are; GDP, Inflation, Unemployment and 
Minimum wage. The research finds evidence that changes in oil price, as 
a result of subsidy withdrawal, is the major source of variation in GDP, 
Inflation and Unemployment, while it is not found to be a significant 
source of variation in minimum wages. The result also reveals that there 
is positive impact of oil price changes on GDP and Inflation but negative 
impact on Unemployment and Minimum wages at the beginning of the 
observation period which became positive in the later stage of the 
observation. Finally the Granger causality test indicates unidirectional 
causality running from Petroleum prices to GDP and from Inflation to 
Petroleum prices while there is no evidence of causality on Minimum 
wage and Unemployment. The result of the granger causality test is an 
 vi 
 
indication that the positive effect of changes in petroleum prices on GDP 
is not as a result of increased economic activity but a result of increased 
government spending due to increased revenue available to it as a result 
of subsidy withdrawal. The study suggests that countries wishing to 
deregulate their downstream oil sectors should evolve ways that will 
reduce the impact of the policy on cost of production, protect jobs, 
control inflation and protect real wage. This will mitigate economic 
recession and promote growth.  
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Definition of Terms 
 For the purpose of this research work some terms are used and it 
is imperative to give the definitions of these terms within the context of 
this study. These are as follows: 
Deregulation 
 In this study deregulation is used to mean how the government 
could be freed of subsidy payment due to its concurrent control and 
involvement in the business of refining, importation and distribution of 
and fixing prices for refined petroleum products in the Nigerian market. 
Upstream Oil-Sector 
 This term is used to refer to exploration and production of crude 
oil and associated activities.  
Downstream Oil-Sector  
 This term is used to describe activities beyond crude oil discovery 
and production such as refining, storage and transportation. It also 
includes distribution and marketing of refined products.  
Barrel  
 One barrel of oil is equivalent to forty-two (42) U.S. gallons or one 
hundred and fifty-nine (159) litres.  
Refinery  
 This is a factory that refines crude oil into petroleum products and 
fuels. In Nigeria, there are four (4) refineries: Port Harcourt I, Port 
Harcourt II, Warri and Kaduna refineries.  
Pipelines  
 It is lines of connecting pipes often under the ground, used to 
transport crude oil to the four (4) refineries in Nigeria at a total distance 
of seven hundred and nineteen (719) km. The pipeline network, 
however, covers five thousand and one (5001) km in Nigeria. 
Liberalization  
 Liberalization as it affects downstream oil-sector means opening 
up of the sector to competition among all players in the industry. It 
means ensuring that every aspect of production, refining, distribution and 
 xx 
 
dispensing of petroleum products is self-financing. Liberalization involves 
competitive pricing of products. 
Privatization or Divestiture  
 It connotes a number of different processes such as leasing 
liquidation and the transfer of ownership and assets from public to 
private hands.  
Commercialization  
 This entails reforms of public enterprises so that their operations 
are subject to competition and market forces. There would be no 
alteration in state ownership and control of the enterprises, ownership is 
vested on the state.  
Subsidy  
 It is viewed here as the payment by the government or its agency, 
that is responsible for refining, importation and distribution of petroleum 
products such as Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) for 
example in Nigeria, in order to make the price paid by consumers lower 
than the cost of producing the subsidized petroleum products, the price is 
less than marginal cost and in order to have the uniform pump price 
throughout the country.  
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1 CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 2 
1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
 Worldwide, petroleum and energy in general are indispensable for 
human sustenance and industrial production. Thus, crude oil is the 
mainstay of the Nigerian economy, accounting for a massive 83% of total 
federally collected revenue in 2008, 65.8% in 2009, 73.8% in 2010 and 
75.67% during the second quarter of 2014 (CBN Statistical Bulleting and 
Reports, 2014). In fact this has been the trend from 1972. In West 
Africa, Nigeria accounts for 60% of all consumers, over 50% industrial 
and manufacturing potential and about 47% of regional GDP (CBN 
2011a). Certainly, the subject of oil subsidy withdrawal is of immense 
interest to each of Nigerian’s over 170 million citizens. 
 However, the long-standing decay of the oil industry in Nigeria has 
largely been attributed to government ownership and control of the 
sector. This had actually fuelled calls for public sector reform. In Nigeria 
such reforms are variously referred to as commercialization, privatization 
or more recently, deregulation.  
 Consequent upon this, the federal government of Nigeria decided 
to embark on deregulation of the downstream sector of the oil industry. 
The most prominent feature of the deregulation policy however, is 
subsidy withdrawal. Deregulation of downstream oil-sector is aimed at 
reducing the role of the government as owner of assets and operator in 
the sector while maintaining an active role as policy maker and regulator. 
The policy initiative is predicated on government objective of removing 
 3 
the institutional, regulatory and financial difficulties inhibiting the 
development of the downstream oil-sector and enhancing the sector’s 
market orientation. 
 Mayer (2001) sees Nigeria’s decision to withdraw subsidy at the  
downstream oil-sector to be in line with international trends. All over the 
world, from developed to developing and least developed petroleum 
endowed countries, deregulation of the oil-sector has emerged in the 
past decade as a policy imperative for governments. This is because it is 
widely believed that private capital and expertise within an appropriate 
framework that encourages delivery will expand the potential for 
providing services and infrastructure beyond that which the state alone 
can deliver.  
 Globally, the impetus for deregulation of downstream oil-sector 
has been driven by re-conceptualization of the role of the state in the 
economy. This has been accompanied by a paradigm shift in the 
approach to the provision of services and infrastructure traditionally 
provided by the state. Lawal and Derek (1985) asserts the view that 
certain types of services such as energy, telecommunications and 
transport infrastructure are “Natural monopolies with goods 
characteristics” has been replaced by the perspective that such services 
can be provided by the private sector if they are packaged in a particular 
way. Moreover, if the state creates institutions for a competitive 
 4 
environment and/or regulation of these sectors, they can readily be 
owned and operated by the private sector.  
 The federal government’s decision to deregulate the downstream 
oil-sector, despite the huge amount that has been spent on it, is 
undoubtedly based on the poor performance of the sector and the belief 
that private ownership and management of the refineries, pipelines and 
depots will improve the delivery of the sector. It is also, however, based 
on global trends over the past decade and the acceptance of 
“Washington Consensus” that the role of the state should be confined to 
creating an enabling environment for the private sector (Mayer 2001), 
which will act as the engine of growth in the economy.  
 A critical dimension of internal experience is, however, that 
deregulation of the downstream oil-sector is not a panacea and may not 
be an appropriate response to the poor performance of the sector in 
Nigeria. Reason adduced for this is the institutional arrangement of the 
stakeholders such as Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), 
Pipelines and Product Marketing Company (PPMC), Independent 
Marketers, Petroleum and Natural Gas Senior Staff Association of Nigeria 
(PENGASSAN), National Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers 
(NUPENG) etc., within the sector, as well as structural problems 
associated with the market environment in which they operate. Also, the 
over dependence of virtually all Nigeria’s economic structure on 
petroleum products cannot be overemphasized as part of the reasons.  
 5 
 As expected, public opinion about the deregulation in Nigeria 
covers a wide spectrum and cuts across all sides of the argument. Some 
Nigerians hold the view that the deregulation cannot be complete 
whether in the downstream oil-sector of Nigeria or indeed, in any other 
sector of the national economy (Oluloye 2006). Thus, it is widely believed 
that deregulation is desirable in freeing government of its concurrent 
control, and involvement in the business of refining, importation and 
distribution of refined petroleum products in the Nigerian market. In their 
own opinion, this group of people believes that, deregulation of the 
petroleum industry in Nigeria should be implemented in phases, so as to 
enable the state-owned monopolies to regain efficiency before full 
privatization. 
 Another school of thought strongly believes that the Nigerian 
petroleum industry must not be liberalized or deregulated or privatized 
completely for whatever reason. They say the status quo should remain, 
may be with some fine-tuning made ‘here and there’, to improve 
efficiency as appropriate in the overall national interest (Oluloye 2006). 
Essentially this is the implied position of the Nigerian Labour Congress 
(NLC).  
 Besides, labour unions have argued that the subsidy withdrawal at 
the downstream oil-sector should not be seen by the government as 
another means to afflict poor Nigerians with more hardship but rather to 
bring measures that will extend the benefits of this policy to the poor. 
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This is generally termed according to Mayer (2001) as universal services; 
an obligation of the government. Also, labour unions argued further that 
the statement credited to the federal government, that the amount 
realised from unsubsidised petroleum products domestically consumed by 
Nigerians will unlock resources which are supposed to be allocated to 
other areas such as health, road, housing and education in order to 
enhance the provision of these services. This has not yet been felt 
especially as far as health and education sectors are concerned.  
 An extremely worrying aspect of Nigeria’s deregulation of the 
downstream oil-sector is the widespread perception among key 
stakeholders, especially the trade unions, that beneath the rhetoric of 
Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) about the benefits of the 
deregulation and how the FGN’s objectives resonate with international 
practice, lays a sinister set of objectives and personal agendas. These 
objectives, according to NLC, involve using the deregulation process to 
enrich the individuals who are the key decision-makers and implementers 
of Nigeria’s privatization process. If this is not a mere perception, the 
process is doomed to failure.  
 However, stakeholders especially from the government, insist that 
complete deregulation including total and final dismantling, unbundling 
and subsequent wholesale privatization of all state-owned petroleum 
business, should proceed without further delay with maximum dispatch 
for the continued and meaningful survival of the Nigerian petroleum 
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industry in the 21st century. In fact, for such Nigerians, they see “The 
benchmarks of globalization and not nationalization as a factor that 
dictates the tempo of new world order in international petroleum market 
transactions” (Oluloye 2006 p. 2).  
 Thus, this research effort provides useful indication of the 
appropriate conditions under which deregulation of the downstream oil-
sector may be successful. According to Rogers (1999) as quoted in Mayer 
(2001) while analyzing private participation in infrastructure provision 
among sectors and regions, shows that Latin America and the Caribbean 
accounted for 48% of all such initiatives between 1990 and 1998, East 
Asia and the pacific for about 30%, Europe and central Asia for about 
10%, south Asia for 8%, the middle East and North Africa for about 3% 
and sub-Saharan Africa for about 2%. These statistics confirm the 
suggestion that deregulation of the downstream oil-sector is more likely 
to succeed in medium to high income countries that have better 
developed economic institutions than lower income countries like Nigeria.  
  Implementation of government subsidy withdrawal policy, as 
discovered in this research, has wide reaching implications for industry 
and Nigerian masses; it leads to product price increases and has 
generated industrial and social upheavals in the body polity. 
 As noticed by Lardic and Mingnon (2006), Jones et al. (2004) and 
Brown and Yucel (2002) among others, various means exists through 
which prices of petroleum products may have an impact on economic 
 8 
activity. However, in this research, it is discovered that from the 
consumer stand point (household, industry and government), the energy 
bills grow, whereas from the production stand point, companies have to 
contend with a rise in unit costs. All in all, a rise in the energy prices 
causes a drop in productivity, which is passed on to (i) the minimum 
wages;(defined as the lowest remuneration that employers must pay by 
law to the workers) (ii) unemployment; (iii) Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) and (iv) inflation. Therefore, this study is conducted to examine 
the effect of deregulation on the above major macroeconomics variables 
in Nigeria with a view of finding how deregulation policy affects them and 
the way forward.  
 The goal of this study therefore, is to look at the problem of 
deregulating downstream oil sector in Nigeria and its effect on some 
macroeconomic variables. Some of the problems that necessitate 
deregulation include: the general inefficiency in the running of the 
country’s refineries which provides the product for local consumption. 
This coupled with sustained increase in the demand for the product 
forced the government of Nigeria to resort to massive importation of the 
refined products. The importation of the product leads to the problem of 
high cost of subsidy which the government has to bear. The cost of this 
subsidy stands at a whopping N115 billion for the first quarter of 2011. In 
May 2011 alone, about N74 billion was spent on subsidy, (Mirror 2011, 
Akinmutumi 2011). This poses a serious problem of sustainability where 
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the government is saying that the economy cannot sustain the rising cost 
of subsidy. 
   On the other hand is the effect the deregulation will have on real 
income (defined as nominal monetary income discounted for inflation), 
due to the fact that deregulation will lead to increase in petroleum prices 
and could lead to inflation. Therefore, nominal income may rise but real 
income will continue to dwindle consequent upon the inflationary 
pressure. Other problems are the social unrest and loss of productivity 
that could follow as a result of industrial action by labour unions that 
always characterize increases in the petroleum price in Nigeria. It could 
also lead to low profits due to increase in unit cost, which could also lead 
to low capacity utilization and eventual cuts in employment. 
 Therefore, this study makes an empirical analysis using an 
unrestricted Vector Autoregressive Model (VAR) employing Impulse 
response Function, Variance Decomposition and Granger Causality tests 
to study the effect of subsidy withdrawal at the downstream oil sector in 
Nigeria on some macroeconomic variables that are critical to the growth 
of the economy. 
To achieve this, seven objectives were raised for the research.   
 10 
1.2 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY  
 For the purpose of this research and in order to achieve the aim of 
this study, the researcher considers six objectives of which there is one 
main objective and five other specific objectives. 
The main objective:  
1. Is to look into the dynamic effects of subsidy withdrawal at the 
downstream oil sector on the economic growth of Nigeria which 
was achieved through four specific objectives.  
The specific objectives are:  
2. To determine the effect of subsidy withdrawal at the downstream 
oil sector on GDP. 
3. To evaluate the effect of subsidy withdrawal at the downstream oil 
sector on Inflation. 
4. To investigate the effect of subsidy withdrawal at the downstream 
oil sector on Minimum wage.  
5. To analyse the effect of subsidy withdrawal at the downstream oil 
sector on Unemployment rate.  
Another specific objective of the study is: 
6. To suggest possible policy measures and actions as medium and 
long-term solutions to the lingering macroeconomic crisis caused 
by the subsidy withdrawal at the downstream oil-sector.  
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1.3 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
 This thesis examines the effect of subsidy withdrawal at the 
downstream sector of the Nigeria’s oil industry and the resultant 
fluctuations of price on the economic growth of the country. Many studies 
were conducted to examine the effect of changes in the prices of oil on 
the economic growth of countries for example (Hamilton 1983, 2005, 
2011 and 2012; Dartanto 2013; Asafu-Adjaye, 2000; Goto and McKenzie 
2002; Abouleinein, El Laithy, and al-Dīn, 2009). For Nigeria, there are a 
considerable number of studies that were conducted to analyse the effect 
of oil price changes on the economic growth of the country for example, 
(Adenikinju, 2000; Adedipe, 2008; Aliyu, 2011; Iwayemi, and Fowowe, 
2011; Asekunowo, 2012). However, these studies focused their attention 
on the effect of oil price changes at the international market level on the 
economic growth of the country. Therefore, this study contributes to the 
literature by examining the effect of changes in domestic oil prices on the 
economic growth of Nigeria. This is due to the fact that Nigeria is a net 
crude oil exporting country and therefore increases or decrease in the 
international crude price could have different effect on the economy from 
the increase or decrease in the domestic oil price. 
 The study makes further contribution by employing quarterly time 
series data from 1980 quarter one (q1) to 2012 quarter four (q4) to find 
the effect of subsidy withdrawal on the economic growth of Nigeria. The 
findings of this research indicate that the federal government of Nigeria’s 
policy to deregulate the downstream oil sector has serious effect on the 
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economy, and these effects could be very unpleasant to the citizens. This 
is in the form of high rate of unemployment, rising inflation, and low 
industrial capacity utilization in the real sector which remain critical to the 
economic growth of the country.      
Therefore, the study of this nature becomes very significant. Its 
recommendations could make the Nigerian government realize that in the 
short-run certain measures has to be adopted as an option to 
determining the petroleum products prices using the international market 
price for crude oil. While in the medium and long run certain measures 
have to be adopted to ensure sufficient supply of petroleum products 
without heavy burden of subsidy on government. 
 Another significance of this research is that; it will create 
awareness on the implication of withdrawing subsidy at the downstream 
oil sector on productivity in the economy, going by its findings that the 
rate of unemployment may continue to grow and this will negate 
government’s policy of employment generation especially for the youth 
and women in the country.  
 It will help government to find solution to other effects of 
deregulation of downstream oil-sector on Nigerian economy as it affects 
some macroeconomic variables. Such effects are mostly felt on:  
- Minimum Wage  
- Employment  
- Inflation 
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- G.D.P.  
    Lastly, the study helps to provide information to planners and future 
researchers.  
1.4 SCOPE OF THE STUDY  
 The scope of this thesis is to study the effect of subsidy 
withdrawal at the downstream oil sector on Nigeria’s economy by 
considering its effect on some important macroeconomic variables which 
are; domestic oil price, minimum wage, inflation, unemployment and 
GDP. The study could only limit itself to Nigeria due to resource 
constraints, availability of data and time factors. More so, policies are 
continuously being changed by governments to reflect the peculiarities of 
their countries. Lastly, one need to bear in mind that peculiarities exist 
between different countries, hence, the results of this PhD project which 
focuses on Nigerian economy might not be generalized for other 
countries. 
1.5 ORGANISATION OF THE STUDY 
 This research work is organised into six chapters as follows: 
 Chapter One introduces the topic on which the research was 
carried out. It states the rationale of the research and the problem which 
the research work sets out to address. The chapter also spells the 
significance of this study and the scope which the study covers. 
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  Chapter Two discusses the background literature on the Nigerian 
oil industry. Therefore the historical background and the dynamics of the 
Nigeria’s oil industry were reviewed. Furthermore, the performance, 
contributions and problems of the sector were analysed. Finally an 
analytical review of the perspective of regulation and deregulation 
policies in the downstream sector of the industry and their mode of 
implementations was carried out. 
  Chapter Three covers literature reviews on deregulation policy, the 
downstream oil sector and the theoretical framework. Therefore, in this 
chapter analysis of macroeconomic theories and their relationship with 
market deregulation is carried out. The theories reviewed are the classical 
economic theory, the Marxist’s theory, the Neoclassical economic theory, 
the New classical and the Keynesian theories. An analysis of some 
economic systems in relation to market deregulation is also carried out in 
this chapter. These are the free market capitalist economic system, the 
central planning or socialist economic system and the Mixed economy. 
The concept of subsidy is examined and the taxonomy of oil market 
deregulation is also reviewed and analysed. Furthermore, the framework 
for considering subsidy introduction in the downstream oil market is 
analysed. The theoretical link between oil market deregulation and the 
macroeconomic variables that were studied in this thesis was also 
examined. 
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 An analytical review of the literature on oil market deregulation is 
also carried out in this chapter. Finally, an analysis of the deregulation of 
downstream oil sector in the Nigerian context is carried out in this 
chapter.       
  Chapter Four contains specification of the model used and 
elaboration of method and methodology adopted in the study. The 
chapter examines the variables used in this thesis, the data, its nature 
and the sources of the data. The properties of the data and tools used for 
the data analysis were discussed. The tools used for the diagnostic tests 
of the time series properties of the data are Augmented Dickey Fuller 
(ADF) and Philip Peron (PP); these tests were analysed. The long run 
relationship between the variables was also checked using Johansen 
cointegration test. Finally, the tool used for the data analyses in this 
thesis was the unrestricted Vector Autoregressive model (VAR) and the 
accompanying Impulse Response Function, Granger Causality test and 
Variance Decomposition.  
 Chapter Five deals with data presentation, analysis and discussion 
of results, in which data on trend of minimum wage, domestic petroleum 
prices, inflation, unemployment and GDP in Nigeria is presented, 
analyzed and interpreted and an implication of the findings on the 
economy is also discussed. The chapter investigates the dynamic causal 
relationship between changes in domestic prices of petroleum in Nigeria 
and four macroeconomic variables namely; GDP, Inflation, 
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Unemployment and Minimum wage. This was done using unrestricted 
VAR. The short run and long run effect was observed using Impulse 
response function, the causal effect was examined using Granger 
causality test, while the level of significance of the changes on each of 
the variables was examined using Variance decomposition test.  
 Chapter Six comprises of summary, conclusion, recommendations, 
limitations of the study and suggestions for future research. 
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2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 Analyses of the effect of deregulation of downstream oil sector on 
the economic growth of Nigeria will make no meaning without 
understanding the background history and the dynamics of Nigeria’s oil 
industry. Therefore, in this chapter an attempt has been made to provide 
the historical background of the oil industry and the developments and 
challenges in went through since the exploration activities began over a 
century ago. The chapter also appraises the performance, contributions 
and problems facing the industry. Finally an analytical review of the 
perspective of regulation and deregulation policies and their mode of 
implementation is carried out. 
2.2 BACKGROUND HISTORY OF THE NIGERIAN OIL 
INDUSTRY 
 The history of Oil industry in Nigeria can be traced back to 1908 
when a German Company, called Nigerian Bitumen Corporation began oil 
exploration activities in an area called Araromi in south-western Nigeria. 
However, this pioneering activity was halted by the outbreak of First 
World War in 1914. Oil exploration resumed in 1937, but due to the 
Second World War the company had to suspend its operation in 1941. 
The activities were resumed in 1946 by a different company called Shell 
D’Arcy later known as Shell BP (NNPC, 2010c). 
 Oil in commercial quantity was discovered in Nigeria in 1956, when 
the search for this commodity was resumed in 1947 after the Second 
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World War. According to Oremade (1986), the search was initiated by 
Shell Development Company of Nigeria Limited which was at that time 
known as ‘Shell D’Arcy’ and later Shell BP. At that time it was based in 
Warri. The company was a joint stock company financed by the Royal 
Dutch Shell Group of Companies and the British Petroleum Group (Ibid 
1986, pg. 1). The early exploration scope was the whole of Nigeria, but 
later the allocated area under Oil Prospecting Licenses (OPL’S) was 
compacted to 40,000 square miles within the Niger Delta Basin. Akata- 1 
was the first oil well to come up with oil and it was drilled in 1953. 
According to NNPC (2010c) oil in commercial quantity was discovered in 
1956 at Oloibiri, Bayelsa State of Nigeria after several years of 
exploration and an investment of over Thirty Billion Naira.  
 The country became one of the oil producing countries of the 
world in 1958 when it began producing up to 5100 barrels per day (bpd) 
from its first oil field. After independence in 1960 and the immediate 
years that followed, there was considerable development in granting 
exploration rights to other foreign oil companies in the onshore areas of 
Niger Delta and offshore areas adjoining the region (ibid). 
 Oluloye (2006) opinioned that in 1970s there was global up surge 
in crude oil prices and Nigeria made tremendous wealth from its oil 
production. The country also joined the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1971 and established Nigerian National 
Petroleum Company (NNPC) in 1977; a state owned and controlled 
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company which is a major player in both the upstream and downstream 
oil sectors.  
 In its publication of the History of the Nigerian Oil Industry it 
captioned ‘Development of Nigeria’s Oil Industry’ NNPC (2010c) which 
explained how Nigeria made rapid progress in its crude oil production in 
which the country was able to reach a production level of over two 
million barrels per day within two decades of the discovery of oil. NNPC 
(ibid) shows that from an initial production of 5100 barrels per day in 
1958 production increases progressively to 2 million barrels per day in 
1972 and 2.4 million barrels per day in 1979. Although production figures 
dropped in the eighties due to economic slump, 2004 saw a total 
rejuvenation of oil production to a record level of 2.5 million barrels per 
day. Gradually petroleum production and export became predominant 
economic activity in the country accounting for about 90% of the 
country’s gross earnings. This dominant role has pushed agriculture, the 
hitherto traditional mainstay of the economy, from the early fifties and 
sixties, to the background (ibid). 
 While the discovery of oil in the former eastern region and former 
mid-western region which is now called South-South region or Niger-
Delta region pleased hopeful Nigerians, giving them an early indication 
soon after independence that economic development was within reach, at 
the same time it signaled what Oremade (1986) called “a danger of grave 
consequence”. According to him, oil revenues fueled already existing 
ethnic and political tension and nearly "burned" the country. This tension 
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reached its peak with the civil war that lasted from 1967 to 1970 
(Oremade 1986).  
 Nigeria survived the war, and was able to recover mainly because 
of the huge revenues from oil in the 1970s. For some three years an oil 
boom followed, and the country was awash with money. Indeed, 
according to Adedipe (2008) there was money for virtually all the items in 
Nigeria’s developmental plan. The literature of the postwar years shifted 
to the analysis of the world oil boom and bust, collectively known as the 
‘oil shock’. Starting in 1973 the world experienced an oil shock that 
rippled through Nigeria until the mid-1980s. This oil shock was initially 
positive for the country, but with mismanagement and military rule, it 
became an economic disaster. The larger middle class produced by the oil 
boom of the 1970s gradually became disenchanted in the 1980s, and 
rebellious in the 1990s and dangerous in the present years manifesting 
themselves as militants under the guise of ethnicity or religion who carry 
weapons and kill innocent people. The enormous impact of the oil shock 
could not escape scholarly attention. For over forty years (1970s - 
2010s), the virtual obsession was to analyze the consequences of oil on 
Nigeria, using different models and theories (Adedipe 2008). 
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2.3 PERFORMANCE OF THE OIL INDUSTRY IN NIGERIA 
 The Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) has 
categorized the Nigerian oil sector into three main sub-sectors, namely, 
upstream, mid-stream and downstream.  
 The upstream sector according to NNPC (2012) is where the 
exploration, crude oil production and gas production takes place. In 
Nigeria crude oil drilling and production takes place at both onshore and 
offshore. Onshore production is where drilling and production of crude oil 
and gas is done on the land, while an offshore production is the situation 
where drilling and production of crude oil and gas is carried out in the sea 
or ocean.  
 The mid-stream according to NNPC (ibid) deals with the gas and 
power, renewable energy, engineering and technology, Nigerian gas 
master plan and Greenfield refineries initiative.  
 The downstream sector deals with the product distribution and 
retail services. Downstream sector is the link to the final consumer 
(NNPC, 2010d).  
 According to Ojoku (1992) the most problematic among the 
sectors over the years has been the downstream sector, which is the 
distribution arm and connection with final consumers of refined 
petroleum products in the domestic economy. The incessant crisis in 
supply of products culminated in the decision by the Government in 2002 
to deregulate the downstream sub-sector. However, the manner of its 
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implementation has been controversial because, according to Ojoku 
(ibid), it ignores the economic realities in Nigeria. 
 At the upstream sector oil production by the joint venture (JV) 
companies account for about 95 % of Nigeria’s crude oil production. 
Between 2001 to 2010 Shell, which operates the largest joint venture in 
Nigeria, with 55% government interest, through the Nigerian National 
Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), produces about 32% on the average of 
Nigeria’s total crude oil production. Exxon Mobil, Chevron Texaco, 
ENI/Agip and TotalfinaElf operate the other JV’s, in which the NNPC has 
60% stake (Adamu 2010). Odularu (2008) opinioned that the over-
dependence on oil has created vulnerability to the impulses of the 
international market, which show how critical oil is on Nigeria’s major 
macro-economic indices. In particular, the place of oil in the mind of the 
average Nigerian has become more profound since the deregulation of 
the downstream segment of the Nigerian oil industry began in 2002. The 
contradiction was more glaring in 2012 and 2013, with the rise in crude 
oil prices at the global markets, which meant more external earnings for 
Nigeria, but also increased the expense burden on imported refined 
petroleum products! It is such contradictions that make the Nigerian 
economy appear strange at times, as policies seem to ignore what 
appears obvious to do. As such, policies designed to address the 
deficiencies and defects in the structure end up being poorly articulated 
and/or implemented because of regional, political or rent-seeking selfish 
interests (Business Day 2012).  
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 Obviously, it is the same rent-seekers that continually sabotage 
the reinvigoration of the domestic refineries, making Nigeria to depend 
on importation of refined products to meet the domestic needs (Business 
Day 2012).  
 At present, Nigeria has four refineries, with a combined installed 
refining capacity of 445,000 barrels per day (bpd). These four refineries 
according to NNPC (2010e) are as below: 
 1. The first Port Harcourt Refinery was commissioned in 1965 with 
an installed capacity of 35,000 barrel per day (bpd) and later expanded 
to 60,000 bpd.  
 2. The Warri Refinery was commissioned in 1978 with an installed 
refining capacity 100,000 bpd, and upgraded to 125,000 bpd in 1986.  
 3. The Kaduna Refinery was commissioned in 1980 with an 
installed refining capacity of 100,000 bpd, and upgraded to 110,000 bpd 
in 1986.  
 4. The second Port Harcourt Refinery was commissioned in1989 
with 150,000 bpd processing capacity, and designed to fulfill the dual role 
of supplying the domestic market and exporting its surplus. 
 The combined capacities of these refineries is far below the 
domestic consumption of refined products, topmost of which is premium 
motor spirit (gasoline), whose average daily consumption as at April 2011 
was estimated at 30 million liters (Muhammad, 2011). The refineries are 
however, operating far below their installed capacities, as they were 
more or less abandoned during the military era and the civilian 
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governments that succeeded it. Business Day (2012c) reported massive 
decay in the Port Harcourt refinery which is in a sorry state due to 
skipping of the routine and mandatory turnaround maintenance, 
negligence, corruption and out right sabotage that made products 
importation inevitable. As at April 2011 Nigeria imports 75% of refined 
petroleum product to meet domestic demand (Muhammad, 2011). 
Importation notwithstanding, in the main report of the Independent 
Consolidation Committee for Cushioning Measures (FGN 2005), it was 
reported that there have been persistent product shortages, due to 
smuggling and black marketeering that gave strength to the argument 
for deregulation of the downstream oil subsector in Nigeria.  
 The monetization of oil revenue has been a major factor in 
liquidity management in Nigeria. Measuring liquidity as the narrow and 
broad money definitions by the CBN, the early 1990s saw increases that 
were dampened by 1995 up until the civilian administration came on 
board in 1999. The new Government maintained disciplined fiscal 
operations for about one year and thereafter, the floodgates were 
opened. Since then, the CBN has been battling to keep liquidity in check, 
in order to ensure that it does not create adverse effects on the three key 
macroeconomic indices (i.e., interest rate, exchange rate and inflation 
rate). The greatest challenge is when Nigeria generates more revenue 
from crude oil sales than it budgeted; such excesses have always been 
monetized, creating market distortions and inflationary pressure 
(Adedipe, 2008). 
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 The same argument goes for deficit fiscal operations in 
comparison to the GDP. The pattern of this ratio indicates the optimism 
that accompanies increase in oil revenue and makes Government to 
engage in frivolous spending or unnecessary projects. Deficit spending 
invariably makes Government resort to borrowing from the Central Bank 
through the instrument of Ways and Means Advances, which later 
convert into short term debt instruments that are quite expensive to 
service at market rates. 
 At this point, there is sufficient ground to examine how economic 
policy formulation has been impacted or induced by petroleum oil in 
Nigeria. As much as possible, major economic policies since Nigeria 
gained political independence would be examined vis-à-vis the state of 
the oil sector. This should provide adequate basis for making a few 
specific recommendations on how to reduce the dependency.  
2.4 CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE OIL INDUSTRY TO THE 
NIGERIAN ECONOMY 
 Over the past fifty years the oil industry has made a variety of 
contributions to the Nigerian economy. These have included the creation 
of employment opportunities; contributions to government revenues, to 
gross domestic product and to foreign exchange reserves; and the supply 
of energy to industry and commerce.  
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2.4.1 Contributions to Government Revenues 
 The payment of substantial revenues to the government is 
perhaps the most important aspect of the contributions of the oil industry 
to the Nigerian economy. Available statistics has shown that from 1972 to 
2010 the oil industry has always been the highest source of federally 
collected revenue in Nigeria. In 1972 out of the total of N 1,405.10m 
collected N 764.30m comes from oil industry, which represents 54.4%. In 
1980 a total of N15, 233.50m was collected and oil revenue accounted 
for N12, 353.30m which represent 81.4% of the total receipt. In 1990 oil 
revenue was 73.2% in the year 2000 it was a whopping 83.5% and in 
2010 it represents 73.8% of the total receipt (CBN 2010). Prior to the 
discovery of oil, agriculture was the main stay of the Nigeria’s economy. 
It provides the highest percentage of the total revenue accrued to 
government and was the largest employer of labour. However the 
discovery of oil changes the trend and push agriculture to the 
background. 
2.4.2 Create Employment Opportunities 
 One of the first contributions of the oil industry to the Nigerian 
economy was the creation of employment opportunities. From the start, 
Nigerians were employed in a variety of non-basic activities such as the 
building of roads and bridges, the clearing of drilling sites, transportation 
of materials and equipment, and the building of staff housing and 
recreational facilities. As time went on and as the industry's training 
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program progressed, they began to be employed in seismic and drilling 
operations, and in supervisory and managerial functions. However, direct 
oil industry employment in Nigeria is not likely to expand significantly in 
the future because the industry is very highly capital intensive, as is 
illustrated by the size of the capital-labour ratio in the industry, compared 
with other industries. 
 The very high capital-labour ratio in the oil industry means that 
growth in oil operations is generally reflected, not in the relative 
expansion of employment, but the expansion of capital investment. This 
will be particularly the case when, with the passage of time and increased 
extraction, the need arises for increased investment in costly techniques 
of secondary recovery (CBN, 2011b).  
 Notwithstanding the above however, oil industry has proven to be 
a catalyst for employment generation in Nigeria. This is evident in the 
number of employment generated in the refining sector, gas sector, 
petrochemical and fertilizer sectors. It also provides jobs to Nigerians at 
the service stations of the downstream sector (Ejoh E 2014). 
 Furthermore, oil industry has been a contributing factor to the 
development of other industries in Nigeria. Its products also serve as raw 
materials and inputs in other industries that generate employment in the 
country. This is in addition to the multiplier effect of the industry on the 
economy as whole (ibid).      
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2.4.3 Contribution to Gross Domestic Product 
 In general, the contribution of an industry or branch of activity to 
the gross domestic product during any accounting period is measured by 
its gross output less the cost of inputs-materials, equipment, services, 
etc. purchased from other industries or branches of activity and this is 
what is referred to as gross domestic product at factor cost, while 
deduction of any taxes net of subsidies paid, gives the gross domestic 
product at market prices. The gross output of the petroleum sector 
consists of the proceeds from oil exports, local sales of crude oil for local 
refining, and local sales of natural gas. But, because of the massive 
involvement of foreign operators in the Nigerian petroleum industry, not 
all of the industry's value added is retained in the country; at the moment 
a substantial proportion is sent out in the form of factor payments, 
profits, dividends, interest, fees, and wages and salaries paid abroad. It is 
therefore, more realistic to consider the industry's contribution to gross 
national product i.e., gross domestic product less factor payments made 
abroad. The industry's value added can also be obtained by adding 
together the various payments to the government in the form of rents, 
royalties, profit taxes, harbor dues, etc.; the wages and salaries of 
employees paid locally; and any net retained earnings (CBN, 2011b). 
2.4.4 Foreign Exchange Reserves 
 This is an important aspect of the oil industry's contribution to the 
Nigerian economy, which could not have come at a more opportune 
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moment because the country is now embarking upon a massive program 
of the development of critical infrastructure and economic transformation 
which postulates huge imports of capital goods and specialized services 
involving massive expenditure of foreign exchange. In many 
underdeveloped countries, especially those that depend heavily on a 
narrow range of primary commodities, acute shortages of foreign 
exchange, often exacerbated by massive declines in world commodity 
prices, constitute a major obstacle to effective economic development. 
The oil industry in Nigeria now has substantial foreign exchange reserves 
and is in a healthy position of being able to finance the foreign exchange 
cost of her development program (CBN, 2011b).  
2.4.5 Contribution to Energy Supply 
 Another contribution of the oil industry to the Nigerian economy is 
the provision of a cheap and/or readily available source of energy for 
industry and commerce, through the operations of the local refinery and 
the utilization of locally discovered natural gas. The Elesa Eleme refinery, 
near Port Harcourt, which came into operation in November 1965, had an 
initial capacity of 1.9 million tons per annum, and was designed to meet 
the country's main product requirements at that time, with the exception 
of bitumen, aviation gasoline, and lubricating oils. A liquefied petroleum 
gas plant, with a capacity of 15,000 tons per annum, was added in 1966. 
The refinery was damaged during the civil war but has since been rebuilt 
and expanded to a capacity of about 3.75 million tons per annum (NNPC, 
2010a).  
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 The availability of huge reserves of natural gas provides a good 
opportunity for the supply of cheap energy to industry and commerce. 
Already, associated natural gas is naturally produced jointly with crude oil 
and is being supplied by Shell-BP to the Power Holding Company of 
Nigeria. This is, for thermal electricity generation to the Nigerian 
Petroleum Refining Company for use as fuel in petroleum refining at 
Elesa Eleme and to a number of industrial undertakings around the 
centers of oil operations (Odularu, 2008).  
 The above brief review shows that the oil industry is making a 
variety of very useful contributions to the Nigerian economy, especially in 
the provision of revenues and foreign exchange. But when we move from 
the immediately apparent to the long-lasting impact, from the largely 
monetary contribution to the real economic impact, a completely different 
picture emerges which show that, notwithstanding the massive increase 
in oil wealth, the industry has yet to make a significant impact on 
economic development and welfare in Nigeria. 
2.5 PROBLEMS OF THE NIGERIAN OIL INDUSTRY            
 The oil sector has been plagued by various problems which 
undermined its optimal development over the years. In general terms, 
the oil sector of the Nigerian economy faced and is still facing some of 
the following problems: 
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2.5.1 Public Control and Bureaucracy 
 The Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) is controlled 
by the Ministry of Petroleum Resources. It lacks autonomy as a result 
decision taking is often bureaucratic and unnecessarily delayed. 
Therefore, the operation of the NNPC is characterized by inefficiency, 
especially in refinery operations, distribution and marketing (BusinessDay, 
2012c). 
2.5.2 Poor Funding of Investments 
 Frequent delays in the payment of cash calls to the joint venture 
operators have tended to discourage increase in the level of investment 
by the oil companies. Insufficiency of funds has also constrained 
adequate equipment maintenance and efficient refinery operations by the 
NNPC. The Federal Government’s delay in the payment of cash calls for 
its JV operations in the upstream sub-sector as at 31st December, 2009 
stand at N459,658 billion (Ribadu, 2012). 
2.5.3 Communal Disturbances and Vandalism 
 There had been frequent communal disturbances and armed 
militant youth which disrupt crude oil production, as oil communities’ 
clamor for higher stake in oil operations. There are reported cases of 
massive smuggling of petroleum products across the borders in quest for 
foreign exchange and to take undue advantage of the lower domestic 
prices vis-à-vis neighboring countries prices (PPPRA, 2004) and 
(Asekunowo, 2012). 
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2.5.4 Over-Exploration of Niger-Delta 
 The Niger-Delta has an area of 70,000 square kilometers and has 
99% of the Nigeria’s proven crude oil and gas reserves. The Niger-delta 
extends to Rivers, Edo, Delta, Imo, Abia, Akwa-Ibom, Ondo, and 
Anambra and Cross river states. The area is geographically in a rainforest 
belt with extensive swamp and mangrove and geologically it has 
sedimentary rocks with sand and slate that trapped oil, gas, and coal 
millions of years ago. Petroleum exploration began in the Niger-delta, 
particularly in Ondo state, as far back as 1908 but crude oil was first 
discovered in commercial quantity in 1956 at Oloibiri in Bayelsa state. 
Since the discovery of oil, over 60% of the Niger–delta has been 
explored, thus Nigeria faces the problem of over exploration of the area. 
One of the dangers is environmental damage or degradation which has 
become not only an economic issue but also a political and social one 
(NNPC, 2010b). 
2.5.5 Gas Flaring 
 Every year, millions of Dollars are literally going up in smoke in 
Nigeria, as companies’ burn off unwanted natural gas released during oil 
production. This flaring and venting produces more green-house gas 
emissions than any other single source in Africa south of the Sahara, and 
many who live in the Nigeria’s oil producing communities, complains of 
chronic health and environmental problems. Much of the region where oil 
is pumped is a maze of winding mangrove creeks and waterways, the 
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giant gas flares, operated by AGIP-Nigeria belch out noxious flames and 
fumes that loom over homes and farmlands. 
2.5.6 Oil Spillage 
 There had been frequent cases of oil spillage in the Niger-delta 
region where oil exploration in Nigeria takes place, it involves enormous 
discharge of oil into the land including farm lands and inland water where 
fishing and farming activities takes place. Ariweriokuma S. (2009) shows 
that between 1976 and 2005 a total of 8,768 cases of oil spillage were 
reported and this involves the spill of approximately 2,662,900 barrels of 
oil into the land, inland waters and the sea surrounding the environment 
of the Niger-delta area. This causes environmental pollution and damages 
to farm lands and inland waters and have serious economic and health 
implications on the inhabitants of the area. The economic aspect involves 
loss of fertile land for farmers and the death of aquatic life for fisher-men 
which culminate into serious poverty in the area. The health implication is 
that when such a staggering volume of oil is spilled in an area it will be 
absorbed into the ecosystem and is capable of contaminating a wide 
colony of aquatic life and animals. The inhabitants of the area have no 
option but to eat the contaminated seafood, animals and farm produce 
and in the process hydrocarbon substances find their ways into human 
bodies and as such suffer from different types of ailments. 
 The problem of oil spillage also leads to loss of lives; Ariweriokuma 
S. (ibid) reported that in 1998 an estimated 1,000 people died in a place 
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called Jesse near Warri in Delta state while scavenging petroleum 
products from a pipeline leakage.   
2.5.7 Inadequate Refineries  
 Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa with over 170 million 
people. According to Muhammad (2011) and Akinmutumi (2011), the 
country consumes about 30 million litres of petroleum a day. However 
the four existing refineries can only refine about 445,000 barrels per day 
at full capacity. This is a far cry from the country’s requirement. Added to 
this is the fact that the refineries operate far below their installed 
capacity. This is due to a number of reasons which include the skipping 
of the routine and mandatory turnaround maintenance, mismanagement, 
obsolete equipment and outright sabotage (FGN 2005). It is worthy to 
note that no new refinery was built in Nigeria for the past twenty five 
years, notwithstanding the rapid increase in population, number of 
vehicles and industries that depends on fuel to operate due to the almost 
total collapse of the electricity supply in the country.  
2.5.8 Oil theft  
 Oil theft has been a serious problem not only to the Nigeria’s oil 
sector but to the economy as a whole. According to a report by Chatham 
House London, as reported by The Economist (Anon, 2013), Nigeria lost 
at least 100,000 barrels of oil per day (bpd); about five per cent of 
Nigeria’s total output in the first quarter of 2013. The report further 
indicates that oil theft cost Nigeria as much as $8 billion a year. The 
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report shows that this figure is the cost to theft from its onshore and 
swamp operations alone. This figure does not include what may happen 
at export terminals and the larger-scale bunkering which involves 
siphoning oil from pipelines on land or under water and loading it onto 
small barges, from which it is transferred to bigger ships in the Gulf of 
Guinea that carry this to international refiners who may not be aware 
that it is stolen products.  
 The damage caused by the oil thieves also often forces oil 
companies to shut down their pipelines, which translates into a huge loss 
to the companies. This is because apart from the cost of damaged 
pipelines which the companies have to bear, they still have to pay the 
government 100% of what they owe the government (i.e. volumes 
produced inclusive of theft). Eventually the scale of the theft reaches a 
level where the companies are loss making and then decide they are 
better off shutting down rather than producing. As a result, Nigeria as at 
2013 was producing oil at 400,000 bpd below its capacity of 2.5m bpd.  
2.6 FUEL SUBSIDY IN NIGERIA 
 Oluloye (2006) in his paper entitled ‘The Imperative of Petroleum 
Support Fund (PSF) to Industrial Growth in Nigeria’, presented at a 
meeting of The Nigerian Chamber of Commerce Industries, Mining and 
Agriculture (NACCIMA) Industrial and Small and Medium Scale 
Enterprises (SME) Group in Lagos, provides a historical perspective of 
downstream sector deregulation. According to him during the pre- and 
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post- independence era, certain companies were key players in the 
petroleum downstream sector in Nigeria. These were British Petroleum 
(BP), ESSO, Mobil Oil, Shell Nigeria Limited etc. The investments made by 
these companies were capital intensive; with the construction of jetties, 
depots, acquisition of rail tankers, wagons and   network of retail outlets 
throughout the country. That was the genesis of the few oil marketing 
giants in the downstream sector later known as major marketers. The 
operations of these companies were market-driven by the forces of 
demand and supply and did not come under government control in terms 
of the fixing of petroleum products prices. This is the period of real 
deregulation as equipment and assets were wholly owned and operated 
by private companies and as mentioned above prices were determined by 
the market forces.  
2.6.1 Regulation Period and the Advent of Fuel Subsidy: 
Indigenisation and Nationalisation Policy  
 Oil subsidy in Nigeria started in 1973 (Oluloye 2006) when the 
Indigenization and Nationalization policy of the federal government 
became effective. By the Nationalization policy, according to NNPC 
(2010c) the federal government acquired controlling shares in major oil 
companies under what was termed ‘First Participation Agreement’ and 
under this agreement the federal government acquired 35% shares in the 
oil companies. The shares of these companies with the federal 
government out lay were managed by the government owned Nigeria 
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National Oil Corporation (NNOC), replaced by the Nigerian National 
Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) in 1977.   
 On 1st October, 1973 the federal government (F.G.) introduced 
uniform pricing of petroleum products nationwide (Oluloye 2006), which 
makes petroleum products available at prices less than cost in all parts of 
the country. Since the marketing companies are in business for profit 
under the Indigenization policy of the federal government the marketers 
preferred to sell products in major cities, seaports and refinery locations, 
where higher profits were made, mainly in the southern part of the 
country. In order to make products available in all the parts of the 
country and at a uniform price the government therefore introduced 
subsidy. 
 According to Asekunowo (2012) the subsidy scheme was targeted 
at low income Nigerians so that they were able to consume some 
necessary and essential goods and services from the production of which 
the petroleum products serve as necessary inputs. Adenikinju (2000) 
postulates that Nigeria as a major producer and exporter of crude oil has 
always controlled the domestic prices of petroleum products so that its’ 
citizens could enjoy the price subsidy. According to him crude oil is sold 
to local refineries at a lower price per barrel to bring down the cost of 
production and enable Nigerians to enjoy explicit subsidy. 
 According to Asekunowo (2012 P. 302), there exists both explicit 
and implicit subsidies in the Nigeria’s downstream sector subsidy scheme. 
The explicit subsidy is where the government pays the difference 
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between production costs and selling price, while the implicit subsidy 
according to him “involves the difference between the opportunity cost of 
a wasting asset such as crude oil and the present selling price”. 
Adenikinju (2000) shows that the implicit subsidy is the border or 
international market price of the petroleum products which Nigerian 
consumers do not bear. Hossain (2003) calculated the 2002 implicit 
subsidy to be ninety four billion naira or 1.8 percent of the GDP. He 
further asserts that as at 2003 the domestic prices of refined petroleum 
products in Nigeria were much lower than those obtained in the 
neighboring countries. According to him, during that year products were 
domestically sold at 80% of the importation cost. Domestically produced 
products were also sold at the same price, thus given rise to an explicit 
subsidy on imported products and implicit subsidy on domestically 
produced products. Nwafor et al (2006), shows that the explicit subsidy 
alone amounted to 2% of the GDP and if an implicit subsidy of 1.5% is 
added then the total subsidy would be about 3.5% of GDP. 
 Asekunowo (2012) shows that the explicit subsidy is administered 
through the sale of crude oil per barrel to local refineries through NNPC 
at a very low cost compared to international market price, so that the 
production cost will be reduced and bring about improved welfare to the 
consumers. Nwafor et al (2006) provides a clearer picture of the explicit 
subsidy in which they explained that in 1993 the export price of a barrel 
of crude oil was $15 but the local refineries were buying it at $1 per 
barrel. They further posted that in 2002 crude oil was sold at $25 per 
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barrel at the international market but local refineries in Nigeria bought it 
at $18 per barrel. As for the imported products, the authors further 
explained that the government does not sell them at their full landed cost 
because it subsidies them. As at June 2003, the government spent 12 
Naira as subsidy on each litre of petroleum product consumed in Nigeria. 
The figure rose to 78.45 Naira on each litre in 2011 (Muhammad, 2011).  
2.6.2 Development in the Down Stream Sector (1973- 1975)    
 According to the report of the Independent Consolidation 
Committee on Cushioning Measures (FGN 2005) the period 1973 to 1975 
was marked by severe shortages of petroleum products in the country. 
Long queues were observed during this period and filling stations 
charged different pump prices to reflect different transportation costs 
incurred by them.   
 This unhealthy development in the downstream sector attracted 
the attention of the Federal Government therefore, an inter-ministerial 
committee was set up to examine and advise the Federal Government on 
possible solutions out of the observed problems. The committee 
recommended the establishment of: 
1. Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) with expanded 
mandate from that of Nigerian National Oil Company; 
2. Establishment of more refineries, development of a network of 
pipelines and storage facilities nationwide for easy distribution of 
petroleum products in the country, besides the southern outlets; and  
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3. The establishment of Petroleum Equalization Fund (PEF) 
Management Board, to ensure the administration of uniform prices for 
petroleum products throughout the country. 
The establishment of these organisations ensured the restorations of 
regular supply and distribution of petroleum products at uniform prices in 
the downstream sector of the oil industry in the country.  
2.6.3 Development in the Downstream Sector (1980 – 1997) 
 This period was characterised by a gradual decline in 
infrastructural investment in the downstream sector, a sharp increase in 
national demand for petroleum products for local consumption and 
expansive projects, under funding of refineries. This lead to frequent 
breakdowns and scarcity of products, fuel importation to meet the short 
fall in local supply of petroleum products, domestic price inflation and the 
depreciation of the exchange rate of naira to foreign currency (U.S. 
Dollar). And due to the introduction of Structural Adjustment Program 
(SAP) in 1986 adversely affecting the financial resource-base of the NNPC 
which engaged in the massive importation of petroleum products to meet 
the short fall in supplies from the domestic refineries, this resulted in 
sharp practices in the sale of petroleum products and made fuel subsidy 
very expensive (FGN 2005). 
2.6.4 Deregulation Policy-implementation (1998-2012) 
 In 1998 the then Military administration formed another inter-
ministerial committee to examine the problems of the downstream sector 
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with a view to; appraise all the ramifications of the deregulation of 
petroleum products supply and distribution, producing a blue print on the 
modalities for the deregulation program and making suggestions on 
measures including palliative measures to assuage the likely negative 
socio-economic effects of the deregulation exercise. 
 The committee completed its work and came out with the 
following recommendations: 
1. The use of import parity principles in the pricing of petroleum 
products for local consumption; 
2. The inclusion of adequate margins in the determination of 
domestic prices of petroleum products, for investors in the downstream 
sector, to enable them to recover cost.  
 These two recommendations among others were to encourage 
new entrants in the downstream sector to import petroleum products 
directly, to augment the domestic supply, which hitherto was only 
undertaken by NNPC (Oluloye, 2006). 
 On the 14th August, 2000 the Federal Government of Nigeria set 
up a 34 member Special Committee on the Review of Petroleum Products 
Supply and Distribution (SCRPPSD) drawn from various stake holders and 
interest groups to look into the problems of the downstream petroleum 
sector (PPPRA, 2004). According to this source, prior to the setting up of 
the committee, the downstream oil sector was characterized by scarcity 
of petroleum products leading to long queues at the service stations, low 
capacity utilization and refining activities at the nation’s refineries, 
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rampant fire accident as a result of mishandling of products, products 
adulteration, pipelines vandalism, large scale smuggling due to 
unfavorable products boarders’ price with the neighboring countries and 
low investment opportunities in the sector (Oluloye, 2006). The 
committee submitted its report in October 2000 with some far-reaching 
recommendations among which are: the privatization of the four 
government refineries and encouragement for the establishment of 
private refineries. The Government should deregulate and liberalize the 
import of petroleum products by other parties and that the prices of 
products should be based on import parity to enhance and encourage the 
participation of other players other than the NNPC, An establishment of a 
pipeline management authority for the management of pipelines and 
depots, which will charge both private and public users a tariff per 
throughput litre of product and the establishment of Petroleum Products 
Pricing and Regulatory Agency (PPPRA) to be embodied with the 
responsibilities of liberalization of the downstream sector of petroleum 
industry (Oluloye, 2006) . 
 The bill for the establishment of PPPRA was accented to by the 
President in May of 2003. Sote (2006), noted that with the establishment 
of PPPRA the mindset of the government is that it has phased out and 
ended fuel subsidy, moved to market based pricing, opened/liberalised 
downstream petroleum markets in a manner which encourages private 
sector investment and established a level playing ground for competition 
by industry participants for market and profits, reforms and strengthen 
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sector regulations in order to advance public interest and encourage 
competition in non-discriminatory basis, limit government involvement in 
the sector to policy formulation and fiscal matters; leaving commercial 
and investment activities to the downstream operators and regulating 
matters to PPPRA. Furthermore, government will also restructure or 
privatize NNPC subsidiaries in a manner that they will not hold and 
dominate market positions in a post-reform era to impede investment 
and competition.   
2.7 DEREGULATION IN PERSPECTIVE  
 This section will dwell on the controversial issue of fuel subsidy 
withdrawal and the deregulation of the downstream sector of the 
Nigerian petroleum industry. Its design and implementation have invited 
labour strikes, which led to losses of several man-hours and growth 
opportunities in the economy. What then are the arguments involved? 
Nwachukwu and Chike (2011) attempted to find out whether or not 
government subsidy exists in the downstream oil sector in Nigeria. 
According to them the opponents of the removal of oil subsidy argue that 
the existence of fuel subsidy is a fallacy. On the other hand the 
proponents opinioned that the existence of fuel subsidy is a fact. Multiple 
linear regression was used to test their hypothesis and the result 
suggests that there is a significant relationship between the fuel demand 
and fuel subsidy and therefore concludes that there is empirical evidence 
that fuel subsidy is a fact and not a fallacy.  
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 Deregulation, as a concept, seeks freer interplay of economic 
agents that enables market forces to dictate prices. Whenever market 
prices are at unacceptable levels, stakeholders (perhaps the most 
responsible of them all) can only intervene through the market variables 
of demand and supply, and not administratively. This is also the official 
position of the federal government of Nigeria. According to a paper 
issued by the office of the Chief Economic Adviser to the President in 
collaboration with the NNPC and the Budget Office of the Federation 
(2012), between 2006 and 2011, total government expenditure on fuel 
subsidy amounted to 3.7 trillion Naira. Expenditure on subsidies increased 
from N261, Billion Naira in 2006 to N673, Billion Naira in 2010, which 
represent an increase of about 160%. Additionally, there have been 
unprecedented payments in 2011 that as at August, 2011 amounted to 
1.4, Trillion Naira. The paper continues to justify government stand by 
explaining that the government does not have any budget line for the 
subsidy. Even though estimates are made annually for it, the fact is that, 
the amount spent on subsidy is highly unpredictable, as some of the 
underlying factors are highly volatile like international price of crude oil, 
exchange rate, volume consumed etc. Deregulation is thus expected to 
remove these burdens on government and also remove bottlenecks in 
product distribution and lead to more efficient utilization of resources. 
Based on the above discussion the research question to be raised here is:  
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RQ: 2.1. To what extent will the regulation policy reversal and 
subsequently the introduction of deregulation through subsidy removal 
affect the economic growth of Nigeria? 
    At the heart of the deregulation of the downstream sub-sector is 
the controversy over appropriate pricing of petroleum products in Nigeria. 
The extremes have been whether the prices should reflect their full cost 
or contain subsidies, especially against obvious abuses and sharp 
practices in product sourcing and distribution. 
 Conceptually, the pricing of petroleum products can be done in the 
following ways: 
1. Market-Based Approach; which prices are determined by the 
forces of demand and supply, within the constraints of existing market 
imperfections. It dwells on the principle of opportunity cost, so as to 
eliminate arbitrage opportunities. 
2. Exhaustible Resource Theory; which originated from the 
intellectual work of Hotelling (1931). It recognizes that oil and other 
exhaustible resources are only temporarily available, and as such its price 
should be treated as user cost or depletion charge, which compensates 
future generations for a denial of access to the product. 
3. Capital Replacement Approach (CRA); is based on the principle of 
cost recovery, covering production and refining cost. At the minimum, the 
price is expected to be consistent with the cost of replacing capital in the 
production process.  
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 According to PPPRA (2004), Nigeria at present uses the market-
based approach on the principle of import parity which meant increases 
in the prices of refined products along with the rise in world crude prices. 
But the above statement by PPPRA remains just a mere assertion 
because notwithstanding the deregulation, as at 2012 the federal 
government of Nigeria was and is still paying subsidy on both locally 
refined and imported petroleum products in the country. Business Day, 
(2012b) reported that NNPC owed $7 billion on subsidy. Even, on the 1st 
January 2012 the federal government of Nigeria made an attempt to 
completely withdraw the subsidy and make domestic oil price to reflect 
international market price, but the policy met steep opposition from 
organized labour under the auspices of Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) 
and Trade Union Congress (TUC) and other Civil society organizations on 
the ground that total subsidy withdrawal will bring inflation into the 
economy which will erode the real income of wage earners and increases 
the cost of production, which could force producers to cut down 
production and therefore, lead to the loss of jobs, thereby worsening the 
unemployment problem in the country. The industrial action embarked 
upon by the above mentioned unions forced the government to revert to 
subsidy payment. At this juncture the research questions to ask are:  
RQ: 2.2 Will subsidy removals due to deregulation bring about 
inflation into the economy? 
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RQ: 2.3. Will subsidy removal due to deregulation bring an increase 
in the price of petroleum products and affect the minimum wage? 
RQ: 2.4. Will subsidy removal via deregulation increase the prices of 
petroleum products and thereby increase the cost of production and bring 
about unemployment? 
2.7.1 How the subsidy is financed:  
 Asekunowo (2012) provides a complete picture of the operations 
of Nigeria’s downstream sector subsidy scheme. According to him NNPC 
and independent marketers import petroleum products into the country 
because as noted above the local demand for petroleum products is by 
far higher than the combined production of the four domestic refineries. 
While the combined daily production of the four refineries at full capacity 
is to refine 445,000 barrels, the daily demand as at 2011 was 30 million 
litres (Muhammad, 2011). Asekunowo (2012) further explained that 
independent marketers account for 67 percent of total imported volumes. 
The marketers import refined petroleum products into Nigeria from 
North-west Europe, which is the reference spot market on the basis of 
transaction cost, insurance and freight cargoes for diesel (AGO) and 
kerosene (DPK) and on free-on-board barges basis for petroleum (PMS). 
 Under this subsidy scheme there is a dedicated fund kept with the 
Central Bank of Nigeria called Petroleum Support Fund (PSF) which as 
mentioned earlier, was established to ensure uniform pump prices 
throughout the country. In order to participate in these scheme importers 
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must register with PPPRA. A registered company must give notification to 
import. Approval to import must be given by PPPRA based on the 
country’s need of that product at that particular time and other 
requirements in the criteria list of the PPPRA. The imported product 
discharged must be witnessed and confirmed by PPPRA staff, staff of the 
Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR), the independent surveyors 
and the Nigerian Navy at the jetties. The importers’ documents are 
verified and processed by the PPPRA and the DPR. The PPPRA 
determines the payments due to the importers and submit the verified 
documents and subsidy claims to the Federal Ministry of Finance and the 
documents are audited internally. 
 The Federal Ministry of Finance process and approves the audited 
subsidy claims and issue the authority to incur expenditure or a mandate 
to the accountant general of the federation. The accountant general of 
the federation issues the payment mandate to the central bank which as 
mentioned above is the custodian of the fund. The central bank credits 
the petroleum support fund with the amount of the subsidy claims. The 
PPPRA issues cheques to the importers on the basis of the auditor’s 
report as accepted by the federal ministry of finance.  
2.7.2 Problems of Subsidy Financing 
2.7.2.1 False claims 
 Notwithstanding the above elaborate and stringent ways of making 
subsidy claims, some of the oil marketing and trading companies and 
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other independent marketers have evolved ways through which they 
claim subsidy money without importing a single litre of petroleum product 
into the country. Ailemen (2012) reported the indictment of 21 oil 
marketing and trading companies in Nigeria by the presidential 
committee on verification and reconciliation of fuel subsidy payments for 
collecting 382 billion naira which is over $2.5 billion as subsidy claim 
under false pretense. In a separate report BUSINESSDAY (2012a) shows 
that the Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) has on July 
19, 2012 arraigned seven oil marketers and twelve oil marketing and 
trading companies for alleged complicity in the fuel subsidy fraud. The 
accused were facing charges bordering on conspiracy, obtaining money 
under false pretense forgery and use of false documents.    
2.7.2.2 Leakages 
 As mentioned earlier in the literature, the downstream sector of 
Nigeria’s oil industry is characterised by the problems of smuggling, 
pipelines vandalism, and hoarding. All these activities constitute leakages 
in the domestic oil market. Asekunowo (2012), captured these sharp 
practices and shows a graphical illustration of the interplay between 
petroleum products subsidy and leakages and its implication on products 
availability in domestic market and subsidy sustainability. 
 In the graph below, the Nigerian petroleum products demand and 
supply were assumed to be at equilibrium at point c where the demand 
curve of petroleum products meet the supply curve at price OPm and 
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quantity OQm. When the price was subsidised to OPs suppliers were 
willing to supply only OQss quantity of the product at point a while the 
consumers were willing to consume OQds quantity of the product at point 
b a supply and demand gap will therefore exist. But because the Nigerian 
government pays what Asekunowo (2012) called explicit subsidy on per 
unit price of OPm – OPs the gap will not exist and the market will continue 
to operate at point c where the slope of price OPm intercept that of 
quantity OQm. Therefore, quantity OQm of the products will continue to be 
supplied in the market. 
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Figure 2.1 A graphical illustration of petroleum products' subsidy 
and leakages 
Source: OPEC Energy Review September 2012  
 However, according to Adenikinju (2000) petroleum products 
prices are cheaper in Nigeria compared to its other neighboring countries; 
this has made smuggling of petroleum products to other neighboring 
countries highly profitable. So as economic saboteurs procure and 
smuggle large quantities of these products to the neighboring countries 
(Asekunowo, 2012) this shifts the supply curve of the petroleum products 
in Nigeria inward from S to Sˈ which represent a decrease in supply. 
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Meanwhile the market price will rise from OPm to OPp, while only quantity 
OQp will be available for Nigerians to consume at point d, which means 
the government is now paying an implicit subsidy between OPm to OPp. 
 It is noteworthy to observe that since OQm is greater than OQp 
then the activities of smugglers and those engaged in product hoarding 
causes insufficient supply in the domestic market hence, long queues of 
vehicles has become a recurring phenomenon in the petrol stations in 
Nigeria which gives rise to black marketeering where the products are 
sold at much higher prices than the government subsidized ones. Table 
2.1 below depict the various official prices of petroleum in Nigeria from 
1966 – 2012.  
Table 2-1: Fuel Prices In Nigeria from 1966-2012 
S/N  Date Price Per Litre Regime % Increase 
1.  January 
1966 
84/5 Kobo Aguiyi Ironsi - 
2.  To 
September 
1978 
 Gowon - 
3.   Murtala 
/Obasanjo 
- 
4.  October 1, 
1978 
151/3 Kobo Shagari 73.9% 
5.  April 20, 
1982 
20 Kobo Babangida 31.0% 
6.  March 31, 
1986 
391/2 Kobo Babangida 97.5% 
7.  April 10, 
1988 
42 Kobo Babangida 6.0% 
8.  January 1, 
1989 
42 Kobo 
Comm & 
Babangida 43.0% 
  60 Kobo 
Private 
9.  Decem. 17, 60 Kobo For Babangida 16.6% 
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1989 All 
10.  March 6, 
1991 
70 Kobo Shonekan 614.0% 
11.  Nov. 8, 1993 N5.00 Abacha 361.5% 
12.  Nov. 22, 
1993 
N3.25 Abacha  
13.  Oct. 2, 1993 N11.00 Abacha  
14.  Oct. 4, 1994 N15.00 Abdulsalami 127.0% 
15.  Dec. 20, 
1998 
N25.00 Abdulsalami  
16.  January 6, 
1999 
N20.00 Abdulsalami 50.0% 
17.  June 1, 2000 N30.00 Obasanjo  
18.  June 8, 2000 N25.00 Obasanjo  
19.  June 13, 
2000 
N22.00 Obasanjo  
20.  January 1, 
2002 
N26.00 Obasanjo  
21.  June 20, 
2003 
N40.00 Obasanjo 53.0% 
22.  July 9, 2003 N34.00 Obasanjo  
23.  Oct. 1, 2003 N38.50 & N42 Obasanjo  
24.  May 29, 
2004 
N49.50 Obasanjo  
25.  January 
2005 
N50.50 Obasanjo  
26.  August 2005 N65.00 Obasanjo 28.71% 
27.  March 2009 N75.00 Obasanjo  
28.  June 2009  N65.00 Yar’Adua  
29.  Jan. 2012  N141/97 Goodluck 117/49.23% 
Sources: Daily Trust, Monday, January 2, 2012, Vol. 28, No. 56, (page 1) 
and Also Daily Trust, Monday, January 16, 2012, Vol. 28, No. 66, (page 
1).  
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2.8 CONCLUSION 
 From the literature reviewed in the above sections it was clear that 
prior to 1973 the Nigerian oil sector was operating on a free market basis 
where major oil marketers were the major players in the downstream oil 
sector. They made capital investments in the construction of jetties, 
depots, acquisition of rail tankers, wagons, and a network of retail outlets 
throughout the country. But in 1973 fuel subsidy was introduced and that 
marked the beginning of regulation period. It was also established from 
the literature that with the introduction of fuel subsidy and an 
Indigenisation and Nationalisation policy, the federal government 
acquired controlling shares in major oil companies. In 1977 the Nigerian 
National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) was established which became a 
major player in the Nigerian oil sector. In fact NNPC is the owner of all oil 
pipelines, the depots and the domestic petroleum refineries in Nigeria 
and is the major importer and sole distributor of refined petroleum 
products in the country. Indeed despite the entire government clamor 
about deregulation there is not a single privately owned petroleum 
refinery in Nigeria today.  
 It was also established in the literature that petroleum products 
shortages and long queues of vehicles at the petroleum stations were 
first observed from the period 1973 when the subsidy regime started. 
The year 1973 and those that followed were also characterised by the 
gradual decline in infrastructural investment, sharp increase in the 
domestic consumption of petroleum products, under funding and 
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frequent break down of refineries, importation of refined petroleum 
products to meet the short fall in domestic supply, product scarcity due 
to the activities of hoarding, smuggling, pipeline vandalism, black 
marketeering and false claims. The combination of the above factors has 
turned the subsidy fund known as Petroleum Support Fund (PSF) into a 
bottomless pit through which government money is being siphoned which 
gives the government serious concern and hence the decision to 
deregulate the sector. Going by the issues rose in this chapter and based 
on the research questions raised in it, the hypotheses below were 
developed: 
Hypothesis 1.0: There is no relationship between subsidy withdrawal at 
the downstream oil-sector and the economic growth of Nigeria.  
Hypothesis 1.A: There is a relationship between subsidy withdrawal at the 
downstream oil-sector and the economic growth of Nigeria.  
 
Hypothesis 2.0: There is no relationship between subsidy withdrawal at 
the downstream oil sector and inflation in the Nigerian economy. 
Hypothesis 2.A: There is a relationship between subsidy withdrawal at the 
downstream oil sector and inflation in the Nigerian economy. 
 
Hypothesis 3.0: There is no significant relationship between an increase in 
petroleum prices and unemployment rate in Nigeria. 
Hypothesis 3.A:  There is significant relationship between an increase in 
domestic petroleum prices and unemployment rate in Nigeria. 
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Hypothesis 4.0:  There is no relationship between a subsidy withdrawal at 
the downstream oil sector and minimum wage in the Nigerian economy. 
Hypothesis 4.A:  There is a relationship between subsidy withdrawal at 
the downstream oil sector and the minimum wage in the Nigerian 
economy.
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3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 When talking about deregulation of the downstream sector of oil 
industry especially in the context of Nigeria and other net oil exporting 
developing countries, the discussion is normally centered on subsidy 
removal and pricing (Birol et al 1995). As discussed in chapter two, 
deregulation in the Nigerian context involves gradual withdrawal of 
subsidy on petroleum products (table 2.1). However, according to PPPRA 
(2004), deregulation in the downstream oil sector involves total 
withdrawal of government from paying subsidy on importation, refining, 
transportation, storage and pricing. The Government will only assume the 
role of a regulator of the industry.  
 In light of the above, the effect of deregulation within the context 
of this study is limited to subsidy withdrawal and pricing, because in 
Nigeria the focus of this study, is only on these aspects that have so far 
been affected under the deregulation policy, while other remaining 
aspects like importation, transportation and refining are still yet to be 
directly affected.  
3.2 ANALYSES OF MACROECONOMIC THEORIES 
 The issue of the deregulation of downstream oil sector in Nigeria 
can be viewed within the context of five major macroeconomic theories 
these are the Classical, Marxists, Neoclassical, New Classical or Rational 
Expectation and Keynesians.   
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3.2.1 The Classical Economic Theory 
 The classical economic theory was promulgated by the early 
economists, such as Adam Smith (1723-1790) in his book ‘An Enquiry 
into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of the Nations’ (1776); Thomas 
Malthus (1776-1834), in his ‘Essay on the Principle of Population’ (1798); 
David Ricardo (1772-1823) Iron Law of Wages and Jeremy Bentham 
(1748-1832), founder of Utilitarianism.  
 The main theory of classical economics  was microeconomic in 
nature for it dealt with the determination of (relative) prices for and 
quantities of individual goods and services, the determination of relative 
incomes to individual factors of production and the determination of 
relative prices of classes of assets, real and financial. The classics’ 
concentration on the analysis of growth and distribution of income tended 
also to be more general and their discussion integrated philosophy, 
economics and politics recommending laissez-faire, economic freedom 
and “the invisible hand”. 
 Thus before the 1930s, to most economists the market functioned 
quite well and needed no additional policies. The views of the classical 
economists about the economy was first analysed by Adam Smith, who 
was believed to be the foremost classical economist, in his book titled ‘An 
enquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of a nation’; Adam 
Smith recommended a free market economy. That is an economy which 
is free from all sorts of regulations, restrictions and control on the part of 
the government. 
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 According to him all economic activities should be left in the hands 
of private individuals. The decision of what to produce how to produce 
and for whom to produce should be allowed to be made by private 
sectors without the intervention of the government. He pointed out that 
the world is characterised by limited resources, and these limited 
resources can be efficiently and effectively allocated or made use of if 
only they are left in the hands of private individuals. According to him if 
the economy is allowed to function on the basis of free market 
mechanism, with the private sector championing the economic activities, 
there will be competition among them, coupled with the pursuit of their 
self-interest, and the resultant effect is that there will be efficient 
allocation of resources and production of quality goods and services. To 
Smith (ibid) in the presence of a laissez fair economy, each producer will 
seek to protect and promote his self-interest by way of maximizing his 
profit and in the process he protects and promotes the interest of the 
public even without his knowledge - “it is not out of the benevolence of 
the baker that we eat bread…” (Smith 1776). This is the implied position 
of the Nigerian government in introducing the deregulation policy, 
according to the Chief Economic Adviser to the Nigerian President (2012 
p.1): 
 “Deregulation of the downstream oil sector will improve the efficient use 
of scarce economic resources by subjecting decisions in the sector to the 
operations of the forces of demand and supply. This will attract new 
sellers, buyers and investors into the market, thereby increasing 
competition, promoting overall higher productivity, increased product 
availability, improve efficiency in product distribution and, consequently, 
lowering prices over time. The ultimate effect of this chain of activities is 
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increased gains for the people of Nigeria who would be getting the most 
out of their natural resources”.  
 
 According to classical economists no economy is free from 
economic problems, but argued that such problems can be adequately 
taken care of by the “invisible hand” without government intervention. 
The natural force, as it is otherwise called, is capable and powerful 
enough to solve any economic problem without the government 
necessarily having to intervene. This has buttressed our alternate 
hypothesis 1.A raised in chapter two which read thus; there is positive 
relationship between deregulation of downstream oil sector and economic 
growth of Nigeria. 
3.2.2 Marxists Theory  
 The critiques of classical economic theory like Karl Max (1867) 
argued that competition cannot lead to the efficient allocation of 
resources; rather it will lead to the concentration of wealth in the hands 
of the few.  
 According to Marx’s analysis: 
  “Competition gradually leads to the concentration of accumulated 
capital in fewer and fewer hands, since the largest, and therefore the 
most efficient, of the competing groups are bound to absorb and 
eliminate the smaller ones.  The owners of smaller businesses are 
reduced to the status of proletarians. 
 However, while the number of exploited workers swells and 
eventually embraces almost the entire population, and while the degree 
of their poverty increases, so does the intensity of their wrath against 
their oppressors. The proletarian class is organised and disciplined by the 
very mechanism of capitalist production.  The violent intervention by this 
class, together with the growing contradictions inherent in the capitalist 
system, will spell the doom of capitalism.  Private property will be 
abolished by the expropriation of the few remaining super-usurpers by 
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the mass of the working people.  The dictatorship of the proletariat will 
replace capitalist society, together with its super-structure of state, 
culture, and ethics”. (Marx, in Gate Way Edition 1961 p.3). 
  
The above doctrine could be the implied position or may represent the 
view of the Nigerian Labour Congress and other trade unions and civil 
society organisations in Nigeria who were on the streets in January 2012 
protesting against the deregulation of the downstream sector of the 
Nigerian oil industry.  
 The classical economists’ view was however, further supported by 
some other related theories such as; the neoclassical economic theory 
and the new classical or the rational expectation theory. These theories 
are further analysed below: 
3.2.3 Neoclassical Economic Theory 
 Neoclassical economists like their classical counterparts are all pre 
Keynesians; they include economists such as Alfred Marshall (Principle of 
Economics 1890); AC Pigou (The Economics of Welfare 1924); Fredric 
Von Hayek (Individual and Economic Order 1948) and Dennis Robertson 
(1926). They generally favoured laissez-fair or minimal state intervention 
in the economy. They also demonstrate how supply and demand work to 
set prices, and how prices work to direct and control the economic 
system. Today most monetarists share neoclassical ideas. 
 However, neoclassical economics is associated with the marginality 
revolution of the mid-19th century and in the UK it was developed in the 
works of Jevons (1879); Marshall (1890) and Pigou (1924) which provide 
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the main theoretical underpinning to the contemporary theory. That is 
neoclassical economics grew out of the marginality (marginal utility 
theory) school of the latter part of the 19th century which developed 
economic theory on the basis of maximizing behavior. Such ideas 
according to Katzner (1988) were elaborated by Marshall (1890), Walras 
(1896) and others. This provides the theoretical underpinning to modern 
economic theory. The main policy conclusion of these theorists is that 
government intervention to regulate the economy was unnecessary and 
brought about distortions.  
 Since the mid-1950s there has been a resurgence of neoclassical 
economics, Friedman and Schwartz (1982). The monetarists emphasize 
the importance of money in explaining macroeconomic behaviour.     
 It should also be noted that the debate between Keynesians and 
neoclassical (monetarists) has evolved a common analytical framework 
for macroeconomic analysis which is called the Keynesian – Neoclassical 
synthesis or simply the “Neoclassical Synthesis”. Such neoclassical 
synthesis incorporates three elements which are: the Keynesian theory of 
aggregate demand; the basic model theory of aggregate supply and a 
theory of the adjustment of prices in a situation in which aggregate 
demand does not equal aggregate supply. Going by this theory therefore, 
the onus is on the Central Bank of Nigeria to evolve monetary policies on 
head line inflation to mitigate the possible inflationary effect of oil price 
subsidy withdrawal. This can be achieved through what Lescaroux and 
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Mignon (2008 p. 347) calls “inflation targets rather than only output 
targets”.  
3.2.4 New Classical / Rational Expectations 
 The new classical economists (NCE) tries to rebuild 
macroeconomic on micro foundations while maintaining the axiom that 
price adjust very quickly to clear markets. On the other hand, the crucial 
assumption of rational expectations hypothesis (REH) is that economic 
agents act rationally when they formed their expectations of the future, 
they do not waste information, but behave in the most efficient and 
economical manner that they can. They hold the view that individuals 
acquired, process and act on relevant economic information for their own 
enlightened self-interest.    
 The theory was originally introduced formally by Muth (1961) but 
today the leading protagonist of Rational Expectation Hypothesis is 
Robert Lucas (in Lucas Jr. and Robert E. ‘On the mechanics of economic 
development’ 1988).  
 The advocates of Rational Expectation Hypothesis, opined that any 
government stabilization policy which the government might decide to 
undertake and which the economic units like consumers, businesses and 
financial institutions might have “rationally expected” the government to 
undertake, would be doomed to failure.  
 Thus, the basic idea of Rational Expectation Hypothesis is that 
when economic decision makers expect the government to initiate a 
certain economic stabilization policy, then these decision makers will not 
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only take actions that will protect their businesses but they will also take 
decisions that will maximize their own gain in the light of the “rationally 
expected” effect of the government policy. As they do this, they will make 
it impossible for the government’s stabilization policy to work. This theory 
could have explained the behaviour of oil importers and marketers in the 
downstream sector of the Nigerian oil industry. Whenever the 
government announced its intention to withdraw subsidy on petroleum 
products, the marketers as ‘rational thinkers’ will use the information to 
their own advantage and hoard the available products at their disposal 
and refuse to sell so as to take advantage of the newly increased prices 
and make huge profits after subsidy withdrawal. This creates product 
shortages, long queues in the service stations and higher product prices. 
However, there are scholars who faulted the doctrine that individuals 
behave rationally in their economic decisions. Leff (1974 cited in Ellickson 
1989 p. 44) shows the short comings of the rational-actor theory of 
human behaviour which the rational expectations school of economic 
thought employs. According to him the new classical economists' model; 
 “In its purest form, is based on elegantly simple propositions about both 
cognitive capacities and motivations. The model assumes that a person 
can perfectly process available information about alternative courses of 
action, and can rank possible outcomes in order of expected utility. The 
model also assumes that an actor will choose the course of action that 
will maximize his personal expected utility, which may, of course, reflect 
a concern for the welfare of others. Leff further asserted, that the 
assumption of rationality exaggerates actual human cognitive capacities, 
and that, because a person's received utility is unobservable, the 
assumption of rational utility-maximization is strictly no falsifiable. A 
richer model for positive analysis, argued Leff, would look to psychology 
to develop a more realistic view of cognitive processes, and also look to 
sociology to obtain a more accurate picture of social influences on human 
behavior”. 
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3.2.5 Keynesian Economic Theory 
 The great depression occurred between 1929 and 1933 but the 
classical economists at the time had neither a well-developed theory that 
would explain the persistent unemployment nor any policy prescriptions 
to solve the problem (Temin, 1994). 
 However, in 1936, John Maynard Keynes published his book The 
General Theory of Employment Interest and Money. His theory explained 
what had happened, what could have been done to prevent the 
depression, and what could be done to prevent future depressions. His 
explanation soon became accepted by most macroeconomists, in the 
process described as “Keynesian revolution”. The essence of the 
Keynesian explanation of the great depression is based on the simple 
aggregate demand model hence the alternative name “demand-side 
economics”. 
 Keynes shows that there was insufficient aggregate demand as 
well as the fact that an active stabilization policy was needed to maintain 
good economic performance. Consequently fiscal policy was given 
emphasis as the cure of insufficient aggregate demand. 
 To Keynes, the private enterprise economy using intangible money 
needs to be stabilized, can be stabilized and therefore should be 
stabilized by appropriate monetary and especially fiscal policies. Thus, 
Keynesians advocate detailed intervention to “fine tune” the economy in 
the neighborhood of full employment and low inflation. Keynesians seek 
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to use discretion in seeking to stimulate the economy in a depression and 
holding it back in a boom, modifying their policy in the light of current 
and best available forecasted immediate future events. To them, policy 
changes are best not to be pre-announced, so as to prevent speculations. 
Some of the key Keynesian economists include Franco Modigliani (1954) 
and James Tobin (1969), thus, Keynesian economics which had its 
heydays in the 1940s, advocates the necessity of government 
management of the economy by the use of fiscal policy to achieve full 
employment, price stability and growth. It tended to ignore the influence 
of money in explaining the behavior of macro variables.    
 From the analysis made so far on the above theories we can 
understand that Keynesian economic theory can be seen to present a 
moderate view away from the extreme classical view of total government 
withdrawal on one hand and their Marxists critiques who advocate the 
total dismantling of capitalism on the other hand. Keynes advocated a 
mixture of free market economy as well as state intervention where 
necessary. Therefore, from the above discussion it can be suggested that 
Keynesian theory could provide a better approach to understanding and 
solving the problem of subsidy withdrawal debate in Nigeria. The 
research question to be raised here is: 
RQ: 3.1. Which economic theory will best suit Nigerian economy in 
relation to the deregulation of the downstream oil sector?   
For a better understanding of the above theories it is pertinent to explain 
different types of economic systems which are products of these theories.  
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3.3 ANALYSES OF SOME ECONOMIC SYSTEMS 
 In this section, the focus is on the following economic systems: 
Free market (Capitalist) economy, Command (Socialist) economy and 
Mixed economy. It is the view of the researcher that the most 
fundamental issue underlying disagreements among economists, 
government, trade unions and other stakeholders on matters of 
deregulation of the downstream oil sector in Nigeria is that of the proper 
role of government in the economy. Roper and Snowdown (1987) argue 
that what ultimately leads to the choice of economic policy by any 
government may be on political rather than economic grounds. Although 
this choice may be justified by reference to economic theory, but 
undoubtedly, political considerations inspire economic arguments and 
vice versa; the domains of economics and politics overlap.   
 Roper and Snowdown (1987) observe also that economic theories 
provide rationales for government intervention in a market economy by 
identifying a number of areas where market can fail. However, it has also 
been recognized that government too can fail. Thus it therefore becomes 
a question of empirical study as to how much intervention or no 
intervention.   
 The economic systems to be considered in this research work are 
the following: 
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3.3.1 Free Market (Capitalist) Economy 
 It is based on private ownership and control of means of 
production, free choice of occupation and consumer sovereignty (free 
taste and choice). The ideology is that of accumulation of wealth and 
income. Income distribution, as observed by Scott (1979), becomes the 
function of market. That means market determines the returns of the 
factors of production. Lipsey and Chrystal (2004) argue that free market 
works in the framework of circular flow of income and voluntary 
exchange of savings for lending and investment firms. It could be said 
therefore that the use of market systems leads to efficient allocation of 
resources and efficient distribution of goods and services. 
 Roper and Snowdown (1987) have also observed that there is an 
element of price mechanism in a free market economy and this price 
system allows each individual to possess what they need and the rate 
those things are needed in relation to their income, tastes and 
preferences. They further opined that decision making on what to 
purchase by consumers and what to produce by producers have direct 
bearing with price. Therefore, price mechanism, forces of demand and 
supply and cost relationship determines what is produced and consumed. 
In other words, they are relied on the market system (price and profit). 
Under this economic system the buyers aimed at maximizing their welfare 
and or utility with the least expenditure. Producers on the other hand 
attempt to combine input that minimizes cost and maximizes output in 
order to make maximum profit (Koutsoyiannis, 1979).   
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   According to Koutsoyiannis, (ibid), the market systems aimed at a 
series of price relation that tend to lead to a state of equilibrium at full 
employment. Roper and Snowdown (1987) have identified reasons why 
free market is desirable. They believe that government lacks the 
knowledge and information to allocate resources efficiently. They see 
government as using arbitrary power rather than incentives in its effort to 
allocate resources without market forces.   
 Those who support the deregulation of the downstream sector of 
the oil industry in Nigeria are more inclined to this type of economic 
system where Hayatudeen (2012) opines that price deregulation in the 
downstream oil sector in Nigeria is inevitable if the sector must continue 
to survive and develop. Adams (2012) also support the price deregulation 
where he argues that deregulated product prices will eliminate distortions 
in the market by promoting free competition on a level playing field. 
Other supporters of oil price deregulation in line with capitalist (free 
market) economic system in Nigeria are Braide (2012) and PPPRA (2004). 
They hold the belief that with price deregulation in the downstream oil 
sector the present system of a having uniform pump price throughout the 
country will give way to multiple competitive prices and the government 
will no longer be expected to set the price for petroleum products at the 
downstream sector of the oil industry nor will it be expected to pay any 
subsidy either on imported or domestically refined products.  
 But the problems identified with price deregulation in Nigeria are 
many and may not be solved by just applying the doctrine of free market 
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capitalist economy. The belief of trade unions, civil society organisations 
and human right activists in Nigeria are that the profound supply 
problems occasioned by abysmal neglect of domestic refineries 
contributes more to the problem of downstream oil sector than price 
deregulation. Thus they opined that if refineries are not effectively 
repaired and the supply problem continues, the result will be exorbitant 
import parity prices for products while refineries are idle and wasting. 
They argue further that price deregulation without local supply will only 
further encourage import and virtually seal all hopes of ever reviving the 
domestic refineries and gainfully utilizing the vast human and material 
assets therein. It will also seal the hope of building new refineries which 
could worsen the unemployment problem in the country (Ejikkegu 2004). 
According to him (ibid) what is called deregulation in Nigeria is not 
deregulation but rather an imperfect market, which is tantamount to 
Nigeria’s reaction to the management of imported inflation. He says true 
deregulation will come when Nigeria refine its crude oil with its own 
labour and equipment, and sell to the downstream sector on the basis of 
the internal dynamics of the market.  
3.3.2 Central Planning (Command) Economy 
 Marx in Jhingan (1978) observes that free market system has led 
to growth of monopolistic and oligopolistic tendencies in the economy 
thereby exploiting the people. This is what he sees as the factor that will 
lead to class struggle between the labour and the capitalists. He further 
stressed that this class struggle will eventually lead to the collapse and 
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end of capitalism. Thus, Marx predicted the evolution of socialist 
economic system.   
 Socialist economic system involves central planning; under this 
system there is a deliberate control and direction of the economy by 
central authority. The economic question, of what to produce, how to 
produce, and for whom to produce, is decided centrally by government. 
The central planning or command economic system is characterised by 
public ownership and control of the means of production, collective 
determination of economic decision and the allocation of resources by 
command issued by the planning elite (Jhingan 1978). As mentioned 
earlier the socialist theory and central planning economic system could be 
the preferred theory and economic system to follow as far as the 
organized labour unions in Nigeria are concerned.   
 Ropers and Snowdown (1987) presents Smith’s argument, which 
prescribes an “austere economic role for the state”. Smith believes that 
the state has three essential duties to perform: the state needed to 
protect the society first from external aggression, secondly from internal 
strife and thirdly, to maintain certain public institutions and public works 
which facilitates the commerce and enhance the welfare of the society. 
Smith himself was of the opinion that the afore mentioned duties of the 
state were related to a particular stage of development that the society 
had reached and he was pragmatic enough to realize that he was not 
attempting to establish a principle that will be applicable to all societies at 
all times. 
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 From the above therefore, it shows that the extent of state 
intervention as argued by what Smith called the austere economic role 
for the state is a relative term which varies from one country to another 
and also varies according to the country’s level of development. It is 
important to deduce from the Smith argument, therefore, that the state 
is allowed to intervene, however the degree of state intervention in the 
economy may be different from country to country and also depend on 
the level of the development of the country in question. Thus, 
intervention of Nigerian government in the economy during the 
regulation period in the downstream oil sector can still be considered as 
part of government responsibility to maintain public institutions in order 
to project the economy towards growth and subsequent development. 
Bearing in mind, that there was low domestic savings in the country and 
foreign direct investment (FDI) was not forth coming. So there was a 
strong need to support the domestic industries to achieve the 
governmental goal of industrialising the country. Therefore, it became an 
imperative policy then, to embark on central planning in downstream oil 
sector through ministry of petroleum resources in conjunction with 
Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC).     
 However, opinions differed on factors that led to the decision to 
deregulate the downstream oil sector. Some argue that the inherent 
failure of government to properly allocate resources with no market has 
led to the call for free market (Gowland and Paterson, 1993). Some 
argued that the bureaucratic bottleneck of communication, which favours 
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no horizontal communication but rather vertical communication between 
economic units and planning agency has accounted for why free market 
has become necessary. This it was argued leads to delay in decision 
making. That is the implied position of classical economists like Smith. 
While some others are of the opinion that corruption and lack of 
transparency are the reasons why government insist on deregulating the 
downstream sector of the Nigerian oil industry (BusinessDay, 2012). 
3.3.3 Mixed Economy 
 Although the term Mixed Economy did not get prominence until 
late 1940s after the Second World War the term and some policies that 
were later associated with it had been advocated from at least the 1930s. 
But the term got prominence in the 1950s which arose in the context of 
political debate in the United Kingdom in the postwar period. Advocates 
of the mixed economy, include R. H. Tawney, (1961), Anthony Crosland, 
(1974), Andrew Shonfield (1959), and Harold Macmillan (see H Macmillan 
1969, 1971, 1972, 1994 and 2007). The critics of mixed economy are of 
the view that it is a move towards socialism and increasing the influence 
of the state, these include Ludwig von Mises (see Mises 1949 and 1960) 
and Friedrich von Hayek, (see von Hayek 1938 and 1947).  
 There is no single definition for the term mixed economy; however 
the available definitions always shows an interaction of private economic 
freedom mixed with a degree of government regulation of markets. The 
relative strength or weakness of each component in the national 
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economy can vary greatly between countries. Some countries have a 
strong private sector with minimum government regulation while some 
have strong government regulation and a weak private sector.  
  A mixed economy contains the features of both capitalist and 
socialist economy. Under this system there is both private and public 
ownership and control of means of production. Therefore, both 
government sector and private sector interact together to solve the 
economic question of what to produce, how to produce and for whom to 
produce.   
 The private sector under mixed economy engages into the 
business of buying and selling, transportation, own farms, factories, 
stores, warehouses, provide consultancy services and individuals 
participates in cooperative societies, manage enterprises and hire 
materials and labour services. In fact they participate in all businesses 
that are legitimate by law.  
 While the government uses tax money to intervene in areas such 
as the provision of subsidy in health care services, educational services, 
roads infrastructure, water for both human and animal consumption and 
for irrigation purposes. Other areas are subsidy on electricity, fuel and 
other energy services, agricultural research services and other 
development agencies and provide finances to, and pay benefits to 
unemployed, the aged and infirm. It also takes the responsibility of 
environmental protection, regulation of minimum wage, consumer 
protection, enforcing antitrust laws and the general maintenance of law 
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and order and the security of the country against internal and external 
aggression (Crosland, 1974).  
 From the foregoing, one can understand that a mixed economy is 
free from the two extremes of socialism and capitalism. Just like the 
Keynesian theory, it allows for free enterprise with government 
intervention to fine tune the economy and/or mitigate recession and 
stagnation in the economy. Perhaps this could explain the rationale 
behind the introduction of subsidy in the downstream oil sector of the 
Nigerian economy; to boost consumption at the household level and 
boost production at the firm level by subsidising producers through the 
provision of cheap energy to local industries. Mehlum et al (2006) 
indicates that more natural resources raise income when institutions are 
producer friendly. This is also consistent with the Keynes demand side 
theory which indicates that lower prices of products will make the house 
hold to consume more of it, and consequently rise the aggregate demand 
in the economy which will in turn bring about economic growth and 
development. 
 Having discussed the different theories and economic systems and 
the role they play in understanding the dynamics of and rationale for 
subsidy introduction and withdrawal in Nigeria, it is pertinent at this 
juncture, to analyse the concept of subsidy, types of subsidies and the 
conditions under which subsidies can be introduced or phased-out. 
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3.4 THE CONCEPT OF SUBSIDY  
 Having a generally acceptable definition of subsidies has proven 
difficult within the context of G-20 countries (IEA et al 2010). However, 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) has provided a definition for subsidy 
that has been accepted by all its members. Article one of the agreement 
states that:  
 “A ‘subsidy’ exists when there is a ‘financial contribution’ by a 
government or public body that confers a ‘benefit’.  A ‘financial 
contribution’ arises where (i) a government practice involve a direct 
transfer of funds (example grants, loans and equity infusion), potential 
direct transfers of funds or liabilities (e.g. loan guarantees); (ii) 
government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or not collected 
(e.g. fiscal incentives such as tax credits); (iii) a government provides 
goods or services other than general infrastructure, or purchases goods; 
or (iv) a government entrust or directed a private body to carry out one 
or more of the above functions. A ‘benefit’ is conferred when the 
‘financial contribution’ is provided to the recipient on terms that are more 
favorable than those that the recipient could have obtained from the 
market” (ibid, 2010 p.8).  
 
 A more specific definition of fuel subsidy states that: “any 
government intervention that lowers the price of a fuel below its 
economic opportunity cost may be considered a subsidy” (Bacon and 
Kojima 2006 p.30).  
  
 IEA et al (2010 p. 10) conceptualise subsidy as: 
 “government intervening in markets in such a way as to affect costs or 
prices, by transferring funds to recipients directly, by assuming part of 
their risk, by selectively reducing the taxes they would otherwise have to 
pay, and by undercharging for the use of government-supplied goods or 
assets”.  
 
 Going by the above definitions it is hypothesised that: 
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Hypothesis 5.0:   Deregulation of downstream oil sector through subsidy 
removal will not result into higher prices of petroleum products.  
Hypothesis 5.A:   Deregulation of downstream oil sector through subsidy 
removal will result into higher prices of petroleum products.  
3.5 TAXONOMY OF OIL PRICE SUBSIDIES 
 Bacon and Kojima (2006) have provided different schemes for 
price subsidies framework, they showed that subsidies can be implicit or 
explicit. According to them subsidies are said to be explicit when a sum of 
money is paid to the importers, transporters, refiners, wholesalers and 
retailers by the government. On the other hand the subsidies are implicit 
where possible government revenues are foregone through lower or zero 
taxes and by selling government owned crude oil to domestic market and 
or domestic refineries below international market price. 
 The different subsidies schemes according to Bacon and Kojima 
(ibid) are discussed below: 
3.5.1 Universal Direct Subsidies 
  This can be further sub-divided into two elements. (i) Is the 
situation where all petroleum products are subsidised and this type of 
subsidy places a heavy burden on the economy. (ii) Is the situation 
where a particular type of fuel is subsidised for all consumers without 
restrictions in quantity purchased. 
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3.5.2 Cross-subsidies between Products 
 This is a revenue neutral subsidy where by the price of certain 
products rise by more than cost so that the price of others can fall below 
cost. Under this scheme the government will identify the products that 
are mostly consumed by the higher income segment of the society and 
those that are more intensely consumed by the lower income group and 
a subsidy is placed on the product that is mostly consumed by the lower 
income segment of the society for example, kerosene. Such a subsidy is 
aimed at providing protection to lower income groups through its 
redistribution effect because it leads to redistribution of the burden 
between users of different products.   
 However the cross-subsidies scheme has some drawbacks. The 
fact that it makes the price of some products cheaper in relation to others 
could lead to inter-product substitution and adulteration. For example, if 
the price of kerosene is subsidised significantly below cost, its price will 
be comparatively cheaper than other products such as diesel and 
gasoline, therefore, the tendency is that kerosene could be illegally added 
to these products and make the total demand for kerosene to be higher 
and make the cost of subsidy to the government also very high. 
Furthermore, this could make kerosene scarce for the low income group 
and the subsidy could benefit higher income group more than the low 
income earners thereby defeating the goal of introducing the subsidy in 
the first place.  
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3.5.3 Implicit Subsidisation by Reducing Product Taxation 
  Governments usually tax consumption of products through value 
added tax or sales tax but under implicit subsidisation scenario the taxes 
on petroleum products are reduced which lead to lower product prices, 
thereby subsidising the end users. This is a very common type of subsidy 
scheme and is easy to implement. However, its major disadvantage is 
that it leads to loss of revenue accruable to the government which could 
result to either a cut in government spending or an increase in 
government borrowing both of which negatively affects the economy, 
because a cut in government spending could affect the provision of 
infrastructural facilities and social services like the provision of education 
and health services, while a rise in government borrowing could affect 
future generation who will have to bear the heavy debt burden.         
3.5.4 Cross-Subsidies between Groups of Consumers of the 
Same Product  
 This exists when the cost of petroleum products supply vary by 
region or location within the same country due to internal transportation 
cost arising as a result of proximity or other wise to refining or import 
location. A government may wish to have a uniform pump price policy for 
the whole country whereby all consumers pay the same price irrespective 
of their location, this will result in cross-subsidising remote consumers by 
consumers living nearer to points of refining or import. Financing this 
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type of subsidy requires a stabilization fund to neutralize the 
transportation costs of products across the country. 
 The problems of this type of subsidy lies in the difficulty in 
estimating reasonable transportation costs and ensuring that the 
products are actually delivered to the targeted remote areas and also 
ensuring that the products are sold at the government specified prices. 
3.5.5 Indirect Subsidy on Downstream Petroleum Products 
 Under this arrangement the government subsidises a product that 
have much cost and is used by low income earners, like subsidising bus 
prices through providing diesel subsidies to bus operators. Since bus 
transport is mainly used by the lower-income segment of the society 
selling diesel at lower prices to bus companies will ease transportation 
cost on the low income group in both rural and urban areas.   
3.5.6 Indirect Subsidy on Upstream Petroleum Fuels 
 This involves selling crude oil to domestic refineries at a price 
below the international market price, this is mostly done in oil producing 
countries where crude oil is sold to local refineries at a price below what 
is obtained in the international market thus subsidising the refineries with 
the aim that the reduced price be pass on to the consumers who will 
benefit from the implicit subsidy provided by the government through 
lower domestic crude oil pricing. This shows that the government has 
transferred some of its potential revenue from crude oil prices to 
subsidy’s consumers of petroleum products. For this type of subsidy to 
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succeed however, governments must impose export taxes or export 
restrictions to avoid leakages through cross boarder smuggling which 
could cause product scarcity and black marketeering within the domestic 
market. 
3.5.7 Targeted Subsidy 
 This is a subsidy aimed to provide relief to the lower income 
segments of the society so that they would be able to purchase some 
commodities which are considered essential for human existence. This is 
not a general subsidy because it excludes the high income group in the 
society who has the ability to pay higher prices. For targeted subsidy to 
be effective there should be a reliable data on the number of households 
to be covered by the scheme, a low cost method of reaching the targeted 
group and an effective monitoring system to guard against leakage and 
misallocation. 
3.5.8 Income Subsidy 
 The effect of high oil price on the low income households can be 
countered through income subsidy scheme. The amount of the subsidy 
has direct bearing to the direct and indirect effect of higher oil prices on 
the poor. This type of subsidy avoids the disadvantages associated with 
other subsidy schemes discussed above, like excess consumption due to 
lower product prices, smuggling and inter-product adulteration.    
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3.6 FRAMEWORK FOR CONSIDERING SUBSIDY 
INTRODUCTION 
 Having seen the different types of oil subsidy scheme, it is 
imperative at this juncture to show the framework under which the 
introduction of oil subsidy could be considered. 
 Bacon and Kojima (ibid) have provided three frameworks under 
which oil subsidy can be introduced. According to them countries can be 
classified into three: (i) nations that do not possess refining facilities; and 
these can be further classified into two, oil producing and non-oil 
producing (ii) a non-oil producing country with refining capacity and (iii) 
an oil producing country with refining capacity. 
 Under the first scenario that is a country without refining capacity, 
the domestic oil prices are arrived at by adding the import cost of 
products, wholesalers margin, retailers margin and taxes (this include 
both specific tax and value added tax). This could be expressed as; 
PR = (Pi + M +T) x (1 + )                            (Equation 3.1) 
Where: 
PR = retail price per unit of a product.  
Pi = per unit price of an imported product. 
M = Domestic marketers margin (wholesale, retail, storage and internal 
transport). 
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T = specific tax on one unit of product sold. 
 = tax rate on one unit value of final sale. 
If the government desires to bring down the price at retail level it can 
achieve that in four different ways.     
 Pay a subsidy to importers in order to reduce the effective cost of 
imported product (Pi).  
 Pay a subsidy to wholesalers or retailers in order to reduce the 
internal marketers margin (M).   
 Reduce the specific (T) or value added ( ) tax rates. 
 Reduce the final pump price (PR) by paying a subsidy to retailers. 
Closely related to the above scenario is the case of an oil 
producing country with no refining capacity therefore, it exports all its 
crude oil, so the price received is determined by the international price of 
crude oil less transport cost of exporting the crude to the international 
market (selling point). This can be expressed as: 
 D = W   F     (Equation 3.2) 
 Where:  
 D = per unit price of crude received domestically. 
 W = per unit price of equivalent crude on international markets. 
 F = per unit cost of transporting crude to the world markets.  
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 In the scenario above the export price of crude has no influence 
on the mechanism for introducing a subsidy on domestic petroleum 
products. 
 The second situation is that of a non-oil producing country with 
domestic refining capacity. The countries has a choice of either importing 
refined petroleum product at the international market price or importing 
crude oil at the international market price and make use of its domestic 
refineries to refine it domestically. Whichever can guarantee lower prices 
after middlemen margins and taxes would be the one that will be 
prepared by the consumers. The cost of imported refined products is the 
same as the price of crude oil at international market plus international 
refining costs plus the cost of import freight. This may be expressed as:  
Pi = W + RW + F     (Equation 3.3) 
Where:  
RW = is the international refining cost per unit of product. 
 Under the above scenario three simplifying assumptions were 
made. First, the costs of freight in importing one unit of refined product 
and the equivalent amount of crude, and of exporting crude oil to the 
international market are all assumed to be equal. But in reality the cost of 
transporting refined product is always higher than that of crude. Second 
the cost of domestically refined products to the market and that of 
imported products are also assumed to be equal. Third, it is also assumed 
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that there is only one type of crude oil in the international market and 
there is only one single price of crude oil in the international market. 
 Going by the above assumptions the cost of products refined 
domestically at the refinery gate may be expressed as: 
PD = w + F + RD   (Equation 3.4) 
Where: 
PD = per unit price of a domestically refined product.  
RD = domestic cost of refining on the equivalent unit of crude oil. 
 In a situation where the price per unit of domestically refined 
product (PD) is higher than the import price of product (Pi) the 
government would need to take some measures in order to keep the 
domestic refineries in operation. These measures include; providing a 
subsidy which should be equal to the difference between the two prices, 
restrict the import of refined products or impose an import tax on the 
refined products. If a subsidy is provided, the retail domestic price of 
product reflects the import parity price as in Equation 1. Therefore, 
reducing pump prices could be done through the same mechanisms as 
those of a country that has no refining capability. 
 Finally a scenario with an oil producing country that has refining 
capacity is considered. Under this condition the country could either 
supply its refineries with domestically produced crude oil or import crude 
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from the world market. The cost at the refinery level of products refined 
from imported crude oil could be expressed as: 
PDW = w + F + RD     (Equation 3.5) 
Where: 
PDW = cost of locally refined product acquired from imported crude. 
 On the other hand the cost at factory gate of refined products 
from domestically sourced crude oil may be similarly expressed as below: 
PDD = D + RD      (Equation 3.6) 
Where:  
PDD = cost of locally refined product using domestically sourced crude oil. 
 Given that the price of domestic crude oil should be related to the 
international market price by the export parity equation 3.2, equation 3.6 
may also be expressed as:  
PDD = w  F + RD       (Equation 3.7) 
 At this juncture the consumer choice would be that of the 
minimum of either imported products (equation 3.3) or locally refined 
products using imported crude (equation 3.5) or locally refined product 
using domestically sourced crude (equation 3.7).  
 It is worthy to note that it is difficult to make the cost of refining 
imported crude in domestic refineries lower than the cost of imported 
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refined products. However, refining domestic crude oil locally will be 
advantageous in the sense that the cost of crude produced locally will be 
lower than the cost of imported one by twice the transportation cost. 
Therefore, even if the domestic refining cost is higher than that of the 
international market (RD – RW > 0) the transport cost advantage will 
offset it especially if the following condition is satisfied;  
RD – RW < 2F      (Equation 3.8) 
 Under the above scenario it will be more economical to use 
domestic crude in the domestic refinery, the zero transport cost 
advantage makes domestically refined products using domestic crude to 
be cheaper at refinery gate and that can allow for their price to be raised 
towards the product import parity level. This therefore makes it possible 
for another type of subsidy to be introduced, because prices of products 
do not necessarily have to be increased by import parity therefore the 
margin that could have been captured by domestic refining is transferred 
to consumers. Another option is to sell crude oil to domestic refineries at 
a price below export parity, thus foregoing part of the revenue that could 
have been available to the government if the crude were sold at world 
market. 
 In the next section the literature on deregulation of downstream 
oil sector will be reviewed and the way and manner through which it 
influences some major macroeconomic variables. 
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3.7 DEREGULATION AND MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES 
 The variables considered in this study are GDP, Inflation, 
Employment and Wages. The said variables are chosen because of their 
importance in explaining macroeconomic phenomenon not only on 
Nigerian economy but also on the economies of many other countries in 
the world. These variables have been used by many scholars to measure 
the impact of oil price changes on economic activities for example, 
(Hamilton, 1983, Mork, 1989; Mork and Olson 1994; Lee and Ratti 1995; 
Ferderar, 1996; Papapetrou, 2001).  
 The variables are also chosen for practical economic reasons, 
because they explain both direct and indirect effect of deregulation on 
the economy, for instance, the inflation variable will be measured to 
assess the direct effect of deregulation on changes in the price level in 
the economy whereas other variables like GDP, Wages and Employment 
are considered because of their direct and multiplier effects on the 
economy.  
3.7.1 Deregulation of Oil Market and GDP 
 The relationship between fuel prices and GDP can be deduced via 
the supply-side effect, which indicate that rising oil prices are a pointer to 
the reduced availability of  essential input to production, leading to a 
reduction in prospective output (Barro 1984, Brown and Yucel 1999, 
Brown and Yucel 2002, Abel and Bernanke 2001). Therefore, there is an 
upsurge in production cost and the growth of industrial output and 
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productivity are slowed.  This has further justified the research question 
three raised in chapter two as to whether deregulation of the oil market 
will lead to higher cost of production and therefore affect production and 
by extension GDP negatively.  
 Another empirical study that show the relationship between oil 
prices and GDP was the one conducted by Hamilton (2005) and the 
theoretical link by Brown and Yucel (2002). Generally the findings of 
these studies tend to show that oil price increases have a negative effect 
on output.  
 To buttress the importance of oil price on GDP Maeda (2008 pp.1-
2) asserts thus; “rising oil prices can fuel a slump across a country’s 
domestic economy by raising production costs for companies”. He further 
argues that “the International Energy Agency (IEA) calculated the effect 
of high oil prices on lowering gross domestic product (GDP) using a large 
scale computer simulation and issued a report on its findings (IEA 2004)”. 
According to him the agency computed the rate of the decline of GDP in 
“several major countries by comparing two cases: a base line case 
showing what would happen if oil prices remained at $25 per barrel for 
the five-year period starting in 2004, and a high price case showing what 
would happen if the price rose by $10 to hit $35 per barrel and remain at 
that level. The result showed that in the high price case, GDP would fall 
0.3 percent in the United State, 0.4 per cent in Japan, and 0.4 per cent in 
the euro-zone countries”. However, it is worthy of note that the above 
mentioned countries that were covered by the report are developed 
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industrialised oil importing countries therefore it cannot be concluded that 
the same scenario will be obtained in the net oil exporting developing 
country like Nigeria. Therefore the effect of high oil price on the GDP in 
Nigeria is subject to empirical study.    
3.7.2 Deregulation of Oil Market and Inflation 
  When we consider Consumer Price Index (CPI), which is a proxy 
for inflation it is an indicative that an oil price increase represents an 
inflationary shock (Fuhrer 1995, Gordon 1997, Hooker 2002) that can be 
accompanied by second-round effects, through the inflation wage spiral. 
Other scholars that linked inflation to oil price movements include 
authors, such as Hooker (2002), Barsky and Kilian (2004) and LeBlanc 
and Chinn (2004). While the result of the study conducted by Barsky and 
Kilian (2004) indicated that oil price increase causes high inflation, 
LeBlanc and Chinn (2004) in their analysis suggests that high oil prices 
have only a moderate effect on inflation. It is worthy to note at this 
juncture that while Barsky and Kilian (2004) wrote on the US economy 
LeBlank and Chinn (2004) focus their study on G51 countries. The 
research question to be raised here is: 
RQ: 3.2. What will be the effect of oil price change on inflation within the 
context of Nigerian economy?  
                                            
1 G5 countries are UK, US, Japan, Canada and Euro area. 
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3.7.3 Deregulation of Oil Market and Employment:  
 Effect of high oil prices on consumption, investment and 
unemployment was investigated by (Ferderer 1996), the result of the 
study shows that an increase in the oil price may have a negative effect 
on them all. According to him the effect on consumption can be 
understood via its relationship with disposable income, while the effect on 
investment is felt via raising firms’ cost and increasing uncertainties, 
because a rise in oil prices diminishes the return of sectors that are oil 
intensive and the usual response to such circumstances by firms is 
scaling down or folding up leading to higher rate of unemployment. 
 However, according to scholars like Carruth, et al (1998) who have 
studied the effect of oil price changes on the labour market, and Davis 
and Haltiwanger (2001) who investigated the influence of oil price 
dynamics on the natural rate of unemployment, the effect of oil price 
increase on the labour market can differ according to considered period 
either in short run or long run. Keane and Prasad (1996), in their study 
titled ‘The Employment and Wage Effects of Oil Price Changes: A 
Sectorial Analysis’ uses micro panel data to study the effect of oil price 
changes on employment and real wage in the United States of America 
(USA), their findings shows that increase in oil price negatively affects 
aggregate employment in the short run but increases it in the long run. 
According to them this could possibly be an indication of labour energy 
substitution in the production function and they therefore, concluded that 
oil price increases could lead to high unemployment in the short run, but 
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could generate more employment in the long run. The research question 
here is: 
 RQ: 3.3. What will be the short run and long run effect of deregulation 
on Nigeria’s labour market? 
3.7.4 Deregulation of Oil Market and Wages:  
 Keane and Prasad (ibid) used the data of the National Longitudinal 
Survey of young men with a sample size of 4,439 individuals and 23,927 
persons per year observations based on interviews from 1966 to 1981. 
They find that the effect of an oil price increase on wages show a 
substantial decline in real wages for all workers but raised the relative 
wage of skilled workers. According to them real wages fell by 3% to 4% 
in the long run following an increase in the real price of refined petroleum 
products of 1-standard deviation around trend (19%).  
  Blanchard and Gali (2007) posited that an oil price increase leads 
to high wage and price inflation. Their study also finds that high oil price 
leads to a decrease in employment and output. In their paper titled 
‘imperfect competition and the effects of energy price increases on 
economic activity’ Rotemberg and Gali (1996) find that high oil prices 
reduces real wages. They concluded that real wages fall by nearly one 
percent for each ten percent innovation in oil prices. 
 On the whole as noted by Lescaroux and Mignon (2008), various 
transmission channels exist through which oil prices may affect economic 
activity. This has generated numerous studies since the seminal paper of 
Hamilton (1983) cited in Lescaroux and Mignon (2008), who identified a 
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Granger-causal relationship between oil price changes and variations in 
macroeconomic indicators such as GNP (negative correlation), and the 
unemployment rate (positive correlation) in the United States. In both 
cases, the Granger causality ran from oil prices to macroeconomic 
variables. Burbidge and Harrison (1984) came to the same conclusion but 
using a slightly different approach in the UK.  
3.8 ANALYTICAL REVIEW OF LITERATURE ON OIL MARKET 
DEREGULATION 
3.8.1 Oil Market Deregulation Why and Why Not 
 The literature reviewed covers both side of the divide; on one 
hand there are the authors that write in support of deregulation and 
those that are against it.  
 Most of the writers that support deregulation hinge their 
arguments on improved efficiency in domestic demand by eliminating 
energy wastage, improved supply of fuel by attracting new investors into 
the sector who may want to take advantage of the deregulation policy 
and make profit since increased prices may result in increased 
profitability. Other factors are the increased revenue that will be available 
to governments as a result of saving the money that could have been 
spent on subsidy and the tax that could be imposed on the new 
investors. This is evident in the works of Birol, et al (1995), Chakravorty, 
et al (2000), Akpoghomeh and Badejo (2006) and Bazilian and Onyeji 
(2012). 
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 As mentioned above the proponents of deregulation strongly 
advocate for the privatization of refineries, pipelines, depots and the total 
withdrawal of government from all products refining, importation, 
transportation, storage and pricing. The government should also 
abolished laws that restrict the importation of products and refining to 
some specific companies, which will expose the domestic oil market to 
the prices obtained in the international market (PPPRA, 2004). 
 Proponents of deregulation further shows the advantage of 
exposing domestic oil price to the international market price in the sense 
that it helps minimize energy wastage, increase incentive to conserve 
energy efficiently and remove barriers to the entry of cleaner energy 
services. They also assert that energy subsidies create a distortive price 
signal, in addition, it was argued that selling petroleum products below 
international market prices raises the tendencies for profitable smuggling, 
product hoarding and black marketeering. 
 The efficiency questions between private and state owned 
enterprises has also been advanced as one of the reasons for the need to 
deregulate. In their work Obaidan and Scully (1991) investigates the 
technical (managerial), scale and allocation efficiency difference between 
state owned and private for profit enterprises in the international 
petroleum industry. They posited that economic inefficiency is of three 
types; technical inefficiency, scale inefficiency and price or allocation 
inefficiency. 
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i. Technical inefficiency is a situation where the actual inputs exceed 
the minimum required to produce the scale-efficient output with the cost 
minimizing input ratio. 
ii. Scale inefficiency can also arise when the actual output is less than 
the cost minimizing output. 
iii. Price or allocation inefficiency is a situation where the actual input 
ratio differs from the cost minimizing input ratio.  
 They observed that state-owned enterprises serves many masters 
and pursue multiple goals some of which are completely non-economic 
and sometimes political in nature, they are also controlled by ministries 
and the managers were appointed by political leaders, mostly based on 
political consideration rather than economic and technical expertise 
criterion, they are therefore sometimes influenced by political parties. 
Under this scenario therefore, it is very likely that resources will be 
allocated based on political criteria instead of the economic principle of 
allocation to highest-valued use. 
 They (ibid p. 238) further opined that “government subsidy and 
protection, coupled with the pursuit of noneconomic objectives, may lead 
to resources misallocation. Government employment policies prevail over 
staffing. Protection and subsidy policies may presumably poster a relaxed 
operational environment. These policies may distort the allocation of 
capital and material, and lead to over capitalization and low productivity”.   
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 The authors utilized the concept of frontier production function 
introduced by Farreli (1957) for their empirical measurement of 
efficiency. The study concludes that based on the test for efficiency 
carried out by estimating an Aigner-Chu deterministic frontier function, a 
maximum likelihood stochastic frontier function and a maximum 
likelihood Gamma frontier function to test the relative efficiency of state 
owned and private for profit petroleum enterprises, the result shows that 
the inefficiency of state-owned enterprises compared to private 
enterprises remains robust. The empirical findings reveal that state-
owned oil firms can satisfy the demand for their output with less than 
half of their current resource input compared to their privately owned 
counterparts. The authors conclude thus; “whatever the policy goals are 
that justify state ownership of petroleum sector, the evidence suggests 
that the efficiency losses of pursuing these goals are enormous” (Obaidan 
and Scully, 1991, p. 246).          
 However, notwithstanding the above arguments the opponents of 
deregulation maintained that an oil price increase through subsidy 
withdrawal may have negative effect on major macroeconomic indices 
like consumption, industrial output, investment, inflation, employment 
and wages. According to IEA et al (2010 p. 8), “policy makers usually 
justify energy subsidies with the argument that they contribute to 
economic growth, poverty reduction and enhance the security of energy 
supply”. Therefore, oil subsidy withdrawal will raise the cost of production 
thereby adversely affecting productivity, real income and employment. 
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 At this juncture it is relevant to analyse the deregulation of the oil 
market and higher oil prices and their effects on different economies in 
the world. 
3.8.2 Review of Empirical Literature on Oil Market Deregulation 
in Some Selected Countries 
 Masih et al (2011) has studied the oil market price volatility on the 
macro economic variables in South Korea. The variables were assessed 
from economic and financial angle. The VAR model was used to capture 
the effect of crude oil prices on the South Korean economy covering the 
period of Asian economic crises of 1997 and the oil price hike of the early 
1990s which happened as a result of the Gulf war. Cointegration 
technique was employed to test the long run relationship between oil 
price movement and economic activity using time series monthly data 
from May 1988 to January 2005. The results show that long run 
equilibrium relationship exists between oil price movement and macro 
economy in South Korea and the effect of high and volatile oil prices is 
felt in the entire sectors of the economy. The results also show a 
negative indirect effect on industrial production because it leads to high 
cost of production and low profitability which makes investors cut down 
investment. The research question to ask here is:  
RQ: 3.4. Will change in petroleum price in Nigeria due to deregulation 
have indirect negative effect on industrial production due to the high cost 
of production and lead to loss of jobs and negatively affect employment? 
 101 
 Goto and McKenzie (2002) in their paper ‘Price collusion and 
deregulation in the Japanese retail gasoline market’ studied the effect of 
the deregulation of oil industry on the behaviour of retail prices in Tokyo 
and Osaka. According to them (ibid), in 1994 the Japanese government 
made it clear that by the end of March 1996 the law relating to the 
importation of some specified petroleum products (gasoline, kerosene, 
light oil) which restricts their importation to some certain number of 
companies will be abolished, the paper estimates model for the domestic 
retail price of gasoline based on game theory, focusing on forward 
looking behaviour of oil firms in the two towns. Monthly data for the 
period 1990:11 to 1998:5 was used. The data was divided into two parts; 
the first half was the pre deregulation period 1990:11 to 1994:5 and the 
second half of this period was when the decision to deregulate was 
made. Effective from 1994:6 to 1998:5; and the findings were that; 
notwithstanding the deregulation, total imports of the specified petroleum 
products relative to total production in the country remain very small, and 
total number of new importers of the said products also remain rather 
small, furthermore the wholesale price of the products has remained 
unchanged and yet at around the same time that the decision to 
deregulate the importation and abolish the law that restrict the 
importation to some certain companies was made and announced to the 
public the retail prices of the products began to fall.  
 It was concluded therefore, that this is consistent with the said 
game theoretic model which suggests that future changes in the 
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economic environment will affect current price settings by firms if the 
firms are faced with competition in a repetitive game context. 
 It can be hypothesized therefore that; 
Hypothesis 6.0:  Future changes in the economic environment as a result 
of subsidy withdrawal will lead to a fall in the petroleum product prices 
and so will not affect inflation positively.  
Hypothesis 6.A:  Future changes in the economic environment as a result 
of deregulation will lead to a rise in the petroleum product prices and so 
affects inflation positively.  
 In essence this theory has shown that expected future changes in 
the economic environment that exposes firms to competition through 
market deregulation do have an impact on the current pricing of their 
products which in the case of this study apply to petroleum products 
pricing. 
 Similar findings were made by Clarke and Edwards (1998) using a 
simplified general equilibrium model on Japan. Their findings revealed 
that there was a 13.2% reduction in domestic oil price and a consequent 
rise in the consumption of oil products by 4.6% by final consumer and 
17.8% by intermediate users like power stations. Furthermore, domestic 
oil refining increases by 8.4%. The findings also show that the real GDP 
rises by about 0.13% and a 0.70% rise in real wage. At this juncture 
therefore the following hypotheses are raised; 
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Hypothesis 7.0: There is no relationship between subsidy withdrawal at 
the downstream oil sector and GDP  
Hypothesis 7.A: There is a relationship between subsidy withdrawal at the 
downstream oil sector and GDP and;  
Hypothesis 8.0: There is no relationship between subsidy withdrawal at 
the downstream oil sector and minimum wage. 
Hypothesis 8.A: There is a relationship between subsidy withdrawal at the 
downstream oil sector and minimum wage. 
 Bello and Cavero (2008) conducted a study on the Spanish retail 
petroleum market which is the downstream sector of the Spain oil 
industry, and focus on the pattern of liberalization and competition since 
the deregulation of the market in 1992. According to them the Spain oil 
industry has been under strict government control from 1927 to 1984, 
the country’s national oil company CAMPSA ‘Compania Arrendataria del 
Monopolio de Petroleos S.A.’ held the concessionary right and conduct 
the exploration, production, refining and final distribution of petroleum 
products in the country. The period was characterised by low quality 
service, managerial, technical, scale and allocation inefficiencies this 
culminated into the decision to liberalize. However, it was discovered that 
from the year 1992 when the liberalization policy brought about 
competition in the downstream sector there was a significant rise in the 
number of service stations in the country from 4800 in 1992 to 8600 in 
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2005, furthermore this brought about structural changes in refining the 
products in the country. 
 The main finding of the study was that in only a few years the 
Spanish oil industry has moved from being a state monopoly condition to 
the condition of free market competition, which brought about retail 
market growth, development and modernization. It also gives the 
national oil company a good platform to compete with the newcomers in 
the industry. Another important finding was that different prices were 
charged for different quality of products, and deregulation of refineries 
and retail outlets eases price competition in the final market. 
 Birol et al, (1995), investigates the impact of oil subsidy removal 
on oil revenue and the energy sector in three countries, which are 
Algeria, Nigeria and Iran. The paper shows that subsidising consumption 
of petroleum products leads to domestic excessive demand which results 
in lower product availability for export thereby decreasing foreign 
exchange revenues that are needed as investment to stimulate the 
development process. Secondly subsidising producers bring about 
excessive supply which could lead to a fast depletion of resources which 
are the main source of foreign earnings of the countries in question. 
Thirdly, it was observed that switching to energy intensive production in 
these countries which are characterised by excess labour supply could 
worsen the unemployment situation in the countries and this could 
negatively affect growth. Fourthly, subsidies constitute a drain on 
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governments’ budgets because of lower export availability and revenue 
sacrificed for subsidy, this leads to fiscal deficit and in some cases debt 
accumulation.  
 The paper also posits that subsidies in most cases do not benefit 
the segment of the society they are targeted to help – the rural and 
urban poor- but rather it is the rich that benefit most from it. Therefore, 
the income redistribution aim of the introduction of the subsidies in the 
first place is defeated. 
 Finally using a standard econometric approach the findings of the 
paper suggest that the effects of deregulation on government revenue 
and energy use efficiency could lead to substantial revenue saving. 
However, the authors were quick to add that “It is often believed that the 
removal of subsidies would lead to the suffering of the deprived 
segments of the population, while the extra output of oil (from reduced 
domestic consumption) would put down pressure on the world price, 
resulting in constant or even decreasing revenues”, (Birol F. et al 1995 
p.214).  
 Papapetrou, (2001) examines the oil price shock, stock market, 
economic activity and employment in Greece. She employed a 
multivariate vector-auto regression model to find the dynamic 
relationship between real oil price, interest rate, industrial production and 
employment rate. Two specifications were estimated, the industrial 
production specification and the employment specification. The result of 
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the impulse response function shows the responses of the four variables 
to oil price shock which indicated that an oil price shock has an 
immediate negative effect on industrial production and employment. 
Therefore, the paper concludes that oil prices play an important role in 
affecting economic activity and employment in Greece as oil price shocks 
explain a considerable proportion of the fluctuation in output growth and 
employment growth. It can be hypothesised therefore that: 
Hypothesis 9.0: There is no relationship between change in oil prices and 
employment.  
Hypothesis 9.A: There is a relationship between change in oil prices and 
employment.  
 Vladimir (2012) in his article titled ‘Does oil price matter? A case of 
Czech Republic’ investigates the effect of oil price movements on the 
main economic indicators of Czech Republic. More specifically the study 
dwells on the influence of oil price on GDP, Inflation and money supply 
(M1). Bayesian VAR model was employed to analyse the relationship. The 
study used three specifications for the oil prices to find out whether the 
change in oil price significantly affects the above mentioned variables 
either in linear, linear asymmetric or nonlinear asymmetric way. The 
finding shows that there is no significant impact of oil prices movements 
on the dependent variables. Therefore, it was concluded that oil price 
changes are not found to contribute significantly to the changes in GDP, 
Inflation and money supply in the Czech Republic.    
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 In the United States of America (U.S.) the price of oil has 
tremendous influence on the economy; this is evident from the vast 
literature on the issue of oil price and the U.S. macro economy. Hickman 
et al (1987) had examined fourteen studies on the impact of oil prices on 
the U.S. economy that were conducted using econometric models alone, 
this is apart from the ones that were conducted based on empirical 
analysis. Foote, and Sneddon-Little, (2011p. 49) while analysing 
conference proceeding organized by Federal Reserve Bank of Boston 
titled ‘Oil and the macro economy in a changing world’ conclude that 
“economists concur that oil prices continue to have sizeable effects on 
the U.S. economy”. In fact Hamilton (1983) has shown that all the post 
war U.S. economic recessions were always preceded with oil price shock 
except one recession which took place in 1960-61. He further stressed in 
his article titled Nonlinearities and the Macroeconomic effect of Oil Prices 
(2011) while referring to the 2007-2008 doubling of oil price in the 
international market and the recession that followed that 10 out of 11 
U.S. economic recessions were preceded by sharp increase in oil prices. 
The Hamilton stand was concurred by the observation of the Boston 
conference participants who according to Foote, and Sneddon-Little, 
(2011p. 51) “had no trouble agreeing on the empirical regularity that 
large oil supply and price shocks generally precede U.S. recessions and 
tend to have a larger and more extended negative impact on the 
economy than the importance of oil in consumption or production would 
suggest”.  
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 Hamilton (2012), views higher oil prices as tax which the U.S. 
citizens pay abroad which in turn negatively affects their consumption of 
domestic goods and services. Edelstein and Kilian (2009) in their article 
titled ‘How sensitive are consumer expenditures to retail energy prices?’ 
indicated that the personal consumption expenditure (PCE) price index 
for energy goods by U.S. households increased by 68% in real terms 
between 2002q1 and 2006q3. The increase in expenditure on energy 
goods according to Hamilton means decrease in domestic consumption, 
which in turn results into low aggregate demand and therefore slows the 
growth rate of G.D.P. Hamilton explained further that about 5 per cent 
consumer spending in U.S. is on energy products. Therefore, if oil prices 
rise by 20 per cent and the consumers continue to consume the same 
amount of energy goods and services as before, then a pure income 
channel would imply that the U.S. consumer’s consumption of other 
goods would fall by 1 per cent. However, the method of calculation of 
Edelstein and Kilian (2009) reveals that the consumption decline is much 
larger than the 1 per cent predicted by the pure income channel and the 
decline was spread out over many months. In fact the consumption 
decline in response to higher oil prices according to them is both larger 
and more protracted than the pure income effect would predict.     
 Another important effect of higher oil prices on the U.S. economy 
according to Hamilton (2012) is that higher oil prices tend to constrain 
firms to minimise as much as possible in the use of oil inputs which leads 
to a reduction in the amount of output that they produce; this in turn has 
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a general negative effect on output and aggregate supply in the 
economy. The Hamilton view here has concurred with the research 
question 1 raised earlier in chapter two which read thus; will subsidy 
removal via deregulation increase the prices of petroleum products and 
thereby increase the cost of production which will make producers to 
reduce production and bring unemployment in the economy? 
 Having analysed the concept of deregulation in its general form 
and meaning, and the way it affects macro-economic variables in 
different economies in the world, the next section reviews and analyses 
deregulation within the Nigerian context.  
3.9 DEREGULATION IN THE NIGERIAN CONTEXT 
 Currently it is the government through Nigerian National Petroleum 
Corporation (NNPC) that imports fuel in Nigeria. Although private 
companies are also allowed to import, but when they make the 
importation the products are acquired by government for further 
distribution in the country while the importers are paid through the 
Petroleum Support Fund. Domestic transportation and product 
distribution is also wholly controlled by the government and where 
private companies are involved in the transportation of products, the 
companies are paid by the government through Petroleum Equalization 
Fund (PEF). While on the aspect of refining, it is the government that 
 110 
owned and controlled all the four refineries that are operating in Nigeria 
today2 (Asekunowo 2012). 
 Therefore, deregulation of the downstream petroleum sector in the 
Nigerian context “refers to the reduction or removal of government 
control, rules and regulations that restrains free operational activities in 
the sector. This does not mean a complete elimination of the laws that 
govern smooth operation of activities in the downstream oil sector. 
Rather, it means that the role of government in this sector will be limited 
mainly to providing regulatory oversight” (Office of the Chief Economic 
Adviser to the President, 2012 p. 1)3. 
 Therefore, for practical purposes this study dwells on the impact of 
deregulation transmitted into the economy through subsidy withdrawal 
and pricing because these are the aspects that have so far been affected 
by the policy, and that are the delimitation of this study, and this is 
where this work contributes to the frontier of knowledge. This is so 
because there is vast literature on the Nigerian oil industry ranging from 
environmental effect to developmental, yet there was no literature to the 
best knowledge of the researcher that deals with the effect of 
deregulation of downstream oil sector on the Nigeria’s economy. 
                                            
2 See section 2.7.1 in chapter two for detail analysis of the operation of the downstream 
sector of Nigerian oil industry. 
3 Frequently asked questions on deregulation of the downstream petroleum sector and 
removal of petroleum subsidy, prepared by the Office of Chief Economic Adviser to the 
President in collaboration with the NNPC and the Budget Office of the Federation 2012.  
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 Iwayemi and Fawowe (2011) have studied the impact of oil price 
shock on some selected macroeconomic variables in Nigeria; however, 
the oil price shock that was considered by them was the international 
price of crude oil not the domestic oil price as is the case of this study. 
They employ an unrestricted VAR to establish the relationship between 
crude oil price shock and some macroeconomic variables in Nigeria using 
quarterly data from1985:Q1 to 2007:Q4. Their findings indicated that 
international crude oil price shocks do not have major impact on most 
macroeconomic variables in Nigeria. The research question to ask here is: 
 RQ: 3.5. In what ways will the domestic oil price shock affect the 
Nigeria’s economy?  
 Mordi and Adebiyi (2010) analyses the asymmetric effect of 
international crude oil price shocks on output and prices in Nigeria using 
monthly data from 1999:01 to 2008:12. They used a structural VAR 
model and their study shows that oil price shock increases cost of 
production and is likely to decrease output. They further posit that higher 
oil prices lower disposable income and affects consumption negatively, 
and once the price increase is perceived to be permanent it will lead to 
decrease in private investment.  
 The above finding appears strange considering the fact that 
Nigeria is a net oil exporting economy where higher international crude 
oil price should translate into higher revenue for the country, but the 
paradox is that although Nigeria is a net crude oil exporter it is at the 
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same time importing refined petroleum products for domestic 
consumption.   
 Aliyu (2009) in his article ‘Oil Price Shocks and the Macro Economy 
of Nigeria: A Non-linear Approach’ presents an empirical assessment of 
the effects of crude oil price shocks on the real macroeconomic activity in 
Nigeria employing multivariate VAR model using both linear and non-
linear specifications. His findings reveal evidence of both linear and non-
linear impact of price shock on real GDP. He further finds that 
asymmetric price increases in the non-linear models have positive impact 
on real GDP growth of a larger magnitude than asymmetric oil price 
decreases adversely affects real GDP. 
 In an earlier study titled ‘Impact of Oil Price Shock and Exchange 
Rate Volatility on Economic Growth in Nigeria: An Empirical Investigation’ 
Aliyu (2009) studies the impact of international oil price shock and 
exchange rate volatility on the economic growth of Nigeria using 
quarterly data from 1986:Q1 to 2007:Q4. He also uses VAR to examine 
the sensitivity of real economic growth to shock in crude oil prices and 
exchange rate volatility. The findings reveal that positive oil price shock 
and appreciation of the exchange rate have positive impact on real 
economic growth of Nigeria. 
 Bazilian and Onyeji (2012) analyse the effect of fuel subsidy 
removal on the businesses under inadequate public power supply 
condition. Their findings shows that businesses in many developing 
countries like Nigeria where there is inadequate public power supply 
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suffer from high cost of providing self-energy in the form of stand by 
generator and other similar means of generating energy. This makes 
businesses in these countries to become less competitive because of high 
cost of production arising from inadequate power supply and high cost of 
petroleum products to fuel their machines and power generators as a 
result of deregulation policy. 
 In his contribution to the literature on the subsidy removal at the 
downstream oil sector of Nigeria Asekunowo (2012 p. 301) focused on 
the subsidy withdrawal debate to determine who is wrong and who is 
right in his article titled ‘The economics of Nigeria’s petroleum products’ 
subsidy removal debate: Who is right? Who is wrong? After a lengthy 
analysis he concluded that “the review conducted revealed that the 
arguments presented by each side cannot be adjudged to have dwarfed 
the other” and he finally submitted that the poor “would suffer 
immeasurably if the subsidy is totally withdrawn”. 
 Akpoghomeh and Badejo (2006) focus their attention to the study 
of petroleum products scarcity in Nigeria, in their article titled ‘Petroleum 
product scarcity: a review of the supply and distribution of petroleum 
products in Nigeria’. The study identified the reasons for petroleum 
products scarcity in the country which according to them include 
sabotage, pipeline vandalism, banditry and poor maintenance of 
infrastructure. Therefore, they suggested the privatization of refineries, 
pipelines and depots as the solution to the problem. 
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 In his work titled ‘An analysis of the effect of the oil industry on 
economic development in Nigeria’ Onosode (1998) discusses the effect of 
the oil industry on the development of Nigeria’s economy between 1960 
and 1995 using a Dutch disease macro model. The study concluded that 
it cannot be clearly stated that oil is actually a blessing or a curse to 
Nigeria, although it lead to the neglect of agricultural sector there was 
improvements in physical infrastructure and the provision of free basic 
education.   
 There are also literatures that covers the environmental aspect of 
the oil industry in Nigeria, the vast of them concentrate mainly on the oil 
spillage and environmental pollution that repeatedly takes place in the oil 
producing area of the Niger delta. 
 In his book titled ‘The Political Economy of Oil and Gas in Africa: 
The case of Nigeria’ Ariweriokuma (2009) dedicated a whole chapter 
discussing the environmental issues in the oil industry, where he analysis 
both the social and economic effect of environmental degradation caused 
by oil extraction industry in different parts of the world in general and in 
Nigeria in particular. 
 From the foregoing it can be seen that notwithstanding the vast 
literature on the Nigerian oil industry and its effect on the economic 
development, stock market development, effect of crude oil price shock  
and environment, there seems to be no literature on the effect of 
deregulation and subsidy withdrawal on the economy. This is what makes 
this work unique. Furthermore this work utilizes quarterly data which is a 
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higher frequency data in relation to what was used in other studies. This 
work also uses recent and up to date data. 
3.10 CONCLUSION    
 In this chapter it was understood that deregulation of the 
downstream oil sector in Nigeria is based on gradual subsidy withdrawal 
on petroleum products. The chapter also touches on the theoretical 
underpinning of deregulation and the opinion of stake holders in the 
downstream sector which included the government, the trade unions and 
the civil society organisations about the proper role of government over 
the issue of subsidy and pricing.  
 Furthermore the conceptual issue of subsidy was analysed and the 
taxonomy of oil subsidy was carried out to show different types of 
subsidies that a government could provide for its citizens, depending on 
its level of development, resources endowment and macroeconomic 
policy target. 
  Added to the above, the framework for considering subsidy 
introduction was presented in the chapter, where countries in the world 
where classified into three groups, depending on their oil resources 
endowments. This consists of oil producing countries with refining 
capacity, oil producing countries with no refining capacity and non-oil 
producing countries with refining capacities, for each group of countries a 
comprehensive analysis was given on how subsidy could be introduced 
and sustained. 
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 The chapter also reviewed literature on the effect of deregulation 
on some major macroeconomic variables such as G.D.P., Inflation rate, 
Employment rate and Wages, and presented the effect that were 
observed by various scholars based on the experience of their countries 
of studies.   
 The analytical review of the debate on the advantages and or 
disadvantages of oil market deregulation were also presented with 
detailed analysis of the arguments of scholars who were for and that 
were against deregulation. 
 The effect of oil market deregulation in some selected countries in 
the world was also analysed in the chapter. The countries covered were 
both oil producing and non-oil producing. This was done with a view to 
see the effect of deregulation on their economies, and the various studies 
reviewed shows that deregulation has positive effect on the economy of 
some countries and negative effect on some other countries.  
 Finally, literatures on the effect of oil industry on the Nigerian 
economy were reviewed, ranging from the effect of oil industry on the 
growth and development of the economy to environmental issues. It was 
discovered from the review however that of all the vast body of literature 
on the Nigerian oil industry, there was no study to the best of the 
researchers’ knowledge on the effect of deregulation of downstream oil 
sector and subsidy removal on the economy. The vast majority of the 
literature and scholars mainly concentrates their efforts in analysing the 
effect of international oil price shock on the economy without paying 
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much attention to the dynamic effects of domestic oil price change on the 
economy. This is where this study hopes to contribute to the frontier of 
knowledge. 
 It is also worthy to note that the following empirical research 
questions and hypotheses were raised throughout the chapter and some 
of the research questions raised earlier in chapter two were also 
confirmed in this chapter. 
 The empirical research questions raised within this chapter are as 
follows:    
RQ: 3.1. Which economic theory will best suit Nigerian economy in 
relation to the deregulation of the downstream oil sector? 
RQ: 3.2. What will be the effect of oil price change on inflation within the 
context of Nigerian economy?  
RQ: 3.3. What will be the short run and long run effect of deregulation on 
Nigeria’s labour market? 
RQ: 3.4. Will change in petroleum price in Nigeria due to deregulation 
have indirect negative effect on industrial production due to high cost of 
production and lead to loss of jobs and negatively affect employment? 
RQ: 3.5. In what ways will the domestic oil price shock affect the 
Nigeria’s economy?  
 The following research questions raised in chapter two have also 
been confirmed in this chapter. 
RQ: 2.1 Will subsidy removals via deregulation increase the prices of 
petroleum products and thereby increase the cost of production which 
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will make producers to cut down production and increase unemployment 
in the economy? 
RQ: 2.2 Will subsidy removals due to deregulation bring about inflation 
into the economy? 
RQ: 2.3 Whether deregulation of the downstream oil market will lead to 
higher cost of production and therefore affect GDP negatively. 
RQ: 2.4 Will subsidy removals due to deregulation bring an increase in 
the price of petroleum products and affect the minimum wage? 
 The research hypotheses developed in this chapter are; 
Hypothesis 5.0:   Deregulation of downstream oil sector through subsidy 
removal will not result into higher prices of petroleum products.  
Hypothesis 5.A:   Deregulation of downstream oil sector through subsidy 
removal will result into higher prices of petroleum products.  
 
Hypothesis 6.0:  Future changes in the economic environment as a result 
of subsidy withdrawal will lead to a fall in the petroleum product prices 
and so will not affect inflation positively.  
Hypothesis 6.A:  Future changes in the economic environment as a result 
of subsidy withdrawal will lead to a rise in the petroleum product prices 
and so affects inflation positively.  
 
Hypothesis 7.0: There is no relationship between deregulation of 
downstream oil sector and GDP  
Hypothesis 7.A: There is a relationship between deregulation of 
downstream oil sector and GDP and;  
 
Hypothesis 8.0: There is no relationship between subsidy withdrawal at 
the downstream oil sector and minimum wages. 
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Hypothesis 8.A: There is a relationship between subsidy withdrawal at the 
downstream oil sector and minimum wages. 
 
Hypothesis 9.0: There is no relationship between oil prices and 
employment.  
Hypothesis 9.A: There is a relationship between oil prices and 
employment.  
 Finally, it should be noted that the chapter has also buttressed the 
alternate hypothesis 1.A raised in chapter two which read thus;  
Hypothesis 1.A: there is a relationship between subsidy withdrawal at the 
downstream oil sector and economic growth of Nigeria.
 120 
 
 
4 CHAPTER FOUR 
 
METHOD  
AND  
METHODOLOGY
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4.1 INTRODUCTION  
Choosing appropriate methodology and methods is very vital in any 
scientific research. This is due to the fact that there are different types of 
methods and methodologies available to researchers depending on what 
they are researching or what type of research they are conducting. When 
a researcher intends to measure some certain variables or verify existing 
theories or hypothesis or questioning them, then a quantitative method 
may well be the most appropriate tool to use. However, when a 
researcher intends to carry out research on ideas, beliefs systems, 
values, or describes and understands experience and other intangibles, 
then a qualitative method might prove more useful (Creswell 1994). 
 Apart from using either quantitative or qualitative methods there is 
also the possibility of a researcher using triangulation; that is using both 
qualitative and quantitative methods together. This approach is used to 
back up one set of findings from one method used – for example 
quantitative - with another method – for example qualitative – to see if 
the same or similar results will be arrived at. 
 There are certain assumptions underpinning the use of either 
quantitative or qualitative methods in research. These include ontological, 
epistemological, axiological, rhetorical and methodological (Burrell and 
Morgan 1994). 
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 Under an ontological assumption the question is on the nature of 
reality. Quantitative approach assumes that reality is objective, particular 
and separate from the researcher, while qualitative approach assumes 
the reality to be subjective and multiple as seen by the participants in a 
study.   
 Epistemological assumption has to do with the relationship 
between the researcher and the researched. Quantitative approach 
assumes that the researcher is independent from that being researched 
while; qualitative approach assumes that the researcher interacts with 
that being researched. 
 Axiological assumption has to do with value judgment of the 
researcher. Under qualitative method the researcher is value-free and 
unbiased. However, under qualitative research methods the researcher is 
assumes to be biased and value-laden. 
 Rhetorical assumption refers to the language of the research; 
under quantitative method the language used is formal, based on stated 
definitions and uses accepted quantitative words and techniques. 
Qualitative method on the other hand accepts the use of personal voice, 
informal language, evolving decisions and accepted qualitative words.       
 Methodological assumption is about the process of the research, 
that is whether the process is inductive or deductive. Quantitative 
method is associated with deductive process, which means the reasoning 
is deducted from the general to the particular. It examines causes and 
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effect, and involves research leading to predictions, explanation, and 
understanding. Its reliability and accuracy is tested through a validity 
test. Qualitative method on the other hand is associated with inductive 
process, meaning the reasoning is from particular to the general. It 
involves mutual simultaneous shaping of factors and is context bound. Its 
reliability and accuracy is tested through verification (Creswell, 1994). 
 According to Creswell (ibid), research methods must necessarily 
address and adequately measure research hypotheses and research 
questions. Research methodology should describe in enough detail the 
methods to be used for the study in such a way that it can be replicated 
or be repeated in a similar way in another situation and obtain same or at 
least a similar result. Every stage of the methodology should explain and 
justify with clear reasons why the methods used were chosen.  
 In view of the foregoing therefore, for the purpose of this research 
quantitative research methodology is adopted, employing unrestricted 
vector autoregressive model with accompanying granger causality test, 
impulse response function and variance decomposition as tools of 
measurement, while Johansen cointegration test using both trace 
statistics and maximum engine value will be employed to test for the long 
run relationship between the variables under study. 
 The choice of quantitative method for this research was informed 
out of the fact that the variables considered in the study which are 
Inflation, GDP, Unemployment and Minimum wage are all numeric and 
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the data which is a time series data from 1980q1 to 2012q4 were also 
numeric. Measuring numeric data and variables that are numeric in 
nature requires quantitative approach. This is in contrast with the 
situation where categorical data and or variables are being tested, in 
such circumstances qualitative method might prove more effective. 
4.2 DEFINITION OF VARIABLES AND DATA SOURCES 
 This study uses quarterly data from 1980q1 to 2012q4. The 
researcher intends to use data from 1960 when Nigeria recieved its 
political independence from British but the quarterly data for most of the 
variables from that period was not available.  
 Five variables were considered in this study, one independent 
variable and four dependent variables.  Domestic oil price is the 
independent variable which is a proxy for subsidy withdrawal presented 
here as petroleum prices (PEP) while Inflation, Minimum Wages, 
Unemployment rate and GDP are the dependent variables. Empirical tests 
using time series data will be conducted to find the effect of petroleum 
price (PEP) change as a result of deregulation on the dependent 
variables. All the data are in logarithmic form except inflation rate and 
unemployment rate.  
LGDP: Log of Gross Domestic Product at Current Basic Prices (N' Million). 
Gross Domestic Product is the market value of all goods and services 
produced in an economy over a period of time usually one year. 
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Quarterly data on GDP from 1980q1 to 2011q4 was obtained from CBN 
Quarterly Statistical Bulletin (2011), while data from 2012q1 to 2012q4 
was obtained from CBN Quarterly Statistical Bulletin (2012).  
Data collected on GDP will help the researcher to answer question 
3.5 raised in the literature review chapter three which reads thus; in what 
ways will the domestic oil price shock affect the Nigeria’s economy. It will 
also help the researcher to answer question 2.1 raised in literature review 
chapter two which read thus; to what extent will the deregulation of 
downstream oil sector through subsidy removal affect the economic 
growth of Nigeria? 
 Further to the above, the data will also help the researcher to test 
hypothesis 7 which was raised in the literature review chapter three.  
 It will in addition help the researcher to test hypothesis 1 raised in 
literature review chapter two which was also confirmed in the literature 
review chapter three.  
INF: Inflation is the general increase in the prices of goods and services 
in the economy over a period of time usually one year. INF in this case 
denotes CPI inflation rate calculated as the first log difference of the 
consumer price index (CPI). Symbolically presented as (log(cpi) - 
log(cpi(-1))). Quarterly data on CPI from 1980q1 to 2012q2 was obtained 
from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics Data Base (IFS)( 2012). 
While, the quarterly data on CPI for 2012q3 and 2012q4 where obtained 
from IMF (IFS) (2013). 
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 Data on inflation will help the researcher to find answer to the 
research question 3.2 which was raised in chapter three which read thus; 
what will be the effect of oil price change on inflation within the context 
of Nigeria’s economy. It will also help to answer research question 2.2 
which was raised in chapter two which reads; will subsidy removal due to 
deregulation bring about inflation into the economy?  
 Furthermore, data on inflation will be used to test hypothesis 6 
which was raised in the chapter three. 
 It will further be relevant in testing hypotheses 2 raised in chapter 
two.   
LMINWAG: Minimum wage is the lowest remuneration paid to an 
employee by law. In Nigeria there is legislation on minimum wage termed 
minimum wage act. The government also has a minimum wage policy 
that stipulates the minimum possible amount of money to be paid as 
salary to a worker in government employment or in the private sector. 
The minimum wage changes from time to time and it is influenced by 
government policy and workers agitation through the activities of trade 
unions. Data on minimum wage was obtained from Central Bank of 
Nigeria Statistical bulletin (various years) which was also a compilation of 
data sourced from the National Salaries, Income and Wages Commission 
and the Federal Bureau of Statistics. The data was converted into natural 
logarithm form. 
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 Data on minimum wage assists the researcher to answer research 
question 2.3 raised in chapter two which reads; Will subsidy removal due 
to deregulation bring an increase in the price of petroleum products and 
affect the minimum wages?  
 It will also help to test hypotheses 8 raised in chapter three.  
 It will also further help to test hypothesis 4 raised in chapter two.  
UNEMPRT: Unemployment is a situation where people who are able and 
willing to work could not find any work to do. For the purpose of this 
research, the unemployment rate is measured as a total number of 
unemployed as a percentage of total population in Nigeria. Data on the 
reported unemployment rate was obtained from International Monetary 
Fund (2011): World Economic Outlook (Edition: September 2011).  
 Data collected on unemployment rate will be used to answer 
research question 3.3 raised in the literature review chapter three which 
reads thus; What will be the short run and long run effect of deregulation 
on Nigeria’s labour market? 
  It will also help to answer question 3.4 Will change in petroleum 
price in Nigeria due to deregulation have indirect negative effect on 
industrial production due to high cost of production and lead to loss of 
jobs and negatively affect employment? 
 In addition to the above, the data on unemployment will further 
help the researcher answer question 2.4 raised in the literature review 
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chapter two which was also confirmed in the literature review chapter 
three and read thus; Q: 2.4 Will subsidy removal via deregulation 
increase the prices of petroleum products and thereby increase the cost 
of production which will make producers cut down production and 
increase unemployment in the economy? 
 The data will also help the researcher to test hypothesis 9 raised in 
the literature review chapter three.  
 It will further be relevant in testing research hypothesis 3 raised in 
literature review chapter two.  
LPEP: This is the log of domestic petroleum prices obtained in Nigeria. 
The data on domestic petroleum price changes was sourced from Daily 
Trust Newspaper which published a detailed trend of domestic oil price 
changes from 1966 to 2012 (DailyTrust 2012).  
 Data on domestic petroleum price is important to this research 
because as it is the independent variable all the other variables in this 
study will be tested against the movement in domestic petroleum price. 
Added to that, the data also helps answer research question 3.5 raised in 
literature review chapter three which reads thus;  in what ways will the 
domestic oil price shock affect the Nigeria’s economy. It will also help test 
research hypothesis 5 which was raised earlier in the literature review 
chapter three.  
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 It can be understood from the foregoing therefore, that the 
variables to be tested in this research are numeric and the data used 
which is in a time series is also numeric, therefore to test the effect of 
PEP on GDP, MINWAG, INF and UNEMPRT employing time series data 
makes the method of measurement to be quantitative. This has put the 
research within the realm of positivist approach in its methodology. 
 According to Wallace et al (2008) positivism in the social sciences 
research is mostly characterised by quantitative approaches, while 
interpretive on the other hand is usually associated with qualitative 
research methodology. 
4.3 METHOD OF ECONOMETRIC MEASUREMENT 
4.3.1 Unit root 
 As mentioned above, in this study we are going to consider the 
response of four macroeconomic variables to changes in domestic 
petroleum prices (PEP) in Nigeria. These variables are GDP, INF, 
MINWAG, and UNEMPRT for the period 1980q1 to 2012q4 a total of one 
hundred and thirty two observations. This shows that the data used is a 
time series data. Gujarati and Porter (2009) posited that empirical works 
based on time series assumed that the series are stationary. But in reality 
not all economic variables are stationary in their levels and some 
variables are non-stationary which means their mean, variance and 
covariance are not constant over time.  
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 A non-stationary variable is one which has a trend; the trend could 
be stochastic or deterministic. If the trend is completely predictive and is 
not variable then it is called deterministic. On the other hand if the trend 
is not predictable and is variable it is called stochastic (Brooks, 2011). It 
is essential that variables that are non-stationary be treated differently 
because of unit root problem. In essence non-stationary data suffers 
from unit root problem or what is called stochastic or random walk.  
According to Gujarati and Porter (2009), non-stationarity gives rise to the 
problem of autocorrelation and spurious or nonsense regression. This is a 
situation where a very high R2 (an indication of high statistical 
relationship) is obtained when regressing a time series variable on 
another even though there is no meaningful relationship between the two 
variables. 
 Brooks (2011, p. 318) provides a lengthy explanation on why the 
concept of non-stationarity is important. He posited that the stationarity 
or non-stationarity of a series “can strongly influence its behavior and 
properties”. 
 If two variables are not related to one another it is expected that 
when one of the variables is regressed on the other the t-ratio on the 
slope coefficient would not be significantly different from zero and the 
value of R2 would be expected to be very low. But the problem of non-
stationary variable is that if two variables are trending over time a 
regression of one on the other could have a high R2 meaning they are 
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statistically significant, even though in reality they are completely 
unrelated. This is because the dependent variable will follow the trend of 
the independent variable. In relation to this Brooks stated that “if 
standard regression techniques are applied to non-stationary data, the 
end result could be a regression that ‘looks’ good under standard 
measures (significant coefficient estimates and a high R2), but which is 
really valueless” (Brooks 2011, p. 319). Such a model suffers from unit 
root problem. 
 Therefore, there is need to investigate the time series property of 
the data by conducting unit root and cointegration tests on the variables 
before proceeding with estimation of parameters in order to avoid 
spurious or nonsense regression. If a variable is non-stationary it could 
be made stationary by differencing. A variable is said to be integrated of 
order k; denoted as I(k) if it has to be differenced k times to make it 
stationary. 
In this study two unit root tests are considered. They are 
Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) unit root test and Philips Peron (PP) unit 
root test. 
4.3.2 Dickey Fuller (DF) and Augment Dickey Fuller (ADF) Unit 
Root Tests 
 The Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test is an extension of the 
Dickey Fuller (DF) test correcting for autocorrelation (Asteriou and Hall, 
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2007). The DF test is based on an Auto regression of order 1, (AR(1)) 
model of the following form : 
ty = 1ty + t          (4.1)
  
Where ty  will be stationary of the estimated value if  is less than 1 and 
ty  will not be stationary of the estimated value if  is more or equal to 1. 
Therefore, we check for: 
H0: =1 ( ty is not stationary) 
H1: 1 ( ty  is stationary) 
However, in practice hypothesis testing are available for 0 in the Ho 
instead of 1. So if 1ty is subtracted in both sides of equation 4.1 the 
following equation is obtained: 
 ty = 1ty +t           (4.2) 
Where = - 1. We thus test for  as follows:  
H0: =0( ty  is not stationary) 
H1: 0( ty  is stationary) 
 The DF model however, suffers from autocorrelation and the test 
statistics may be invalid. ADF corrects for higher-order correlation by 
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assuming that the dependent variable ty  follows an AR (1) process and 
adding  lagged difference terms of ty  to the right-hand side of the test 
regression (Eviews 7 User’s Guide II).  The ADF test is based on the 
following equation: 
           tptpttttt yyyxyy    ...2211
'
1   (4.3) 
Where  is the difference operator, ty is the dependent variable; pty   are 
the lagged differenced variables and t  is our error term. There are three 
possible models based on the presence of intercept and trend, because 
some variables have intercept and trend, some have only trend without 
intercept while some others have none. 
4.3.3 Philips Peron (PP) Unit Root Test 
 The other test which is popularly applied to test for stationarity of 
a time series is the Phillips-Perron test. The Philips Peron test is a 
modified version of the ADF test by taking into account serial correlation 
in the error term. It makes minor assumptions concerning distribution of 
errors in contrast to the ADF which assumes the error terms are 
statistically independent and have a constant variance (Asteriou and Hall, 
2007). The PP test does not include lagged differenced terms to correct 
for serial correlation in the auxiliary equation. Instead it uses a non-
parametric adjustment for higher order serial correlation. The PP test 
regression is as follows:        
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 ttt yy    11       (4.4) 
Where 1ty and t are as defined above. The PP test like ADF also has 
three possible models, trend and intercept, trend without intercept and 
none. 
4.3.4 Cointegration 
 Unit root and cointegration tests can be thought of as a pre-test to 
avoid spurious regression situations. Regression of non-stationary time 
series on another non-stationary time series may produce a spurious 
regression, trended time series also creates major problem in empirical 
econometrics. Two or more variables will be cointegrated if they have a 
long term equilibrium relationship between them. Non stationarities have 
different properties over time hence difficult to generalize (Kozhan, 
2010). 
 Econometricians have developed the concept of cointegration to 
address the problem of non-stationarity in time series data. This is 
because, even when variables contain unit root, there may exist a linear 
combination of them which is stationary. “Engle and Granger (1987) 
pointed out that a linear combination of two or more non-stationary 
series may be stationary. If such a stationary linear combination exists, 
the non-stationary time series are said to be cointegrated. The stationary 
linear combination is called the cointegrating equation and may be 
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interpreted as a long-run equilibrium relationship among the variables” 
(Eviews user guide II pg, 219). 
 There are two main cointegration techniques, the Engle-Granger 
two step techniques and the Johansen technique. The Engle-Granger 
approach involves the estimation of the cointegrating vector by ordinary 
least squares (OLS). However, the limitation of this procedure is that it 
cannot treat the possibility of having more than two variables, for this 
reason therefore, this study employs the Johansen approach.  
The Johansen methodology extends the idea of an error correction 
model to a vector of variables. It avoids the limitations of the Engle-
Granger approach based on VAR model estimation. Consider a VAR of 
order p below:  
ttptptt BxyAyAy   ...11                                        (4.5) 
Where ty is a k-vector of non-stationary I(1) variables, tx  is a d-vector of 
deterministic variables, and t  is a vector of innovations. The VAR may 
be rewritten as,  
 


 
1
1
1
p
i
ttititt Bxyyy                                 (4.6)      
 
 Where:  
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  (4.7)       
 The Granger proposition states that if the coefficient matrix  has 
rank r  k then there will be k x r matrices of  and  each with rank r 
such that  = ’ and ’ ty  is I(0). The parameter r is the number of 
cointegrating relations and each column of  is the cointegrating vector. 
If the rank of  is 0 then there are no cointegrating relationships (Khozan 
2010). The elements of  are the adjustment coefficients in the VAR 
(Vector auto regressive model) model. Johansen's method estimates the 
 matrix from an unrestricted VAR and tests whether the restrictions 
implied by the reduced rank of   can be rejected (Eviews User Guide II, 
2009).  
 Tests for cointegration are based on tests for the rank of the Π 
matrix. These are based on a transformation of Π to ensure that it has 
real eigenvalues and the tests are based on either the trace or the 
maximum eigenvalue of this transformed matrix. Johansen’s likelihood 
ratio statistic tests the nested hypotheses below: 
H0 : r = 0 versus H1 : 0 < r ≤ g 
H0 : r = 1 versus H1 : 1 < r ≤ g 
H0 : r = 2 versus H1 : 2 < r ≤ g 
:  :       : 
H0 : r = g − 1 versus H1 : r = g 
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We present the Johansen likelihood ratio statistic, known as trace statistic 
as follows: 



g
ri
itrace nTr
1
)1(1)(        (4.8) 
Where r is the number of cointegration vectors under the null hypothesis 
and i  is the estimated value of the i th ordered eigenvalue from the  
matrix. The trace statistics investigates whether the smallest g – r are 
statistically different from zero (Brooks, 2011, Kozhan 2010, Asteriuo and 
Hall 2007).  
 The maximum eigenvalue statistic where separate test on each 
eigenvalue was conducted is presented as follows: 
)1(1)1,( 1max  rnTrr       (4.9) 
 
Where the null hypothesis is ,r while the alternate hypothesis is 1r , so 
the null hypothesis is that there is no cointegrating vectors with the 
alternative suggesting that there is 1r cointegrating vectors4 (Asteriuo 
and Hall 2007).  
 
                                            
4 See Asterio and Hall page 328 for full explanation on cointegration test  
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4.4 MODEL SPECIFICATION: VECTOR AUTOREGRESSIVE 
MODEL (VAR) 
 In this research work an unrestricted Vector Autoregressive model 
(VAR) is employed to examine the response of macroeconomic variables 
to changes in domestic petroleum prices in Nigeria. VAR is a system 
regression model used where there is more than one dependent variable. 
 This model has been used by Farzanegan and Markwardt (2009) 
to measure the effect of oil price shocks on the Iranian economy. VAR 
was also used by Olomola and Adejumo (2006) to examine the effects of 
oil price shocks on output, real exchange rate, money supply and inflation 
in Nigeria. Jimenez-Rodriguez and Sanchez (2005) also used VAR to 
empirically assess the effects of oil price shocks on real economic 
activities in a sample of seven Organisations for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) countries. In fact VAR has been frequently 
used to examine the relationship between oil prices and other 
macroeconomic variables since the work of Hamilton (1983) and Sims 
(1980). One of the advantages of this model is its ability to capture the 
relationship between different variables. 
 Consider the following Vector Autoregressive model: 


 
p
i
ttiot yAAy
1
1       (4.10)  
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Where ty  is a 5x1 vector of variables determined by p  lags of all 5 
variables in the system, t is a 5x1 vector of error terms, oA  is a 5x1 
vector of constant term coefficients and iA  are 5x5 matrices of 
coefficients on the ith lag of y . Where ty  = [LPEP, LMINWAG, INF, 
UNEMPRT, LGDP]. Where PEP denotes petroleum price (domestic 
petroleum price in Nigeria), MINWAG denotes minimum wage, INF 
denotes inflation, UNEMPRT denotes unemployment rate and GDP stands 
for gross domestic product.  
 To examine the response of the above mentioned macroeconomic 
variables to changes in domestic oil prices, an unrestricted vector 
autoregressive model (VAR) is used. This model provides a multivariate 
framework where changes in a particular variable (domestic petroleum 
prices) are related to changes in its own lags and to changes in other 
variables (minimum wage, inflation, unemployment rate, and GDP) and 
their lags.  
 An important advantage of VAR is that all variables are considered 
as endogenous, therefore the problem of specifying which variable is 
exogenous or endogenous does not arise, so this has solved the problem 
of identification because for simultaneous equations structural model to 
be estimable, the requirement is that all equations in the system are 
identified (Asteriou and Hall 2007).  
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 Brooks (2011 pg. 292) opined that “forecasts generated by VARs 
are often better than traditional structural models”. He posited that 
“large-scale structural models performed badly in terms of their out-of-
sample forecast accuracy. This could perhaps arise as a result of the ad-
hoc nature of the restrictions placed on the structural models to ensure 
identification” as discussed above. McNees (1986) cited in Brooks (2011) 
proves that forecast for some United States (US) macroeconomic 
variables like unemployment rate and real gross national product (GNP) 
were done more accurately using VARs than from some other structural 
specifications.  
4.4.1 Granger Causality Test  
 In order to achieve the research objectives of determining the 
effects of deregulation of the downstream oil sector on Nigeria’s 
economy, the dynamic relationship between Petroleum price, 
Unemployment, Inflation, Minimum wage and GDP will also be explored 
by means of a Granger causality test. A causality test seeks to answer the 
basic questions of whether changes in domestic petroleum prices cause 
changes in the above mentioned macroeconomic variables. If this is the 
case then petroleum price (PEP) would be said to ‘Granger-cause’ the 
afore mentioned macroeconomic variables and the causality could be 
unidirectional or bidirectional. 
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4.4.2 Impulse Response Function (IRF) 
 When VAR is estimated it will be possible to assess the impulse 
response function. The impulse response function presents us with the 
possibility to assess the responsiveness of the dependent variables to 
shock to each variable and the effect on the VAR system over time could 
be noted. So, if there are k variables in the model a total of k2 impulse 
responses will be generated. This is done through expressing the VAR 
model as a vector moving average, if the system is stable the shock will 
gradually disappear (Brooks 2011). Thus impulse response function is 
employed to assess the response of the above mentioned macroeconomic 
variables to shock in domestic petroleum price. 
4.4.3 Forecast Error Variance Decomposition (VDC) 
 Added to this, the relative significance of a variable in generating 
variations in its own value and the value of other variables can be 
assessed through Forecast Error Variance Decomposition (VDC). In this 
study therefore, VDC will be used to assess the relative significance of 
changes in domestic Petroleum price in relation to GDP, Unemployment, 
Minimum wage and Inflation. According to Brooks (2011, pg. 300) 
variance decomposition “offer a slightly different method for examining 
VAR system dynamics. They give the proportion of the movements in the 
dependent variables that are due to their ‘own’ shocks, versus shocks to 
the other variables. A shock to the ith variable will directly affect that 
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variable of course, but it will also be transmitted to all of the other 
variables in the system through the dynamic structure of the VAR”. 
 An important issue in calculating Impulse response and Variance 
decompositions is the question of ordering especially when the Cholesky 
decomposition method is used because this method is based on the 
assumption of orthogonality which imposes the ordering of variables. 
According to Bidda (2010) “the implication of this is that reordering the 
variables in the system may lead to a number of different conclusions”. 
To avoid the above noted problem this study employs Generalised 
Impulse Response Function which is not sensitive to the ordering of the 
variables in the VAR system. 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
 In this chapter an attempt was made to explain the methodology 
and methods employed in the empirical analysis of this thesis. It has 
shown that the variables considered for analysis are changes in 
petroleum price due to deregulation in the downstream oil sector in 
Nigeria. This is the independent variable, while GDP, minimum wage, 
inflation and unemployment are the dependent variables. The study 
covers the period 1980q1 to 2012q4, this shows that the data used is 
time series. 
 To carry out a valid analysis and arrives at an unbiased scientific 
result using time series data, some diagnostic tests need to be carried 
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out first on the time series properties of the data before proceeding with 
the estimation process. These diagnostic tests are unit root and 
cointegration tests. Depending on the outcome of the cointegration test 
either Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) or Vector Autoregressive 
Model (VAR) will be employed. When there is at least one or more 
cointegration relationship among the variables under study Vector Error 
Correction Model (VECM) will be employed. On the other hand when no 
cointegration relationship is established among the variables the Vector 
Autoregressive Model (VAR) will be employed to examine the response of 
the dependent variables to the shock on the independent variable. After 
estimating VAR the dynamic long run relationship between variables will 
be examined using Johansen cointegration technique employing both 
trace statistics and maximum engine value. Granger causality tests will be 
conducted to measure the causal relationship between the variables. 
These will be followed by the impulse response function where the 
impulse response of the estimated VAR will be considered to assess the 
responsiveness of the dependent variables to shock to each variable and 
the effect on the VAR system over time. Finally Forecast Error Variance 
Decomposition will be considered to analyse the significance of changes 
in the independent variable on the dependent variables. 
 In summary the above are the econometric method and tests to 
be carried out on the variables and data used for this thesis so as to 
come up with a standard scientific empirical analysis and arrive at an 
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unbiased scientific result consistent with the assumptions of quantitative 
methodology approach.  
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5.1  INTRODUCTION 
 The main focus of this PhD project has been to examine the 
impact of changes in domestic petroleum prices in Nigeria as a result of 
subsidy withdrawal at the downstream oil sector on the economic growth 
of the country. This was carried out using four major macroeconomic 
variables which are; GDP, Inflation, Unemployment rate and Minimum 
wage rate.   
 In this chapter the data collected will be presented and analysed 
to show the impact of subsidy withdrawal at the downstream oil sector in 
Nigeria on the above mentioned variables. The aim of this chapter is to 
examine the response of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Inflation rate 
(INF), Minimum wage (MINWAG), and Unemployment rate (UNEMPRT) to 
the changes in domestic petroleum price (PEP) following the subsidy 
withdrawal at the downstream oil sector in Nigeria over the period 
1980q1 to 2012q4.  
 To achieve this, the empirical analysis begins with a look at the 
descriptive statistics of the macroeconomic variables. It then proceeds to 
examine the time series properties of the series to check for unit root 
using Augmented Dickey Fuller and Philip Perron tests. Serial correlation 
was also checked using Johansen cointegration test technique employing 
both Maximum Eigen Value and Trace Statistics to determine the long run 
relationship of the variables. Finally, an Unrestricted Vector 
Autoregressive Model (VAR) is estimated and resulted in Generalised 
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Impulse Response, Granger Causality and Forecast Error Variance 
Decomposition which were obtained and analysed. Results of the tests 
mentioned above were discussed in relation to the research objectives, 
hypotheses and research questions.  
 The analysis covers the implications of the results on the variables 
under study. It also covers the implications of the results on the Nigeria’s 
oil industry in general and to the downstream oil sector of Nigeria, in 
particular, the implication of the policy on private oil companies, the 
independent marketers, the transport sector, the fixed income earners 
and the general economic and social effects of the subsidy withdrawal at 
the downstream oil sector in Nigeria.   
 The overall goal of the chapter is to come up with thorough 
empirical analyses of the advantages and disadvantages of subsidy 
withdrawal policy on the economy and provide suggestions on the 
conditions under which subsidy introduction or withdrawal can be 
effective in the economy. The chapter also aims to come up with 
recommendations on the workability or otherwise of subsidy withdrawal 
at the downstream oil sector given the macroeconomic conditions in 
Nigeria.  
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5.2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
Table: 5.1 Descriptive Statistics for GDP (N’ million), MINWAG, 
PEP, UNEMPRT and INF for Nigeria (1980q1 – 2012q4) 
  GDP MINWAG PEP UNEMPRT INF 
 Mean 1,910,042 2,879.845 22.90473 3.492248 0.044751 
 Median 670,619.8 250 15 3.4 0.034323 
 Maximum 10,048,574 18,000 141 4.7 0.201273 
 Minimum 11,241.89 125 0.15 1.7 -0.04795 
 Std. Dev. 2781019 4394.221 27.9018 0.968699 0.050722 
 Obs. 129 129 129 129 129 
 
Source: Authors’ computation using E-views 7.0 based on data from the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) International Financial Statistics 
(2012; 2013), IMF World Economic Outlook, (2011), Central Bank of 
Nigeria (CBN) Statistical Bulletin (2012) and Daily Trust (2012) 
  
 Over the observation period 1980q1 to 2012q4, Nigeria had an 
average GDP of N1, 910,042.00 billion and the maximum over the period 
was N10, 048,574.00 billion while the minimum stood at N11, 241.89 
billion. Focusing on minimum wage, the average of N2, 879.845 were 
observed over the study period with a maximum of N18, 000 and a 
minimum of N125.00. In terms of domestic petroleum price, the price of 
a litre of fuel averaged N22.9 per litre over the period under review. A 
further look at Table 5.1 shows that the domestic petroleum price in 
Nigeria was a minimum of N 0.15 with a maximum of N141. Looking at 
the reported unemployment rate for the period under review, the 
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reported unemployment rate stood at an average of 3.5%, a maximum of 
4.7% and a minimum of 1.7%. Turning to inflation, the average rate over 
the period of observation stood at 0.04% with a maximum of 0.20 and a 
minimum of -0.04%. 
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Figure 5-1: Graphical presentation of GDP, MINWAG, PEP, 
UNEMPRTSIS and INF 1980q1 – 2012q4 
Source: Authors’ construction using E-views 7.0  
 150 
 From figure 5.1, it can be observed that there is an upward trend 
in GDP, MINWAG and PEP, while UNEMPRT has an upward trend up to 
1990 then it began to decline, it picked up again in the year 2000 and 
reached its peak in 2002 when it declined slightly during 2004 to date. 
The Consumer Price Index (CPI) which is the proxy for inflation rate has 
demonstrated an erratic behavior always reverting to the mean 
throughout the observation period. The reason of the upward trend could 
be an indication that the time series data of GDP, Minimum Wage, 
Unemployment rate and Petroleum prices are non-stationary. In other 
words from the table above there is some indication that these data 
suffers from the unit root problem5. However, this can only be confirmed 
after using standard econometric methods of testing for unit root. In this 
study Augmented Dickey Fuller and Phillip Perron tests are employed to 
check for unit root on the time series data used. Although using one test 
is enough to check for unit root, the second test was carried out to check 
the robustness of the result. 
                                            
5 Detail explanation on unit root problem in time series data was given in chapter four of 
this thesis. 
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5.3 UNIT ROOT TEST 
 Prior to the stationarity test, a graphical presentation of  the 
variables under study is presented below to find out whether or not they 
have a unit root at their levels and whether there is trend, intercept or 
both. For the statistical test to be conducted, data on Petroleum price 
(PEP), GDP and Minimum wage were presented in logarithmic form. 
While data on Inflation and Minimum wage are presented the way they 
are because both of them are rates. 
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Figure 5-2: Graphical presentation of PEP, GDP, MINWAG, (in 
logarithmic form) UNEMPRT and INF (1980q1 – 2012q4) 
Source: Authors’ construction using E-views 7.0 
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 From the graphs in figure 5.2 above it can be understood that all 
the variables except INF are trending upward which means they are non-
stationary at their level and the graphs also shows that they have an 
intercept. Therefore there is need to test for stationarity using both trend 
and intercept. However, we still resort to formal scientific statistical tests 
to determine the order of integration of the variables. The stationarity of 
the variables was examined using Augmented Dickey Fuller and Philip 
Perron unit root tests and the results of both tests are presented in 
Tables 5.2 and 5.3 below: 
Table 5-2 Augmented Dickey Fuller Unit Root Test Results 
VARIABLES LEVELS FIRST 
DIFFERENCE 
ORDER OF 
INTEGRATION 
LPEP -1.90 -12.85 I(1) 
LGDP -2.02 -4.31 I(1) 
LMINWAG -2.44 -11.51 I(1) 
UNEMPRT -2.53 -11.35 I(1) 
INF -3.80 -11.73 I(0) 
 
Note: ,  and, indicates significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively. 
 
Source: authors’ computation using E-views 7.0 
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Table 5-3 Philips Peron Unit Root Test Results 
VARIABLES LEVELS FIRST 
DIFFERENCE 
ORDER OF 
INTEGRATION 
LPEP -2.05 -12.77 I(1) 
LGDP -2.51 -12.61 I(1) 
LMINWAG -2.45 -11.51 I(1) 
UNEMPRT -2.49 -11.51 I(1) 
INF -7.11 -16.98 I(0) 
 
Note: ,  and, indicates significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively. 
 
Source: authors’ computation using E-views 7.0 
 
 
 From Tables 5.2 and 5.3 above it can be concluded that all the 
variables are non-stationary in their levels but they are stationary in their 
first difference with the exception of inflation which is stationary in its 
level. Therefore, LPEP, LGDP, LMINWAG and UNEMPRT are characterised 
as I(1) variables while INF is integrated to order zero denoted by I(0)6. 
 Under the above scenario we cannot continue to run a simple 
regression because it will give us spurious results (Brooks 2011). 
Therefore, the data has to be first differenced in order to make it 
stationary. There is also the need to run a cointegration test in order to 
see if in the long run, the variables move together having established the 
                                            
6 See appendix 2 for the full results of both ADF and PP tests 
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fact that they don’t move together in the short run. Since the variables 
are characterised as unit root processes.  
5.4 COINTEGRATION TEST 
 Given that all our variables except INF suffer from the problem of 
stationarity which means they are I(1) variables we need to test for a 
long term relationship by means of Johansen cointegration test. Non 
stationary series have different properties over time and are difficult to 
generalize (Kozhan, 2010). As mentioned earlier in the methodology 
section, econometricians have developed the concept of cointegration to 
address the problem of serial correlation in non-stationary time series 
data. This is because, even when variables contain unit root, there may 
exist a linear combination of them which is stationary. If such a 
stationary linear combination exists, the non-stationary time series are 
said to be cointegrated. Two or more variables will be cointegrated if they 
have a long term equilibrium relationship between them.  The stationary 
linear combination is called the cointegrating equation and may be 
interpreted as a long-run equilibrium relationship among the variables 
(Brooks 2011). 
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Table 5-4 Results of Johansen Cointegration Test 
Null 
hypotheses 
Trace statistics Critical value 
  r=0 41.85 47.86 
  r≤1 15.73 27.79 
  r≤2 6.86 15.94 
  r≤3 0.46 3.84 
Null 
hypotheses 
Max. Eigen 
statistics 
Critical value 
  r=0 26.12 27.58 
  r≤1 8.87 21.13 
  r≤2 6.40 14.26 
  r≤3 0.46 3.84 
Source: Authors’ computation using E-views 7.0 
 Given that our variables of interest each contain a unit root and 
having established the order of their integration, the Johansen’s 
procedure of maximum likely hood cointegration test was employed to 
examine their long run relationship using five lags as suggested by: 
sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level) (LR), Final 
prediction error (FPE) and Akaike information criterion (AIC)7. 
 A look at Table 5.4 reveals that both Trace and Maximum Eigen 
Value shows that there is no cointegration among the variables8 as we 
fail to reject the null of no cointegration. To determine the number of 
cointegrating relations, we can continue successively from zero to k-1 
until we fail to reject (see chapter 4). To reject the null hypothesis, the 
Trace statistics and Maximum Eigen Value statistics must be greater than 
                                            
7 Appendix 7 contains the full details of lag length selection criteria. 
8 See appendix 4 for full results of Johansen cointegration tests 
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the critical value. From Table 5.4 above, we can observe that the Trace 
statistic of 41.85 is less than the critical value of 47.86. Thus we fail to 
reject the null that r = 0. Similarly, the Maximum Eigen Value statistic of 
26.12 is less than the critical value of 27.58 and hence we cannot reject 
the null as well. 
5.5 VECTOR AUTO REGRESSION MODEL (VAR) 
 According to Brooks (2008), Vector Autoregressive model (VAR) is 
a system regression used where there is more than one dependent 
variable. The main purpose of employing VAR for our empirical estimation 
in this study is that we have four dependent variables which are GDP, 
Inflation, Unemployment rate and Minimum wage. Using VAR allows us to 
evaluate the impact of changes in petroleum price on the four dependent 
variables under study. Employing VAR also gives us the opportunity to 
measure the response of the dependent variables to changes in 
petroleum prices through the use of impulse response function and to 
find the dynamic causal relationship and response among the five 
variables of interest that is domestic Petroleum Price, GDP, Inflation, 
Unemployment rate and Minimum wage, using Variance Decomposition 
and Granger Causality test. Results of these tests will enable the 
researcher to come up with empirical findings that could help policy 
makers and serve as a basis for future research. 
 The generalised impulse response function is employed to find out 
the mutual impact of shocks in domestic petroleum price on 
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macroeconomic variables in Nigeria. The impulse responses are illustrated 
in figure 5.3 and the variance decompositions are given in the table 5.5. 
While the Granger causality test results are given in table 5.6.  
5.5.1 Generalised Impulse Response Function Test 
 In this study generalised impulse response was employed as 
against the use of Cholesky ordering. Under the generalised impulse 
response, causal ordering of the variables doesn’t matter; while under 
Cholesky method different ordering of variables generates different 
results (Bidda 2009). The generalised impulse response shows how long 
and by what extent Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Inflation, Minimum 
wage, and Unemployment rate reacts to unanticipated changes in 
domestic petroleum prices. The horizontal axis measures the period after 
the impulse shock and the vertical axis measure the magnitude of the 
response.  
 The results of the generalised impulse responses for the 
unrestricted VAR in levels are presented for twentieth quarter time-
intervals. The impulse response is presented along with a 10,000 Monte 
Carlo simulation and two-standard error band as in Bidda (2009)9.  
                                            
9 Appendix 5 contains the full results of the impulse response function 
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Figure 5-3 Impulse Response Function 
Source: authors’ computation using e-views 7.0 
 In response to a positive shock in domestic petroleum prices, there 
is a positive impact on GDP growth in Nigeria. It can be observed that in 
response to a shock in domestic price of petroleum, GDP responds 
positively peaking at the 5th quarter and then slowly dying down with 
spikes in the 9th and 13th quarter. This positive relationship persisted till 
the twentieth quarter. The response was also statistically significant 
between the 4th and 8th quarter.  
 This positive relationship is inconsistent with the classic supply side 
effect which argues that an oil price increase leads to increase in 
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production cost and ultimately leading to reduction in output and 
productivity and therefore has negative effect on GDP (Barro, 1984, 
Brown and Yucell, 1999, Abel and Bernanke, 2001). It is also inconsistent 
with the findings of Mirzaei H. (2007) who conducted research on an 
Iranian Business Cycle (A study of the Impacts of Oil Price Shocks) who 
finds a negative relationship between oil price shocks and output in the 
Iranian economy. 
 The result of this study is inconsistent with the findings of Mirzaei 
(2007) because although both Nigeria and Iran are oil exporting 
countries, yet Mirzaei conducted his studies based on international oil 
price shock on the economy of Iran, while in this study the focus is on 
domestic oil price shock on the economy of Nigeria. This is an indication 
that international oil price shock and domestic oil price shock could have 
different effect on the GDP growth of net oil exporting countries.  
 The observed positive relationship is also inconsistent with the 
findings of Hamilton (2005), who demonstrated a negative relationship 
between increased oil prices and output, but is consistent with the 
findings of Aliyu (2009) who finds a positive relationship between oil 
prices and real GDP growth in Nigeria. The inconsistency between the 
findings of Aliyu (2009) and that of Hamilton (2005) can be explained 
thus; that Hamilton conducted his studies on the USA economy which is 
an oil importing developed country, while Aliyu conducted his studies on 
Nigeria which is an oil exporting developing country. As an oil exporting 
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country, a positive oil price shock means increased revenue to Nigeria, 
which could be channeled into productive projects and therefore results 
into increased GDP growth. On the other hand positive oil price shock 
could raise the cost of input and affects GDP negatively in an oil 
importing country like America.    
 The import of Aliyu’s result is that, an increase in domestic oil price 
is expected to generate higher revenue to the government and hence 
more resources are available for increased government spending and 
expansion of governmental projects in the economy.  
 Furthermore, the significance of this positive relationship as far as 
domestic oil price is concerned can be explained by the fact that by 
withdrawing fuel subsidy in the domestic market, the government will 
have more money available for other developmental activities. 
  Similarly inflation rates responds positively to a shock in the 
domestic petroleum price. The shock from domestic petroleum prices on 
inflation rate is positive up to the 4th quarter before reversing to a 
negative effect from the 5th quarter which persisted throughout the 
remaining quarters. The theoretical literature posits a positive relationship 
between oil price rise and inflation rate. As observed by Fuhrer (1995), 
Gordon (1997) and Hooker (2002), an oil price increase represents an 
inflationary shock which can be followed by an inflation wage spiral.  
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 Turning to unemployment rate, a shock from domestic petroleum 
prices initially has a negative impact on unemployment rate in Nigeria, it 
becomes positive in the 5th quarter and it persists throughout the 
remaining quarters. This is consistent with the findings of Caruth et al 
(1998), David and Haltiwanger (2001) and Keane and Prasead (1996) 
who show that oil price increases tend to reduce unemployment rate in 
the short run but tend to increase it in the long run. It is also consistent 
with the findings of Papapetrou (2001) in his study on the economy of 
Greece.  
  As to the shock from domestic petroleum prices on the minimum 
wage, it is expected that theoretically the minimum wage will be 
influenced by changes in domestic petroleum price through its negative 
relationship with inflation which erodes the purchasing power of fixed 
income earners. A look at figure 5.3 reveals that the response generated 
was initially negative. While a further look at the impulse response 
reveals that it becomes positive from the 10th quarter up to the twentieth 
quarter observation period. This could be as a result of a wage increase 
by the government and multiplier effect in the economy to cushion the 
effect of subsidy withdrawal. This is consistent with the findings of 
Lescaroux and Mignon (2008) where they observed that, increase in oil 
prices erodes the purchasing power of the working class which makes 
them demand for increase in wages.  
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5.5.2 Variance Decomposition Test 
 The variance decomposition offers an alternative of examining the 
dynamics among the variables under study. It allows us to show the 
relative importance of an individual variable due to its own shock and the 
shock to other variables of interest. This test is used in this study in order 
to find out the percentage at which changes in domestic petroleum price 
causes changes in other dependent variables. Table 5.5 explains the 
percentages of the variations in macroeconomic variables that are 
attributed to domestic oil price changes. The variance decomposition 
indicates that Nigerian Domestic oil price changes are a significant source 
of variation for Nigerian GDP, Inflation and Unemployment.  Conversely, 
a domestic petroleum price change has dismal effect on Nigerian 
minimum wage. Throughout the 20th quarters, petroleum price changes 
accounted for only 0.0% to 4.65% changes in minimum wage other than 
itself. 
Table 5-5 Variance Decomposition 
      
       Variance 
Decomposition 
of LGDP:      
 Period LGDP LPEP LMINWAG INF UNEMPRT 
      
       1  100.0000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 5  84.00037  10.67249  0.337467  3.623008  1.366666 
 10  77.69035  14.69969  0.458711  6.331674  0.819578 
 15  80.42957  10.98631  1.868574  5.740403  0.975136 
 20  81.41675  7.813484  3.574585  5.280486  1.914695 
      
        
Variance 
Decomposition 
of LMINWAG:      
 Period LGDP LPEP LMINWAG INF UNEMPRT 
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 1  0.074135  0.009955  99.91591  0.000000  0.000000 
 5  5.824871  2.553385  75.15818  5.282272  11.18129 
 10  5.046557  1.832837  70.15266  12.73158  10.23637 
 15  5.504898  2.386554  67.49677  13.28702  11.32476 
 20  5.854473  4.655233  64.67950  13.17978  11.63101 
      
       Variance 
Decomposition 
of INF:      
 Period LGDP LPEP LMINWAG INF UNEMPRT 
      
       1  10.87990  0.078043  0.262208  88.77985  0.000000 
 5  18.14418  1.732350  1.155241  78.82278  0.145452 
 10  20.45541  6.002800  1.956272  71.23312  0.352399 
 15  19.40719  12.10089  3.177001  64.71869  0.596227 
 20  19.23069  13.33472  3.350965  62.87766  1.205974 
      
       Variance 
Decomposition 
of UNEMPRT:      
 Period LGDP LPEP LMINWAG INF UNEMPRT 
      
       1  8.230958  7.080289  0.108062  1.280445  83.30025 
 5  11.28903  6.507133  1.913612  3.555636  76.73459 
 10  9.115437  11.64798  1.659461  9.872354  67.70477 
 15  9.041726  23.06547  2.139351  10.44976  55.30369 
 20  9.510138  31.59836  3.136480  10.19536  45.55966 
      
       Cholesky 
Ordering: LGDP 
LPEP 
LMINWAG INF 
UNEMPRT      
      
      
Source: authors’ computation using e-views 7.0 
 Coming to GDP, domestic oil price changes  explains more than 
10% of variation in GDP in 5th quarter, more than 14% by the tenth 
quarter, and then declining to more than 7% in the 20th quarter. 
 As for inflation rate, other than itself domestic petroleum price 
accounted for 0% to 13% of variation over the 20th quarters of 
observation. This demonstrates the importance of domestic oil price to 
changes in inflation. 
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 When unemployment rate is considered, it can be seen that the 
changes in domestic oil prices accounts from, 7% to more than 31% of 
variations other than itself under the review period. 
5.5.3 Granger Causality Test 
 In this study granger causality test is employed as against the use 
of correlation which is frequently the case in most studies; however, 
correlation does not imply causation because in some cases the use of 
correlation gives spurious results (Eviews 7 Help file). “The Granger 
(1969) approach to the question of whether x causes y, is to see how 
much of the current y can be explained by past values of x and then to 
see whether adding lagged values of x can improve the explanation. y is 
said to be Granger-caused by x if x helps in the prediction of y , or 
equivalently if the coefficients on the lagged 's are statistically significant” 
(Eviews 7 User Guide I, pp 428 - 429). In light of the above granger 
causality test was run on the variables LGDP, LPEP, MINWAG, INF and 
UNEMPRT and the result is presented in table 5.6 
Table 5-6 Causality Analysis 
VAR Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests 
Date: 12/03/13   Time: 22:44  
Sample: 1980Q1 2012Q4  
Included observations: 122  
    
        
Dependent variable: LGDP  
    
    Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
    LPEP  31.36707 5  0.0000 
LMINWAG  2.619767 5  0.7584 
UNEMPRT  16.16815 5  0.0064 
INF  7.636541 5  0.1774 
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All  64.99209 20  0.0000 
    
     
    
Dependent variable: LPEP  
    
    Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
    LGDP  5.007211 5  0.4150 
LMINWAG  1.339725 5  0.9308 
UNEMPRT  8.939520 5  0.1115 
INF  13.35182 5  0.0203 
    
    All  30.53169 20  0.0617 
    
        
Dependent variable: LMINWAG  
    
    Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
    LGDP  7.431293 5  0.1905 
LPEP  1.898836 5  0.8630 
UNEMPRT  20.74007 5  0.0009 
INF  5.062685 5  0.4083 
    
    All  47.57407 20  0.0005 
    
    
 
 
 
 
   
Dependent variable: UNEMPRT 
    
    Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
    LGDP  7.530687 5  0.1841 
LPEP  9.235556 5  0.1000 
LMINWAG  2.384409 5  0.7938 
INF  7.315058 5  0.1982 
    
    All  29.50887 20  0.0782 
    
        
Dependent variable: INF  
    
    Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
    LGDP  9.845999 5  0.0797 
LPEP  8.866989 5  0.1145 
LMINWAG  1.926413 5  0.8592 
UNEMPRT  0.530343 5  0.9910 
    
    All  19.51074 20  0.4889 
    
        
Source: authors’ computation using e-views 7.0 
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 To test for Granger causality, the block exogeneity test using Wald 
statistics are employed to test for the joint significance of each of the 
other lagged endogenous variable. There is a unidirectional causation 
running from LPEP to LGDP as we reject the null hypothesis that LPEP 
does not granger cause LGDP, but we do not reject the null hypothesis 
that LGDP does not granger cause LPEP. Therefore, it appears that 
Granger causality between LPEP and LGDP runs one-way. 
 There is also a unidirectional causation running from INF to LPEP. 
This is because although we cannot reject the null hypothesis that LPEP 
does not Granger-cause INF but we reject the null hypothesis that INF 
does not Granger-cause LPEP. Therefore, it appears that Granger 
causality between LPEP and INF also runs one-way. 
 According to the test results also, it was observed that LPEP does 
not granger-caused MINWAG neither does MINWAG granger-cause LPEP, 
because we cannot reject the null in either case. In the same vain when 
we consider LPEP and UNEMPRTSIS it can be concluded that there is no 
granger causality between them either way. 
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5.6 DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS  
 This section presents the discussion of research findings in relation 
to research objectives, hypotheses, research questions and results of 
various tests carried out in this chapter and other issues that were raised 
in the literature review chapters and the methodology chapter. 
 As indicated in chapter one, the main objective of this research is 
to investigate the effect of subsidy withdrawal at the downstream oil 
sector on the Nigerian economy, with specific reference to its effects on 
GDP, Inflation rate, Unemployment rate, and Minimum Wage. Going by 
the results of the various tests carried out on the quarterly time series 
data of the variables covering the period 1980q1 to 2012q2 it can be 
seen that the objectives of the research have been achieved. Results of 
Impulse Response Function, Granger Causality test and Variance 
Decomposition have shown the dynamic effect of subsidy withdrawal at 
the downstream oil sector on the Nigerian economy. 
 As stated in section 5.5 of this chapter, the result of impulse 
response function shows that subsidy withdrawal has a positive effect on 
inflation, in which case we reject the null hypothesis 5.0 which reads thus; 
deregulation of downstream oil sector through subsidy removal will not 
result into higher prices of petroleum products and accept alternate 
hypothesis 5.A which reads; deregulation of downstream oil sector 
through subsidy removal will result into higher prices of petroleum 
products.  
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The result also makes us reject null hypothesis 6.0 which read 
thus; future changes in economic environment as a result of deregulation 
of downstream oil sector through subsidy removal will result to a fall in 
the petroleum products prices and so will not affect inflation positively. 
We in turn confirm alternate hypothesis 6.A which read thus; future 
changes in economic environment as a result of deregulation of 
downstream oil sector through subsidy removal will result into higher 
prices of petroleum products and affect inflation positively.  
In addition, the result makes us reject null hypothesis 2.0 which 
states that; there is no relationship between subsidy withdrawal at the 
downstream oil sector and inflation in the Nigerian economy and accept 
the alternate hypothesis 2.A which states that; there is a relationship 
between subsidy withdrawal at the downstream oil sector and inflation in 
the Nigerian economy.  
This result is consistent with the findings of Barsky and Kilian 
(2004) who conducted their study on the US economy and finds that oil 
price increase causes high inflation. It is also partially consistent with the 
findings of LeBlanc and Chinn (2004) who finds that oil price changes has 
a moderate effect on inflation in their study on G5 countries. The result 
of this study is partially consistent with that of LeBlanc and Chinn (2004) 
because while LeBlanc and Chinn finds moderate impact of deregulation 
on inflation, this study finds statistically significant impact of subsidy 
withdrawal on inflation in Nigeria.  
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 However this finding is inconsistent with the findings of Goto and 
McKenzie (2002) who conducted their study on the Japanese retail 
gasoline market and finds negative relationship between price 
deregulation, import deregulation and inflation in Tokyo and Osaka. It is 
also inconsistent with the findings of Clarke and Edwards (1998) who 
used a simplified general equilibrium model on Japan to arrive at the 
conclusion that deregulation of the downstream oil market resulted in 
lower product prices by 13.2%. It is worthy to note that the result of this 
study is inconsistent with that of Goto and McKenzie (2002) and that of 
Clarke and Edwards (1998) because the level of infrastructural 
development in terms of refining capacity for domestic consumption 
between the two countries is incomparable. While Japan has large scale 
modern petroleum refineries, Nigeria is maintaining old refineries. The 
latest of these refineries was commissioned in 1989 about twenty five 
years ago. In addition, Japan is the fourth biggest oil refiner in the world 
with 25 operating refineries as at 2012. Japan is refining 4.25 Mbd which 
is equivalent to about 4.6% of the world’s total refinery capacity 
(Petroleum Association of Japan 2013). Theoretically, countries can 
deregulate their downstream oil sector base on many criterions among 
which is petroleum resources endowment and refining capacity10. Japan 
refines all the petroleum products it requires for domestic consumption, 
while Nigeria imports most of the refined petroleum products for 
                                            
10 Different criteria for deregulating downstream oil sector or introduction of subsidy into 
the sector was discussed in detail in chapter three of this thesis. 
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domestic consumption. Therefore, Nigeria’s deregulation is import 
dependent which is inherently inflationary. While Japan’s deregulation is 
based on what is termed as “Domestic Petroleum Refining System” a 
system which makes the country self-sufficient in terms of domestic 
supply of petroleum products and reduces the impact of external market 
shocks on the domestic supply and prices.   
 The result of variance decomposition shows that deregulation is 
the source of variation in inflation accounting for over 6% in the tenth 
quarter, 12% in the fifteenth quarter and 13% in the twenty quarter 
under the study period 1980q1 – 2012q4. This indicates that subsidy 
withdrawal at the downstream oil market in Nigeria is inflationary, 
because increase in the price of petroleum indirectly affects all the other 
sectors in the economy through its direct effect on transport and 
manufacturing sectors.  
 The result of the granger causality shows unidirectional 
relationship between changes in domestic petroleum price and inflation 
which means that changes in petroleum price granger causes inflation 
but inflation does not granger causes changes in domestic petroleum 
price. This shows that changes in petroleum prices (LPEP) is not as a 
result of increased productivity in the country but is rather a result of an 
exogenous factor which in this case is the subsidy withdrawal policy 
which makes prices to go up in the economy. This positive relationship 
between change in petroleum price and inflation has provided answers to 
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the research question RQ: 3.2 which read thus; what will be the effect of 
oil price change on inflation within the context of Nigerian economy?  It 
also answers research question RQ: 2.2 which read thus; will subsidy 
removal due to deregulation bring about inflation into the economy?  
 What is desirable is a unidirectional causality where inflation 
granger causes changes in petroleum prices and not vice versa. In a 
situation where inflation granger causes changes in petroleum prices the 
interpretation would have been that there is high productivity in the 
economy which resulted in high demand of inputs including petroleum 
products as a result of which prices went up. But under this scenario, the 
rise in inflation is not as a result of increased economic activities and 
therefore has negative effect on the economy as a whole. 
 The justification for the above assertion is that all economic 
sectors in Nigeria have a direct or indirect linkage with the transportation 
sector. Once the prices of petroleum products went up, transportation 
becomes more expensive as transporters mark-up their fares to recover 
the high cost of fuel. 
 Besides, because of the increase in transportation fares, nearly all 
commodities prices go up.  This is what leads to undesirable inflationary 
pressures in the economy. As mentioned earlier on, all Nigerian economic 
sectors are dependent on the transport sector which is in turn dependent 
on petroleum products (Adetola, A., Goulding, J., and Liyanage, C. 2011). 
It is worthy to note that increases in petroleum price affects even those 
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who have no vehicles. It has become a common denominator upon which 
the prices of almost everything in Nigeria are measured. 
 As mentioned earlier in chapter two, the combined production 
capacity of all the four petroleum refineries in Nigeria is to refine 
445,000.00 barrels of crude oil per day when operating at full capacity. 
However, as at 2012 the refineries where only operating at 60% capacity 
(Budget Office 2012). In a country which consumes an average of 30 
million litres of petroleum per day, the total production by the domestic 
refineries is highly in adequate. Therefore, as against the situation in 
Japan, the deregulation in Nigeria is a deregulation based on imported 
refined products. It is worth emphasizing that a deregulation policy that 
is based on importation of refined products is inherently inflationary and 
destabilizing for the domestic economy. This is because massive 
importation necessarily puts pressure on the exchange rate which makes 
the local currency weak in the face of international currencies and 
therefore makes importation very expensive. 
 This is a bad scenario for a country like Nigeria where the 
manufacturing sector depends on imported raw materials, imported 
machineries, imported tools and imported spare parts to operate. 
 Therefore, a subsidy withdrawal policy which leads to higher prices 
of petroleum products in an economy with inadequate electric power 
supply where according to Bazilian and Onyeji (2012) industrial sector 
rely heavily on fueled generators to operate, makes cost of production 
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very high which in turn makes the prices of the products they produce to 
be very high and therefore attracts low demand which results into low 
profits and low return on investments. It also makes their products less 
competitive in relation to imported ones. This has the potential effect of 
destroying the industrial base of the country and worsening the 
unemployment situation. This is because manufacturers respond to high 
cost of production and low demand of their products by cutting down 
production and laying off of their workers as a means of saving cost and 
survival under harsh business environment.  
 This has made void of the government’s assertions that a 
deregulation policy will attract new investors, sellers, buyers, increase the 
competition and thereby promote higher productivity and lowering 
general prices of goods and services over time in the economy. On the 
contrary Okafor, (2008) in Bazilian and Onaji (2012) observed that 
deregulation in a country with ailing power sector results into oil price 
hike which in turn results into increased aggregate expenditure on 
gasoline to fuel factories generators which leads to high cost of 
production, shrinking domestic demand and leads to reduction of sales 
for businesses. 
 Turning to Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the result of impulse 
response function indicates that subsidy withdrawal has positive effect on 
GDP (fig. 5.3). With this result we can reject the null hypothesis 1.0: 
which read thus; there is no relationship between subsidy withdrawal at 
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the downstream oil-sector and the economic growth of Nigeria and 
confirm the alternate hypothesis 1.A: which read thus; there is a 
relationship between subsidy withdrawal at the downstream oil sector 
and economic growth of Nigeria. It also makes us confirms alternate 
hypothesis 7.A: which read thus; there is a relationship between subsidy 
withdrawal at the downstream oil sector and GDP. This makes us reject 
the null hypothesis 7.0: which reads thus; there is no relationship 
between subsidy withdrawal at the downstream oil sector and GDP. The 
result also disprove research question RQ: 2.3 which reads thus; whether 
deregulation of the downstream oil sector will lead to higher cost of 
production and therefore affects GDP negatively.  
 Similarly, the result of variance decomposition has shown that 
changes in domestic oil prices through deregulation is a significant source 
of variation in GDP in Nigeria, accounting for over 10% in the fifth 
quarter, rising to over 14% in the tenth quarter and then declining to 
approximately 11% and 8% in the 15th and 20th quarters respectively. 
This result answers the research question 3.5 which reads thus; in what 
ways will the domestic oil price shock affects the Nigeria’s economy.  
 The result of granger causality test indicates unidirectional 
causality between LPEP and LGDP, which shows that LPEP granger 
causes LGDP but LGDP do not granger causes LPEP. This result is 
interesting because it is instructive to note that the test result indicates 
that LPEP granger causes LGDP because we fail to reject the null of no 
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causation but LGDP do not granger cause LPEP because we reject the 
null of no causation. In other words the result means that the growth in 
GDP is as a result of changes in petroleum price, but the increase in 
petroleum prices is not as a result of increased productivity. This means 
that increase in petroleum prices was not caused by increased in demand 
which indicates increase in productivity but by the government policy of 
deregulation of downstream oil sector. 
 This has shown that even though the change in LPEP has positive 
effect on LGDP as noted in the results of the impulse response function 
(fig. 5.3) above, yet the increase in GDP as far as the result of granger 
causality test indicates it is not as a result of increased productivity within 
the economy but rather as a result of increased income accrued to the 
Nigerian government in the form of withheld revenue that could have 
been spent on subsidy which is now retained by government as a result 
of subsidy withdrawal. As noted in chapter three, theoretically GDP can 
be affected by changes in oil prices either via its demand side effect or 
via its supply side effect. The demand side effect is the change and or 
increased in oil prices due to high demand which is also as a result of 
increased economic activities and productivity within the economy. The 
supply side effect on the other hand is caused by exogenous factors such 
as the activities of cartel or government policy that have no direct 
bearing with increased productivity in the economy.   
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 From the above it can be understood that demand side effect of 
changes in oil prices is desirable because it is a result of increased 
economic activity while the supply side effect is not a good indication 
because it could retard economic growth in the long run as argued by 
Hamilton (1983) and Paul C. et al (2012). The supply side effect 
however, is what the subsidy withdrawal at the downstream oil sector 
brought into the Nigeria’s economy which is a negative effect in the 
actual sense. This is evident from the result of short-run economy-wide 
effect of 10% increase in petroleum prices using data from Nigerian 
Institute of Social and Economic Research 2012.  
Table 5-7 Short Run Effect of 10% Increase in Domestic 
Petroleum Price on Various Sectors of the Economy in Nigeria 
Serial 
Number 
SECTOR EFFECT ON 
SECTORAL INPUT 
(% CHANGE) 
EFFECT ON 
SECTORAL 
OUTPUT 
(% CHANGE) 
1. Agriculture 0.20 -4.35 
2. Livestock 0.00 -1.69 
3. Forestry 0.60 -4.07 
4. Fishing 0.60 -3.90 
5. Petroleum 4.02 -3.37 
6. Other mining 1.80 -3.33 
7. Drink Bev. And 
Tobacco 
0.70 -3.84 
8. Textile 0.60 -3.35 
9. Foot wear 0.90 -6.09 
10. Wood 0.60 -7.26 
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11. Paper 0.70 -4.61 
12. Pmg. and chemical 0.80 -4.39 
13. Refineries 10.00 -5.72 
14. Rubber and plastic 0.20 -4.39 
15. Iron and steel 2.10 -6.45 
16. Fabrication metal 1.70 -5.98 
17. Vehicle assembly 0.60 2.95 
18. Other 
manufacturing 
1.20 -2.81 
19. Utilities 3.30 -4.83 
20. Building and 
construction 
0.50 -1.87 
21. Transportation 6.20 -7.03 
22. Communication 0.90 -1.05 
23. Distribution trade 1.70 -3.44 
24. Hotel and restaurant 0.30 -6.67 
25. Finance and 
insurance 
1.30 -6.67 
26. Business services 0.60 -4.70 
27. Housing 0.60 -1.89 
28. Commercial services 0.30 -4.03 
 
Source: Authors’ computation using data from Nigerian Institute of Social 
and Economic Research (2012). 
 The above data shows that increase in petroleum prices has 
profound economy wide effects as shown on table 5.7 above. Indeed 
price subsidy withdrawals based on imported products without local 
supply from domestic refineries have a negative impact on various 
sectors of the economy. 
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 As an illustration, the table 5.7 indicates that if there is an increase 
of 10% in the pump prices of petroleum products, there will be an 
increase of 0.20% cost in agricultural sector with -4.35% decreases in 
output. There will also be a decrease of -1.69% in livestock output. The 
forestry sector will have a cost rise of 0.60% with a decrease in output to 
the tune of -4.07%. Fishing will have a rise in cost by 0.60% and a 
decline in output by -3.90%. The data also reveals that petroleum sector 
will record a 4.02% rise in cost and -3.37% declines in output. The same 
goes with other mining sector which will receive a cost rise of 1.80%, 
with output decline of -3.33%. Drinks, beverages and tobacco sector will 
have cost increase of 0.70%, and output decline of -3.84%. Textile 
sector will record 0.60% increase and a decrease in output of -3.35%. 
Foot wear will have 0.90% cost increase and -6.09% decreases in output. 
A further look at the data also shows a 6.2% increased cost in 
transportation sector, with -7.03% decreases in output and utility sector 
3% increase in cost with -4.83% decreases in output etc. Conclusively, it 
shows that there will be significant decreases in output in all sectors with 
transportation and wood suffering the severer decline.   
 Going by the above therefore, the goal of introducing a subsidy 
withdrawal policy is far from being realistic. In chapter three of this thesis 
we have reviewed the position of the Federal Government of Nigeria 
where it argues that among the advantages of a deregulation policy is 
that it will expose the domestic oil market to the prices obtained in the 
international market which will bring efficiency in the downstream oil 
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market itself and will also bring efficiency in the energy usage in all the 
sectors of the economy which would stimulate growth and development 
in the economy. Unfortunately however, the results of this study indicate 
that none of the three types of economic inefficiencies were abated by 
the introduction of deregulation policy. For example, it was posited in the 
literature that there are three types of economic inefficiencies which 
include; technical and or managerial inefficiency, scale inefficiency and 
price or allocation inefficiency. A situation as the one reported in table 5.7 
above negates every definition of efficiency, because a situation that 
raises the cost of input and reduces the quantity of output is everything 
but efficiency. As mentioned in the literature review chapter three, 
technical inefficiency is a situation where the actual inputs exceeds the 
minimum required to produce the scale efficient output with cost 
minimising input ratio. While, scale inefficiency is a situation where the 
actual output is less than the cost minimising output, furthermore, price 
or allocation inefficiency is a condition under which actual input ratio 
differs from the cost minimizing input ratio. All these were not achieved 
under the Nigeria’s downstream oil sector deregulation strategy. 
 This may not be unconnected with the fact that the federal 
government of Nigeria has not taken a critical look at the country’s 
macroeconomic condition as an oil producing state prior to introduction of 
deregulation policy. As postulated in chapter three where taxonomy of 
downstream oil sector deregulation was carried out, countries can 
deregulate their downstream oil sector or introduce subsidy based on 
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their resource endowment and refining capacity (Bacon and Kojima 
2006). Under this situation scholars have classified countries into three 
categories, depending on their petroleum resources endowment;  
1. Countries without refining capacity, which is further subdivided 
into two; (i) oil producing and (ii) non-oil producing 
2. Oil producing countries with refining capacity 
3. Non-Oil producing countries with refining capacity     
 According to the above classification Nigeria can be either in group 
1(i) or group 2 above, it can on the other hand be in both groups. This 
means Nigeria is an oil producing country with refining capacity on one 
hand because it refines part of the products consumed in the country 
using its four refineries. On the other hand Nigeria can be said to be an 
oil producing country without refining capacity because it cannot refine 
enough products to satisfy its domestic needs. Therefore, for the purpose 
of this analysis we are going to consider Nigeria as an oil producing 
country without refining capacity because it imports a substantial part of 
the refined petroleum consumed locally.  
 Under this situation, using Bacon and Kojima (2006) frame work 
the country has two options either to deregulate the sector and allow 
market forces to determine the prices of petroleum products or introduce 
a subsidy. If the country decides to deregulate as is the case with 
Nigeria, domestic oil prices will be arrived at by adding the cost of 
imported product, whole sellers and retailer’s margin plus specific and 
value added taxes. This can be expressed as follows: 
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PR = (Pi + M +T) x (1 + )                                               (Equation 5.1) 
Where: 
PR = retail price per unit of a product  
Pi = per unit price of an imported product 
M = Domestic marketers margin (wholesale, retail, storage and internal 
transport) 
T = specific tax on one unit of product sold 
 = tax rate on one unit value of final sale 
If the government choses the second option and desires to bring down 
the price at retail level it can achieve that in four different ways.     
 Pay a subsidy to importers in order to reduce the effective cost of 
imported product (Pi)  
 Pay a subsidy to wholesalers or retailers in order to reduce the 
internal marketers margin (M)   
 Reduce the specific (T) or value added ( ) tax rates 
 Reduce the final pump price (PR) by paying a subsidy to retailers 
 Second option was the situation in Nigeria from 1973 when a 
subsidy was introduced in the downstream sector of the oil industry, 
where distribution subsidies were paid to middle men through Petroleum 
Equalisation Fund and other form of subsidies were paid through the 
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Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), and no taxes were 
imposed.   
 That has made possible the development of agro-allied and import 
substitution industries. It has also led to the development of a large 
number of small and medium scale enterprises which became one of the 
largest employers of labour in the country (Bazilian and Onyeji, 2012). 
Clearly the country experienced growth and a low level of unemployment 
rate during that period. 
 With the introduction of a deregulation policy however, the cost of 
production became high and as of May 2007 about 30% of all 
manufacturing industries in the country had shut down, about 60% were 
operating below their installed capacity and only about 10% were 
operating at a sustainable level (Bazilian and Onyeji, 2012). 
From the above, it can be clearly seen that the Nigeria’s federal 
government decision to deregulate the downstream oil sector in line with 
the classical theory of free market, where forces of demand and supply 
sets the prices of goods and services in the economy, has not brought 
the desired results of allocating resources for the production and 
consumptions of goods and services to meet the need of all sectors in the 
economy.  
 The supposed optimisation assumption in the allocation of 
resources and profit maximisation through perfect competition associated 
with free market economy may not be applicable to all situations.  What 
the promulgators of deregulation policy in the Nigerian government failed 
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to understand is that the free market theory and its optimisation 
assumptions depends on a series of conditions, assumptions and 
circumstances which according to a report of the World Energy Council 
(2001 p. 1) “are more stringent than those likely to exist in the real 
world, and especially in developing countries”.  In Nigeria the question of 
inefficiencies associated with imperfect market mechanisms, the 
existence of market failures and the peculiarity of the oil sector where the 
number of producers and or suppliers is small need to be addressed. This 
is because for a perfect competition market to exist there must be large 
number of buyers and sellers in the market. Otherwise even the 
deregulation policy itself instead of leading to competition in the sector, it 
will only succeed in creating monopoly and oligopoly with all their 
attendant negative consequences on the other sectors of the economy.   
 For the above reasons therefore, deregulating the downstream oil 
sector along the line of classical free market theory of price mechanism 
may not redress the problem of the downstream oil sector in Nigeria. In 
its report entitled ‘Pricing Energy in Developing Countries’ the World 
Energy Council shows the relevance of subsidising energy in the 
developing countries where it states thus; 
“The failure of the price system to allocate resources efficiently, in all 
situations and for all actors, is of interest for various reasons. It implies 
that market prices do not necessarily reflect marginal social benefits or 
costs, and that market profitability does not necessarily reflect net social 
benefits and costs. Also, the failure of market to allocate resources 
efficiently provides reasons to consider supplementary mechanisms, 
intervention or corrective devises to induce market to function more 
efficiently. The two best known and commonly used intervention devises 
are taxes and subsidies, which consequently makes them of major 
 185 
interest in the context of energy markets, where market reform must go 
hand in hand with appropriate regulation”  
 
(A report of the World Energy Council 2001 pp 1-2). 
 
The Report continues to suggest that;  
 
“’Pure’ economic efficiency is not the only criterion that may be used for 
utility pricing, and many policy makers and prominent economists have 
argued that equity or income distribution ought to be taken into 
consideration as well” (op cite 2001).  
 
  In the case of Nigeria the survival of small and medium scale 
enterprises and indeed the whole manufacturing sector and the 
protection of jobs ought to be taken into consideration in the pricing of 
oil. This is because, contrary to the classical theory of market efficiency 
and the assumption that any economically desirable outcome can be 
achieved via market forces provided the market condition is appropriate. 
However, according to a report of the World Energy Council (2001) such 
an appropriate market condition clearly does not exist in most developing 
countries. At this juncture the appropriate question to ask is how does a 
country with such market imperfection make progress towards achieving 
the goal of economic growth, increased productivity, generate 
employment, and achieve prosperity for all its people and ultimate 
development? The answer to this as suggested by a report of World 
Energy Council (2001p.3) is simple where it states thus; “transfer 
payments are one technique, but obviously subsidies are a very appealing 
and easy method to apply”. 
 Another point, worthy of note is that, developing countries such as 
Nigeria need to look at their peculiarities before embarking on any policy. 
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For example, a country like Nigeria with weak institutions and inadequate 
infrastructure cannot copy a policy just because that policy has worked in 
the developed countries. This is due to the fact that in developed 
countries the primary challenge of market reform is to bring prices down 
to the competitive cost of service. However, in developing countries like 
Nigeria, due to inadequate infrastructure and high cost of fuelling 
generators as a result of deregulation policy and inadequate power 
supply, the primary challenge is to set prices high enough in order to 
cover the cost of production. This creates a situation where the prices of 
the goods produced by the domestic industries and the services they 
provide become unaffordable for many people in the country. Law of 
demand postulates a negative relationship between price and quantity 
demanded. That is the higher the price the lower will be the quantity 
demanded. This condition usually results into economic recession and 
stagnation. It could also ignite a vicious circle of recession where low 
demand leads to low profit, which in turn leads to low investment and 
results into low productivity and loss of jobs. This therefore makes it 
imperative for the government to intervene in the economy alongside the 
market forces as advocated by Keynes and in line with the doctrine of 
mixed economy. This answers research question RQ 3.1 which states 
thus: Which economic theory will best suit Nigerian economy in relation 
to the deregulation of the downstream oil sector?   
 With regards to the unemployment rate, the result of impulse 
response function shows that changes in petroleum prices has a negative 
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effect on unemployment rate in the beginning of the observation period 
up to the fourth quarter. It became positive in the fifth quarter which 
continues up to the end of the twentieth quarter period. This means that 
the shock in prices of petroleum has a positive effect on unemployment 
rate in the economy. The result answered the research question RQ: 3.3 
which read thus; what will be the short run and long run effect of 
deregulation on Nigeria’s labour market?  
 Furthermore, the result of the impulse response function on the 
effect of the domestic oil price increase on unemployment rate shows 
persisting positive effect on unemployment. In other words it indicates 
higher unemployment rate in the economy and this answers research 
question RQ: 3.4 rose earlier which reads thus; will change in petroleum 
prices in Nigeria due to deregulation have indirect negative effect on 
industrial production due to high cost of production and lead to a loss of 
jobs and negatively affect employment? The result has also answered a 
similar research question raised in chapter two which reads thus; will 
subsidy removal via deregulation increase the prices of petroleum 
products and thereby increase the cost of production which will make 
producers cut down production and increase unemployment in the 
economy?  
 Another significant feature of the result of the impulse response 
function on unemployment rate is that, going by the result we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis 9.0: rose in chapter three which read thus; 
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there is no relationship between domestic oil prices and employment. 
Therefore, the result could not provide strong evidence to support the 
alternate hypothesis 9.A which states that; there is a relationship between 
domestic oil prices and employment. This is because even though the 
result of the test indicates that the shock has brought about increased 
employment in the beginning of the observation period, the results 
reveals increased unemployment in the later period of the observation. 
This is consistent with the findings of Papapetrou, (2001) who examines 
the oil price shock, stock market, economic activity and employment in 
Greece. She employed a multivariate vector-auto regression model to find 
the dynamic relationship between real oil price, interest rate, industrial 
production and employment rate. Papapetrou’s findings reveal that oil 
price shock has negative effect on industrial production and employment. 
Conversely this is inconsistent with the findings of Keane and Prasad 
(1996) who shows positive result of oil price shock on unemployment in 
the short run which became negative in the long run. Nevertheless, it 
should be noted that Kean and Prasad conducted their studies on the 
economy of United States of America where the economy is developed. 
However, the economy of Nigeria, the focus of this research is developing 
and hence the findings became opposite. Little wonder therefore, that 
while the price shock results into increased employment in United States 
of America in the long run it results into increased unemployment in 
Nigeria. This has also vindicated the assertion of Carruth, et al (1998) 
and Davies and Haltiwanger (2001) who shows that effect of oil price 
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increase on the labour market can differ according to considered horizon 
either long run or short run. It could also depend on the level of 
economic development of the country under study. 
 The initial negative effect of the domestic oil price increase on 
unemployment in Nigeria can be explained by the fact that every period 
of domestic petroleum price increase is followed by a boost in black 
market activities which provides seasonal (ad-hoc) employment to the 
citizens especially the youth who constitute the larger body of the 
unemployed in the country. Therefore, in the later period when the prices 
normalised the activities of the black market wanes and the rate of 
unemployment rises. This has confirmed the views expressed by labour 
unions and other civil society organisations in Nigeria who argues that 
changes in the domestic petroleum prices as a result of subsidy 
withdrawal will lead to increased unemployment in the country. 
 The result of a variance decomposition test on unemployment rate 
shows that increase in domestic petroleum prices in Nigeria has 
significant influence on unemployment rate. The result as shown in table 
5.5 indicates that 7% changes in unemployment rate in the first quarter 
of the observation period is as a result of increase in domestic petroleum 
prices, it rose to more than 11% in the tenth quarter, to more than 23% 
and 31% in the fifteenth and twentieth quarters respectively. 
 This has buttressed the results of the impulse response function 
analysed above. In view of this result therefore, we reject the null 
 190 
hypothesis 3.0: rose in chapter two which states that; there is no 
significant relationship between increase in petroleum prices and 
unemployment rate in Nigeria and accept the alternate hypothesis 3.A: 
which states that; there is a significant relationship between increase in 
domestic petroleum prices and unemployment rate in Nigeria.  
 A closer look at the results of Granger causality test on 
unemployment rate reveals that neither change in LPEP Granger cause 
UNEMPRTSIS nor does changes in UNEMPRTSIS Granger causes LPEP. 
This shows that the two variables are independent of one another. It is 
however noteworthy that the mere fact that there is no granger causality 
among these two variables does not mean no relationship at all because; 
“Granger-causality really means only a correlation between the current 
value of one variable and the past values of others; it does not mean that 
movements of one variable cause movements of another” (Brooks 2011 p 
298).   
 Added to that, it is worthy to have a second look at the impulse 
response function which shows negative effect of subsidy withdrawal on 
unemployment in the beginning of the observation period which became 
positive at the later stage. This shows that in the long run subsidy 
withdrawal policy in Nigeria results into increased unemployment. As 
indicated above, subsidy withdrawal policy in Nigeria is based on 
imported products, which means Nigeria as an oil producing country 
cannot refine enough petroleum products for its domestic consumption. 
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It has to relay on imported products, thereby exporting employment and 
importing unemployment, because when Nigeria import refined products, 
the refineries in exporting countries will produce more and employ more 
people and resources while Nigerians remain unemployed due to the 
failure to expand the existing refineries and build new ones in order to 
boost products supply and generate employment in the process.  
 Furthermore, high cost of imported products and the high cost of 
domestically refined products as a result of subsidy withdrawal policy 
results into higher cost of production to the domestic industries that 
depend on fuelled generators because of near absence of electricity 
supply in the country (Bazilian and Onyeji 2012). This situation forces 
them to scale down production and reduce their workforce and in some 
cases fold up completely, as is the case with textiles industries. According 
to ‘Frontier Market Intelligence’ an online tabloid of ‘Trade Invest Nigeria’ 
accessed on (22/06/2014) 
 “The textile industry of Nigeria used to be one of the biggest in Africa 
and one of the largest employers in the country. The sector has however 
shrunk dramatically and many companies have closed shop with the 
smuggling of cheap foreign textile materials and clothing into the 
Nigerian market being one of the main reasons for this collapse. Prices of 
local materials have also become much higher than its imported 
counterparts due to increased production costs”.  
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 The above quotation shows how subsidy withdrawal at the 
downstream oil market results into high cost of production, as a result of 
high oil prices to fuel machines and generators which in turn leads to 
shrinking of some textiles companies and the closing of many others. 
This has resulted in the laying off of workers to reduce cost in the case of 
the former and a colossal loss of jobs in the case of the latter. The above 
scenario with regards to textiles industry is just an example of one sector, 
the same is the case with almost all the other economic sectors in the 
country. 
 Turning to minimum wage, the result of the Impulse response 
function reveals that increase in domestic petroleum prices has a 
negative effect on the minimum wages in the early quarters of the 
observation up to the tenth quarter when it becomes positive and 
persisted up to the twentieth quarter study period, which indicates 
positive effect in the later stage. Going by the results observed we reject 
the null Hypothesis 4.0:  which states that; there is no relationship 
between subsidy withdrawal at the downstream oil sector and minimum 
wage in the Nigerian economy. We in turn accept the alternate 
Hypothesis 4.A:  which states that; there is a relationship between 
subsidy withdrawal at the downstream oil sector and minimum wage in 
the Nigerian economy. In the same vain, the result makes us reject the 
null hypothesis 8.0 raised in the chapter three which states that; There is 
no relationship between subsidy withdrawal at the downstream oil sector 
and minimum wage. We in turn accept the alternate hypothesis 8.A: 
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which states thus; there is a relationship between subsidy withdrawal at 
the downstream oil sector and minimum wage. 
 In view of the above it can be concluded that increase in LPEP has 
a short term negative effect on MINWAG which becomes positive in the 
long run. The finding on long run effect is inconsistent with the concept 
of inflation effect on fixed income. Theoretically inflation affects fixed 
income earners negatively because it erodes the real value of money paid 
to them. However this can be explained by the fact that every increase in 
the prices of petroleum products in Nigeria is followed by increased in 
wages through the review of minimum wage act. Therefore, the short 
period negative effect represent the period before wage increase while 
the later stage effect represent the period that follows the wage increase. 
However, this finding is consistent with the findings of Clarke and Edward 
(1998). Using a simplified general equilibrium model on Japan they 
observes that downstream oil sector deregulation policy leads to a rise of 
about 0.70 percent in real wage and 0.13 percent rise in GDP.   
  When we focus on the results of variance decomposition on 
MINWAG it shows that changes in domestic petroleum prices does not 
have much effect on minimum wage which indicates 0.0% in the first 
quarter of the observation period and rose to a dismal 4.6% in the 
twentieth quarter study period. This could be as a result of wage 
increases after each rise in the domestic oil price as explained above. 
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 In the same way the result of Granger causality test indicates that 
neither does LPEP granger-causes LMINWAG nor does LMINWAG 
Granger-causes LPEP. Therefore, there is no Granger-causality either 
way.  
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5.7 CONCLUSION  
 This chapter assessed the effect of subsidy withdrawal in the 
downstream oil sector on the economic growth of Nigeria using quarterly 
time series data from 1980q1 to 2012q4. The main focus is on the 
dynamic relationship between an increase in oil prices as a result of 
subsidy withdrawal at the downstream oil sector in Nigeria and four 
macroeconomic variables namely; GDP, INF, UNEMPSIS and MINWAG. 
The main instrument of the data analyses is the Vector Auto Regression 
Model techniques, using; Impulse Response Function, Variance 
decomposition and Granger causality. Added to that, Augmented Dickey 
Fuller (ADF) and Philip Perron (PP) techniques were employed to check 
the time series characteristics of the data, while Johansen cointegration 
test using both Trace and Maximum Eigen value was carried out to test 
the long run relationship of the variables.   
 The ADF and PP tests indicate that INF is stationary at its level, 
while the remaining variables which are PEP, GDP, UNEMPRSIS and 
MINWAG were non stationary at their level but are stationary at first 
difference. Furthermore the Johansen cointegration test was carried out 
to test for long run relationship among the variables employing Trace 
Statistics and Maximum Eigen Value and the result of both the Trace and 
Maximum Eigen value shows that there is no cointegration among the 
variables. 
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 The result of the Impulse response function shows positive impact 
of deregulation on GDP and INF, while the impact was negative in the 
short run on MINWAG and UNEMPRT it also became positive in the long 
run. 
 The result of Variance decomposition indicates that change in 
LPEP is a significant source of variation in GDP, INF and UNEMPRTSIS but 
is not significant in the variation of MINWAG. 
 The result of Granger Causality indicates unidirectional causality 
running from LPEP to LGDP and from INF to LPEP, while there is no 
indication of granger causality either way in the case of LPEP and 
UNEMRTSIS and LPEP and MINWAG. 
 Overall it can be concluded that there is a strong relationship 
between variation in domestic oil price and major macro-economic 
variables in Nigeria, and variation in domestic oil price is a strong source 
of variation in the economic growth of Nigeria. 
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6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 In this chapter the summary of the thesis and conclusions based 
on the research findings are presented. It also presents the contribution 
of this research to the body of knowledge and highlights the limitations of 
the study and suggests areas for further research.  
6.2 SUMMARY OF THE STUDY 
 This study was undertaken to determine the effect of subsidy 
withdrawal at the downstream sector of the Nigerian oil industry on the 
economic growth of the country. Literature shows that there was long 
standing decay in the Nigerian’s oil sector (see for example Ribadu 2012, 
and Ariweriokuma S. 2009) especially the downstream sector which was 
characterised by inadequate refining capacity due to small number of 
refineries, which are operating below their installed capacities. The 
refineries were operating far below their installed capacity because of 
skipping the routine turn-around maintenance due to poor funding of 
refineries and gradual decline in infrastructural investment in the sector. 
There was also the prevalence of pipeline vandalism and product 
smuggling (FGN 2005). These problems coupled with rapid increase in 
the demand for petroleum products resulted in product scarcity which 
manifest in long queues of vehicles at filling stations and black marketing 
in the country.  
 In order to address the problems mentioned above, the federal 
government of Nigeria resorted to a massive importation of refined 
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petroleum products. However, products importation came with new 
challenges; firstly is the huge amount of foreign currency required in 
financing the importation and secondly the large scale fraud associated 
with financing the importation of refined products (Ribadu 2012) and 
(Aliyu SUR. and Elijah AO. 2008). This added to the argument that the 
subsidy in the sector does not benefit the targeted beneficiaries; that is 
the low income in the society, culminated into the decision to withdraw 
subsidy in the sector.  
 However, the labour unions and other civil society organisations 
were of the view that subsidy withdrawal at the downstream oil sector 
under the prevailing condition in Nigeria where there is inadequate power 
supply and where manufacturing sector largely depends on fuel 
generators to run their machineries (Bazilian M. and Onyeji I. 2012) will 
bring negative effect on output, employment and wages. It will also 
trigger inflation into the economy. 
 In view of the above two conflicting arguments this empirical 
study was conducted to find the effect of subsidy withdrawal at the 
downstream oil sector on the economic growth of Nigeria.  To achieve 
the aim of the study, four major macroeconomic variables which are; 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Inflation, Unemployment rate and 
Minimum wage were tested against the change in domestic petroleum 
prices (PEP). To find the effect of subsidy withdrawal at the downstream 
 200 
oil sector on the economic growth of Nigeria, the quarterly time series 
data was used from 1980 q1 to 2012q4.   
 The methodology employed for the study is Unrestricted Vector 
Autoregressive Model (VAR), where the resultant Impulse Response 
Function, Variance Decomposition and Granger Causality tests are 
conducted and analysed.  Prior to running the VAR, some diagnostic tests 
were carried out on the time series properties of the data to check for the 
problem of unit root using Augmented Dickey Fuller and Philip Peron 
tests. Furthermore, cointegration test was also conducted to check the 
long run relationship among the variables using Johansen cointegration 
test technique, which is based on Maximum Eigen value and Trace 
Statistics. The lag length criteria used was five lags as suggested by: 
sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level) (LR), Final 
prediction error (FPE) and Akaike information criterion (AIC)11.  
6.3 REVISITING THE RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
 In order to achieve the aim of this study, the researcher considers 
six objectives of which there is one main objective and five other specific 
objectives.  
1. The main objective is to look into the dynamic effects of subsidy 
withdrawal at the downstream oil sector on the economic growth of 
Nigeria which was achieved through four specific objectives.  
                                            
11 Appendix 7 contains the full details of lag length selection criteria. 
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The specific objectives are:  
2. To determine the effect of subsidy withdrawal at the downstream 
oil sector on GDP. 
3. To evaluate the effect of subsidy withdrawal at the downstream oil 
sector on Inflation. 
4. To investigate the effect of subsidy withdrawal at the downstream 
oil sector on Minimum wage.  
5. To analyse the effect of subsidy withdrawal at the downstream oil 
sector on Unemployment rate.  
Other specific objective of the study is: 
6.  To suggest possible policy measures and actions as medium and 
long-term solutions to the lingering macroeconomic crisis caused by the 
subsidy withdrawal at the downstream oil-sector. 
 The main research objective and the other specific objectives were 
achieved as follows: 
1. RO1:  To look into the dynamic effects of deregulation of 
downstream oil sector on the economic growth of Nigeria. 
 The main objective was achieved by analysing quarterly data from 
1980q1 to 2012q4 on four major macroeconomic variables in the country. 
This was successfully carried out using unrestricted Vector Auto 
Regressive Model (VAR). The model is a system regression used where 
there is more than one dependent variable. One of the advantages of 
VAR is its ability to capture the relationship between different variables. 
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 As there are more than one dependent variables in this study, VAR 
was employed using Generalised Impulse Response, Variance 
Decomposition and Granger Causality tests to analyse the dynamic 
relationship between the macroeconomic variables and their response to 
changes in domestic petroleum prices in Nigeria. The result of the tests 
suggests that an increase in domestic petroleum prices due to the 
subsidy withdrawal at the downstream oil sector has a negative effect on 
the overall economic growth of Nigeria. Although the result of the 
impulse response function indicates positive relationship between LPEP 
and LGDP, a critical look at the Granger Causality test result shows that 
the positive effect is not as a result of increased productivity but rather a 
result of expansion in government spending. It is therefore concluded 
that there is negative relationship between subsidy withdrawal at the 
downstream oil sector and overall economic growth of Nigeria.  
 To test the robustness of the above findings data from Nigerian 
Institute of Social and Economic Research (NISER 2012) was used to test 
for short run economy-wide effect of 10% increase in petroleum prices in 
addition to the four main variables that were considered in this study. 
The result indicates that subsidy withdrawal at the downstream oil sector 
brings negative effect on the economy. This is clear from the observed 
percentage change on sectorial input versus percentage change in 
sectorial output in Nigeria. The results of deregulation on inflation have 
also buttressed this. Furthermore, the granger causality results on GDP 
which shows that the rise in GDP under the subsidy withdrawal regime is 
 203 
not as a result of increased economic activity but rather a result of 
exogenous factor all pointed to the negative economy-wide effect of 
subsidy withdrawal policy in Nigeria. The same is also the case when 
results of subsidy withdrawal and the unemployment rate are considered. 
This therefore shows that this research objective is achieved. 
 Each of the specific objectives has been met as follows: 
2. RO 2: To determine the effect of subsidy withdrawal at the 
downstream oil sector on GDP. 
 This objective was achieved by analysing quarterly time series 
data collected on GDP from 1980q1 to 2012q4.  The analyses were 
carried out using unrestricted VAR with its resultant Impulse Response 
Function, Variance Decomposition and Granger Causality tests.  
 The result of the impulse response function indicates positive 
response of GDP to rise in domestic petroleum prices due to the subsidy 
withdrawal at the downstream oil sector in Nigeria.  The positive response 
is statistically significant between the 4th and 8th quarter. The statistical 
significance observed in these quarters can be explained by the fact that 
subsidy withdrawal brings extra income to government in the form of 
retained revenue which would have been spent in subsidy payment. The 
government in turn injects that revenue into the economy by way of 
increased spending. However, that increased spending is injected slowly 
and is absorbed slowly into the economy. Therefore, the first three 
quarters represent the window period when the increased spending was 
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yet to make significant impact in the economy and the remaining periods 
after the 8th quarter, this represents the period when the impact was 
slowly dying down as the economy adjusts to the increase.         
 The result of Variance decomposition shows that changes in 
domestic petroleum prices in Nigeria is a significant source of variation 
for GDP. It explains more than 10% of variation in GDP in the 5th 
quarter, more than 14% by the tenth quarter, and then declining to more 
than 7% in the 20th quarter. This means that there is strong relationship 
between subsidy withdrawal at the downstream oil sector and GDP growth 
in Nigeria.  
 Granger causality test indicates that changes in domestic 
petroleum prices as a result of subsidy withdrawal at the downstream oil 
sector granger causes GDP while changes in GDP does not granger 
causes changes in domestic petroleum prices. This means that the 
increase in GDP is not as a result of increased productivity in the 
economy but rather a result of an exogenous factor which in this case is 
subsidy withdrawal at the downstream oil sector.12  
 It is therefore concluded that notwithstanding the positive 
response of GDP to change in petroleum prices there is no real 
improvement in productivity in the economy.  
3. RO3: Evaluate the effect of subsidy withdrawal at the downstream 
oil sector on Inflation. 
                                            
12 These results were interpreted in detail and the implications of the results were fully 
discussed in chapter five of this thesis. 
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 This objective was also achieved by analysing the quarterly time 
series data from 1980q1 to 2012q4 on inflation in Nigeria. The method of 
measurement was the use of unrestricted VAR employing Impulse 
Response Function, Variance Decomposition and Granger Causality tests. 
The result of Impulse response function suggests that in the short run 
inflation responds positively to the changes in domestic petroleum price 
which becomes negative in the long run.  
 The result of Variance Decomposition indicates that changes in 
petroleum price due to subsidy withdrawal at the downstream oil sector 
are a significant source of variation in inflation in Nigeria. This means that 
there is strong relationship between deregulation of downstream oil 
sector and inflation in Nigeria. 
 The result of Granger causality test suggests that changes in 
domestic petroleum price due to the subsidy withdrawal at the 
downstream oil sector Granger causes inflation in Nigeria. However, 
inflation does not Granger causes changes in domestic petroleum price in 
Nigeria. The import of this result is that increase of petroleum prices was 
not as a result of inflation in the economy. However, the rise in inflation 
is as a result of an increase in the prices of petroleum products. It is 
therefore concluded that subsidy withdrawal at the downstream oil sector 
results into a rise in inflation in Nigeria. 
4. RO4: Investigate the effect of subsidy withdrawal at the 
downstream oil sector on Minimum wage. 
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 As was the case in analysing the other variables, quarterly time 
series data from 1980q1 to 2012q4 on minimum wages in Nigeria was 
collected and analysed. The analysis was done using unrestricted VAR 
and the Impulse Response Function, Variance Decomposition and 
Granger Causality tests were conducted.  
 The result of the Impulse Response Function shows negative 
response of minimum wage in Nigeria to the changes in domestic 
petroleum prices in the early stage of the observation period which 
becomes positive in the later stage.  
 The result of Variance Decomposition indicates that changes in 
domestic petroleum prices as a result of subsidy withdrawal at the 
downstream oil sector have dismal effect on minimum wage in Nigeria.  
 Result of Granger Causality test suggests that changes in domestic 
petroleum prices as a result of deregulation of the downstream oil sector 
does not Granger cause minimum wage nor does minimum wage Granger 
causes changes in domestic petroleum prices.  
 Based on the above results it is concluded that subsidy withdrawal 
at the downstream oil sector has dismal effects on the minimum wage in 
Nigeria in the long run even though it affects it in the short run. The 
implication of these results is that the policy of subsidy withdrawal in 
Nigeria has no long term significant effect on minimum wage. This is 
because from the literature reviewed and the data obtained on Minimum 
wage in Nigeria, it was discovered that whenever the government tinkers 
with the price of petroleum in line with deregulation policy, it is always 
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followed by increases in wages and an upward review of minimum wage. 
This is as a result of industrial actions embarked by trade unions to 
protect their members whenever petroleum prices are reviewed in line 
with deregulation policy. This therefore shows that the above research 
objective was realised. 
5. RO5: Analyse the effect of subsidy withdrawal at the downstream 
oil sector on Unemployment rate.  
 To achieve this objective data on unemployment rate was 
collected and analysed using an unrestricted VAR employing Impulse 
Response Function, Variance Decomposition and Granger Causality tests.  
 The result of Impulse Response Function reveals that in the short 
run unemployment rate responds negatively to the changes in petroleum 
prices which become positive in the long run. This means that in the 
short run changes in domestic petroleum prices results in lowering 
unemployment rate. It however creates more unemployment in Nigeria in 
the long run.  
 The result of Variance Decomposition shows that changes in 
domestic petroleum prices are a significant source of variation in 
unemployment rate in Nigeria. It can be seen that the changes in 
domestic oil prices accounts from, 7% to more than 31% of variations of 
unemployment rate under the review period. 
 The result of Granger causality test suggests that there is no 
Granger causality between changes in domestic petroleum prices and 
unemployment rate in Nigeria. 
 208 
 The significance of these results is that although subsidy 
withdrawal policy has reduced the incidence of unemployment in the 
country in the short run, yet it worsens it in the long run. 
 Going by the above results, it is concluded that there is strong 
relationship between subsidy withdrawal at the downstream oil sector 
and increase of unemployment rate in Nigeria. It is further concluded that 
a deregulation policy has in the long run a positive effect on 
unemployment in Nigeria. This therefore shows that the above research 
objective was attained. 
6. RO6: To suggest possible policy measures and actions as short, 
medium and long-term solutions to the lingering macroeconomic crisis 
caused by the subsidy withdrawal at the downstream oil-sector in the 
economy. 
 To achieve this objective it was suggested as follows: 
 That Nigeria as an oil producing country should use its oil 
resources in a way that will boost other sectors of the economy and bring 
the desired growth. This can be achieved in the short and medium term 
by employing the Bacon and Kojima (2006) framework13 of given implicit 
subsidy on petroleum products. This is against paying explicit subsidy 
which is very expensive and gives room for fraud. According to them, 
subsidies are said to be explicit when a sum of money is paid to the 
                                            
13 Bacon and Kojima framework was discussed in detail in the chapter three of this 
thesis. 
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importers, transporters, wholesalers and retailers by the government. On 
the other hand the subsidies are implicit where possible government 
revenues are foregone through lower or zero taxes and by selling 
government owned crude oil to domestic market and or domestic 
refineries below international market price.  
 It is the opinion of the researcher that introducing implicit subsidy 
will make petroleum products cheaper in the country and benefits both 
the low income segment of the society and other productive sectors in 
the economy. This suggestion is made considering the fact that it was 
discovered in this thesis that manufacturing, agricultural, transport and 
indeed all other productive sectors in the country depends on oil to 
operate14. Therefore, in order to reduce the cost of production there is a 
need to reduce the cost of petroleum products which is a major input in 
most of the productive sectors in Nigeria. Another reason is that there is 
inadequate power supply in Nigeria (Bazilian and Onyeji 2012). 
Therefore, producers depend on petrol and diesel to fuel their generators 
in order to operate their machines. A subsidised downstream oil sector 
will ease the problem of fuelling generators. It will also boost 
productivity, and lead to the creation of more jobs and reduces the 
incidence of unemployment. It is pertinent to point out at this juncture 
that notwithstanding the problems associated with subsidizing 
downstream oil sector as discussed in chapter two of this thesis it is the 
                                            
14 For details see chapter five of this thesis. 
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view of the researcher that the Nigerian Customs Service and other 
security agencies can curb the menace of petroleum products smuggling 
if the government put emphasis on it. Furthermore other leakages 
associated with it can be adequately controlled by the relevant 
government agencies if the government is serious about promoting the 
economic growth of the country.    
 Another point is that when the cost of input is low, prices of the 
goods and services produced will also be low which will translate into 
lower inflation rate. This will attract high demand for those commodities 
according to the law of demand. This high demand will lead to higher 
profits which will also lead to an increased supply of goods and services, 
expansion in the industrial capacity utilisation and increased productivity. 
This will translate into high GDP growth rate.    
 An additional advantage of the implicit subsidy is that it is not very 
expensive like the explicit subsidy and it does not provide much room for 
fraud as it does not involve direct money payment to refined oil 
importers, middle men and transporters.    
 Based on the results of this study one could suggest that in the 
short term the government should revive the existing refineries and 
modernise them. While in the medium term the Nigerian government 
should build many small and medium scale petroleum refineries to 
complement the old ones and to cater for the rising demand of petroleum 
products in the domestic market. This will create more jobs, eliminate the 
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need to import refined products from abroad and will enable the country 
to conserve foreign currency. 
 In our analyses chapter it was discovered that there is positive 
relationship between increase in domestic oil price due to subsidy 
withdrawal and unemployment. In order to address that problem it is 
further suggested that in the long term Nigeria should build large modern 
refineries. This will change the country from refined oil importer to 
refined oil exporter. It will also bring additional revenue to the country 
and lead to a favourable balance of payments and translate into 
economic growth. It is ironical to see non-oil producing countries having 
large modern oil refineries while a country like Nigeria with vast oil and 
gas deposits is managing only four old refineries. It is even more curious 
to see non-oil producing countries exporting refined petroleum while 
Nigeria as an OPEC member and 12th largest producer of crude oil in the 
world (EIA. 2012) is importing refined petroleum products for its 
domestic needs. Under this scenario Nigeria is exporting employment and 
importing unemployment, because whenever Nigeria exports crude oil it 
makes it possible for those importing countries to operate refineries and 
provide employment in their economies. In the same manner when 
Nigeria imports refined petroleum it is importing unemployment because 
that foregone refining activity could have provided lots of jobs in the 
country.    
 The government should also encourage private investors to build 
refineries and petrochemical industries. This will positively affect other 
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sectors of the economy especially the agricultural sector in terms of the 
provision of fertiliser, pesticides and other related products which are by-
products of petroleum. It will also make the country save large sum of 
foreign currency that are spent every year in the importation of fertilizer 
and other pesticides. According to El-Rufa’i (2011) the Nigerian 
government spent a whopping N4.7 billion (equivalent to $29.4 million) in 
the importation of fertiliser in 2011.  
 It is further suggested that the government should strengthen the 
regulatory and anti-corruption institutions in the country in order to 
eliminate fraud and encourage fair trade and healthy competition in the 
sector. This will translate into a reduced cost of operation to the private 
investors and create jobs for the citizens. 
 The researcher is of the opinion that pipeline vandalism has direct 
relationship with youth unemployment. Therefore, when the youth are 
gainfully employed the problem of pipeline vandalism will reduce if not 
will be completely eliminated.   
 Based on the results of this work it was found that the activities of 
smugglers of petroleum products contributes in the products shortages 
and triggers inflation in the economy. This erodes the purchasing power 
of fixed income earners and negatively affects minimum wage. It is 
therefore suggested that the government should strengthen the Nigerian 
Custom Service and other security personnel that are responsible for 
protecting the boarders of Nigeria in order to effectively put the 
smuggling of petroleum under control. Otherwise the implicit 
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subsidisation and all its attended advantages that have been suggested 
above will not bring the desired results. 
6.4  CONTRIBUTION OF THIS RESEARCH TO THE 
FRONTIER OF KNOWLEDGE 
 This research makes contribution to the existing literature by 
focusing on the effect of increase in petroleum prices as a result of 
subsidy withdrawal due to the deregulation of the downstream oil sector 
on the economic growth of Nigeria. The existing literature has made 
several attempts at studying the effect of oil price shock on the economic 
growth of many countries. Even on the Nigerian economy there is a large 
body of literature on the relationship between oil price shocks and 
economic growth. However, while those studies focus their attentions on 
the effect of changes in crude oil price in the international market on the 
economic growth of Nigeria, this study is on the effect of domestic oil 
price increase on the economic growth of the country. This is significant 
because Nigeria is an oil producing developing country. Therefore, an 
increase in oil prices in the international market affects its economy 
differently from the way domestic increase in petroleum prices affects the 
economy. While an increase in the crude oil prices in the international 
market brings higher income to the country, domestic increase in 
petroleum prices squeezes money out of the people. That money could 
have been used as an investment in the productive sector which could 
generate profits, employment and further investments.   
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Another area through which this study contributes to knowledge is 
that; this study uses quarterly time series data from 1980q1 to 2012q4 
on five major macroeconomic variables in Nigeria namely; Petroleum 
Price, GDP, Inflation rate, Unemployment rate and Minimum wage and 
come up with empirical analyses of how changes in domestic oil prices 
affects these variables. To the best of my knowledge no previous study 
has done these analyses specifically with the case of Nigerian economy.   
 Another contribution is in the application of econometric approach 
analysing the data by using three different techniques. This provides 
richer understanding and robustness of the results. In this study an 
unrestricted vector autoregressive model (VAR) was used employing 
Impulse Response Function, Variance Decomposition and Granger 
Causality tests to find how the macro economic variables under 
consideration responds to changes in domestic prices of petroleum in 
Nigeria. The result shows significant relationship between variation in 
domestic price of petroleum on three of the four variables, which are 
GDP, Inflation and Unemployment. While no significant relationship was 
found between changes in domestic prices of petroleum and Minimum 
Wage. The result also shows short run positive response of inflation, 
unemployment and minimum wage to changes in domestic price of 
petroleum which becomes negative in the long run. It also shows positive 
response of GDP to changes in domestic petroleum prices both in the 
short run and long run periods.  
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 The study also contributes to knowledge by providing evidence 
that subsidy withdrawal at the downstream oil sector brings inflation in 
the economy, increases the incidence of unemployment and does not 
have much effect on the minimum wage. It also provides evidence that 
the positive response of GDP to changes in domestic petroleum price, as 
indicated by the result of Impulse Response Function is as a result of 
increased government spending from higher revenue available to it, but 
not as a result of increased productivity in the economy. Previous studies 
on the effect of oil price shock on Nigeria’s economy have postulated 
positive effect of oil price shock on GDP growth in Nigeria. However, the 
result of Granger causality test carried out in this research negated this 
view. This could serve as a base for future studies.   
6.5  LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY AND SUGGESTIONS FOR 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
 The issue of subsidy withdrawal at the downstream oil sector in 
Nigeria is an ongoing issue and will continue to attract the attention of 
researchers and government planners. This makes the area attractive for 
future research. 
 The data used, the methodology, results and conclusions of this 
study should serve as a basis for future research on the effect of subsidy 
withdrawal at the downstream oil sector on the economic growth of 
Nigeria. However one of the limitations of this research is that, the results 
obtained and conclusions made may not be applied in other countries 
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because the data used is on Nigerian macroeconomic variables. Using 
different set of data from a different country may give different results. 
However the findings may aid in understanding the relationship between 
subsidy withdrawal at the downstream oil sector and economic growth of 
other countries. Understanding the relationship with regards to other oil 
producing countries is also an area open for future research. 
 Possible extension can be made to this study by adding more 
variables to the estimations. It may be rewarding to investigate the effect 
of subsidy withdrawal at the downstream oil sector on critical welfare 
variables such as poverty rate, transport, housing, health and education.  
 Another area for future research would be to study the effect of 
deregulation of downstream oil sector on the entire economy using 
Computational General Equilibrium Model (CGE). Employing a CGE model 
makes it possible for all social, welfare and economic variables in the 
country to be studied and analysed.  
 As mentioned at the beginning of this section and in chapter three 
of this thesis deregulation of the downstream oil sector in Nigeria is an 
on-going process and is still a partial deregulation. This is because the 
refineries, the depots and the pipelines are still wholly owned by 
government. What is actually deregulated is the price aspect through 
gradual subsidy withdrawal. A further study on this area can be 
conducted when the whole sector is completely deregulated.  
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 Furthermore, as this research uses quantitative approach, other 
areas for future research on this topic are the use of qualitative approach 
where the perception of major players in the downstream oil industry and 
other Nigerians that are affected by the policy could be sought, studied 
and analysed.  
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7 APPENDIXES 
7.1 APPENDIX 1: GRAPHICAL PRESENTATION OF UNIT 
ROOTS TEST 
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7.2 APPENDIX 2: RESULTS OF AUGMENTED DICKEY 
FULLER UNIT ROOT TEST 
 
Null Hypothesis: LPEP has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=12) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -1.908235  0.6446 
Test critical 
values: 1% level  -4.029595  
 5% level  -3.444487  
 10% level  -3.147063  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(LPEP)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 01/17/13   Time: 21:35   
Sample (adjusted): 1980Q2 2012Q4  
Included observations: 131 after adjustments  
     
     
Variable 
Coefficien
t Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     LPEP(-1) -0.059765 0.031320 -1.908235 0.0586 
C -0.090448 0.086848 -1.041451 0.2996 
@TREND(1980Q1) 0.003467 0.001950 1.777834 0.0778 
     
     
R-squared 0.028078 
    Mean dependent 
var 
0.04940
3 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.012892    S.D. dependent var 
0.22425
6 
S.E. of regression 0.222805    Akaike info criterion 
-
0.14240
1 
Sum squared resid 6.354212    Schwarz criterion 
-
0.07655
7 
Log likelihood 12.32726 
    Hannan-Quinn 
criter. 
-
0.11564
5 
F-statistic 1.848920    Durbin-Watson stat 2.18949
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Null Hypothesis: D(LPEP) has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=12) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -12.85338  0.0000 
Test critical 
values: 1% level  -4.030157  
 5% level  -3.444756  
 10% level  -3.147221  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(LPEP,2)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 01/17/13   Time: 21:42   
Sample (adjusted): 1980Q3 2012Q4  
Included observations: 130 after adjustments  
     
     
Variable 
Coefficien
t Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     D(LPEP(-1)) -1.130636 0.087964 -12.85338 0.0000 
C 0.066721 0.040436 1.650047 0.1014 
@TREND(1980Q1) -0.000157 0.000526 -0.298548 0.7658 
     
     
R-squared 0.565387 
    Mean dependent 
var 
-5.95E-
18 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.558542    S.D. dependent var 
0.33839
5 
S.E. of regression 0.224837    Akaike info criterion 
-
0.12407
1 
Sum squared resid 6.420091    Schwarz criterion 
-
0.05789
7 
Log likelihood 11.06463 
    Hannan-Quinn 
criter. 
-
0.09718
3 
F-statistic 82.60691    Durbin-Watson stat 
2.01403
3 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
1 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.161586    
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Null Hypothesis: LGDP has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 4 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=12) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.029407  0.5792 
Test critical 
values: 1% level  -4.034356  
 5% level  -3.446765  
 10% level  -3.148399  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(LGDP)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 01/17/13   Time: 21:54   
Sample (adjusted): 1981Q2 2011Q4  
Included observations: 123 after adjustments  
     
     
Variable 
Coefficien
t Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     LGDP(-1) -0.068107 0.033560 -2.029407 0.0447 
D(LGDP(-1)) -0.078780 0.083723 -0.940967 0.3487 
D(LGDP(-2)) -0.104766 0.083748 -1.250972 0.2135 
D(LGDP(-3)) -0.022924 0.082732 -0.277092 0.7822 
D(LGDP(-4)) 0.424213 0.082502 5.141841 0.0000 
C 0.634967 0.287399 2.209360 0.0291 
@TREND(1980Q1) 0.004169 0.002102 1.983250 0.0497 
     
     
R-squared 0.256537 
    Mean dependent 
var 
0.05524
8 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.218082    S.D. dependent var 
0.11266
3 
S.E. of regression 0.099623    Akaike info criterion 
-
1.71961
3 
Sum squared resid 1.151278    Schwarz criterion 
-
1.55957
0 
Log likelihood 112.7562 
    Hannan-Quinn 
criter. 
-
1.65460
4 
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F-statistic 6.671087    Durbin-Watson stat 
1.99176
5 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000004    
     
      
Null Hypothesis: D(LGDP) has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 3 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=12) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -4.318021  0.0041 
Test critical 
values: 1% level  -4.034356  
 5% level  -3.446765  
 10% level  -3.148399  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(LGDP,2)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 01/17/13   Time: 21:47   
Sample (adjusted): 1981Q2 2011Q4  
Included observations: 123 after adjustments  
     
     
Variable 
Coefficien
t Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     D(LGDP(-1)) -0.886089 0.205207 -4.318021 0.0000 
D(LGDP(-1),2) -0.230528 0.168813 -1.365579 0.1747 
D(LGDP(-2),2) -0.367705 0.127179 -2.891235 0.0046 
D(LGDP(-3),2) -0.412149 0.083377 -4.943188 0.0000 
C 0.053322 0.021580 2.470882 0.0149 
@TREND(1980Q1) -6.58E-05 0.000257 -0.256090 0.7983 
     
     
R-squared 0.660720 
    Mean dependent 
var 
0.00135
9 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.646221    S.D. dependent var 
0.16971
0 
S.E. of regression 0.100942    Akaike info criterion 
-
1.70098
5 
Sum squared resid 1.192154    Schwarz criterion 
-
1.56380
5 
Log likelihood 110.6106 
    Hannan-Quinn 
criter. 
-
1.64526
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3 
F-statistic 45.56952    Durbin-Watson stat 
1.98271
3 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Null Hypothesis: LMINWAG has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=12) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.443058  0.3559 
Test critical 
values: 1% level  -4.029595  
 5% level  -3.444487  
 10% level  -3.147063  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(LMINWAG)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 01/17/13   Time: 22:04   
Sample (adjusted): 1980Q2 2012Q4  
Included observations: 131 after adjustments  
     
     
Variable 
Coefficien
t Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     LMINWAG(-1) -0.080508 0.032954 -2.443058 0.0159 
C 0.296952 0.130641 2.273036 0.0247 
@TREND(1980Q1) 0.004048 0.001587 2.550401 0.0119 
     
     
R-squared 0.049029 
    Mean dependent 
var 
0.03793
8 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.034170    S.D. dependent var 
0.29420
2 
S.E. of regression 0.289132    Akaike info criterion 
0.37876
9 
Sum squared resid 10.70047    Schwarz criterion 
0.44461
3 
Log likelihood -21.80937 
    Hannan-Quinn 
criter. 
0.40552
4 
F-statistic 3.299662    Durbin-Watson stat 
1.97302
5 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.040058    
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Null Hypothesis: D(LMINWAG) has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=12) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -11.51495  0.0000 
Test critical 
values: 1% level  -4.030157  
 5% level  -3.444756  
 10% level  -3.147221  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(LMINWAG,2)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 01/17/13   Time: 22:05   
Sample (adjusted): 1980Q3 2012Q4  
Included observations: 130 after adjustments  
     
     
Variable 
Coefficien
t Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     D(LMINWAG(-1)) -1.021790 0.088736 -11.51495 0.0000 
C 0.003056 0.052983 0.057675 0.9541 
@TREND(1980Q1) 0.000541 0.000696 0.778363 0.4378 
     
     
R-squared 0.510777 
    Mean dependent 
var 
0.00000
0 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.503073    S.D. dependent var 
0.42115
9 
S.E. of regression 0.296888    Akaike info criterion 
0.43188
3 
Sum squared resid 11.19410    Schwarz criterion 
0.49805
7 
Log likelihood -25.07240 
    Hannan-Quinn 
criter. 
0.45877
2 
F-statistic 66.29777    Durbin-Watson stat 
2.00049
3 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Null Hypothesis: UNEMPRTSIS has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=12) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.530826  0.3130 
Test critical 
values: 1% level  -4.029595  
 5% level  -3.444487  
 10% level  -3.147063  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(UNEMPRTSIS)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 01/17/13   Time: 22:07   
Sample (adjusted): 1980Q2 2012Q4  
Included observations: 131 after adjustments  
     
     
Variable 
Coefficien
t Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     UNEMPRTSIS(-1) -0.093157 0.036809 -2.530826 0.0126 
C 0.245757 0.094395 2.603508 0.0103 
@TREND(1980Q1) 0.001521 0.000948 1.603927 0.1112 
     
     
R-squared 0.049038 
    Mean dependent 
var 
0.02137
4 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.034179    S.D. dependent var 
0.27651
9 
S.E. of regression 0.271752    Akaike info criterion 
0.25478
3 
Sum squared resid 9.452708    Schwarz criterion 
0.32062
7 
Log likelihood -13.68825 
    Hannan-Quinn 
criter. 
0.28153
8 
F-statistic 3.300268    Durbin-Watson stat 
1.92782
3 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.040035    
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Null Hypothesis: D(UNEMPRTSIS) has a unit root 
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=12) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -11.35589  0.0000 
Test critical 
values: 1% level  -4.030157  
 5% level  -3.444756  
 10% level  -3.147221  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(UNEMPRTSIS,2)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 01/17/13   Time: 22:08   
Sample (adjusted): 1980Q3 2012Q4  
Included observations: 130 after adjustments  
     
     
Variable 
Coefficien
t Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     D(UNEMPRTSIS(-
1)) -1.007563 0.088726 -11.35589 0.0000 
C 0.041238 0.050011 0.824572 0.4112 
@TREND(1980Q1) -0.000294 0.000654 -0.449359 0.6539 
     
     
R-squared 0.503823 
    Mean dependent 
var 
-5.73E-
18 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.496009    S.D. dependent var 
0.39375
0 
S.E. of regression 0.279532    Akaike info criterion 
0.31140
7 
Sum squared resid 9.923548    Schwarz criterion 
0.37758
1 
Log likelihood -17.24146 
    Hannan-Quinn 
criter. 
0.33829
6 
F-statistic 64.47841    Durbin-Watson stat 
2.00028
2 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Null Hypothesis: INF has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 2 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=12) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.808212  0.0192 
Test critical 
values: 1% level  -4.032498  
 5% level  -3.445877  
 10% level  -3.147878  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(INF)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 01/17/13   Time: 22:09   
Sample (adjusted): 1981Q1 2012Q2  
Included observations: 126 after adjustments  
     
     
Variable 
Coefficien
t Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     INF(-1) -0.367822 0.096586 -3.808212 0.0002 
D(INF(-1)) 0.018408 0.087682 0.209943 0.8341 
D(INF(-2)) -0.406596 0.080407 -5.056749 0.0000 
C 0.024292 0.009412 2.580802 0.0111 
@TREND(1980Q1) -0.000116 9.97E-05 -1.165553 0.2461 
     
     
R-squared 0.415507 
    Mean dependent 
var 6.32E-05 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.396185    S.D. dependent var 
0.05094
9 
S.E. of regression 0.039590    Akaike info criterion 
-
3.58160
2 
Sum squared resid 0.189652    Schwarz criterion 
-
3.46905
1 
Log likelihood 230.6409 
    Hannan-Quinn 
criter. 
-
3.53587
6 
F-statistic 21.50429    Durbin-Watson stat 
2.05623
8 
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Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      
 
Null Hypothesis: D(INF) has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 2 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=12) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -11.73543  0.0000 
Test critical 
values: 1% level  -4.033108  
 5% level  -3.446168  
 10% level  -3.148049  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(INF,2)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 01/17/13   Time: 22:11   
Sample (adjusted): 1981Q2 2012Q2  
Included observations: 125 after adjustments  
     
     
Variable 
Coefficien
t Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     D(INF(-1)) -2.175204 0.185354 -11.73543 0.0000 
D(INF(-1),2) 0.870575 0.123822 7.030849 0.0000 
D(INF(-2),2) 0.234490 0.085139 2.754202 0.0068 
C -0.000480 0.007570 -0.063454 0.9495 
@TREND(1980Q1) -1.86E-06 9.95E-05 -0.018711 0.9851 
     
     
R-squared 0.728371 
    Mean dependent 
var 
-
0.00056
2 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.719316    S.D. dependent var 
0.07571
8 
S.E. of regression 0.040115    Akaike info criterion 
-
3.55496
3 
Sum squared resid 0.193104    Schwarz criterion 
-
3.44183
1 
Log likelihood 227.1852 
    Hannan-Quinn 
criter. 
-
3.50900
3 
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F-statistic 80.44457    Durbin-Watson stat 
1.91100
1 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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7.3 APPENDIX 3: RESULTS OF PHILIPS PERRON UNIT 
ROOT TEST 
Null Hypothesis: LPEP has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Bandwidth: 8 (Newey-West automatic) using Bartlett kernel 
     
        Adj. t-Stat   Prob.* 
     
     Phillips-Perron test statistic -2.056214  0.5648 
Test critical 
values: 1% level  -4.029595  
 5% level  -3.444487  
 10% level  -3.147063  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
     
Residual variance (no correction) 
 0.04850
5 
HAC corrected variance (Bartlett kernel) 
 0.05544
7 
     
          
     
Phillips-Perron Test Equation   
Dependent Variable: D(LPEP)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 01/17/13   Time: 22:26   
Sample (adjusted): 1980Q2 2012Q4  
Included observations: 131 after adjustments  
     
     
Variable 
Coefficien
t Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     LPEP(-1) -0.059765 0.031320 -1.908235 0.0586 
C -0.090448 0.086848 -1.041451 0.2996 
@TREND(1980Q1) 0.003467 0.001950 1.777834 0.0778 
     
     
R-squared 0.028078 
    Mean dependent 
var 
0.04940
3 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.012892    S.D. dependent var 
0.22425
6 
S.E. of regression 0.222805    Akaike info criterion 
-
0.14240
1 
Sum squared resid 6.354212    Schwarz criterion 
-
0.07655
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7 
Log likelihood 12.32726 
    Hannan-Quinn 
criter. 
-
0.11564
5 
F-statistic 1.848920    Durbin-Watson stat 
2.18949
1 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.161586    
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Null Hypothesis: D(LPEP) has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Bandwidth: 7 (Newey-West automatic) using Bartlett kernel 
     
        Adj. t-Stat   Prob.* 
     
     Phillips-Perron test statistic -12.77299  0.0000 
Test critical 
values: 1% level  -4.030157  
 5% level  -3.444756  
 10% level  -3.147221  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
     Residual variance (no correction)  0.049385 
HAC corrected variance (Bartlett kernel)  0.057405 
     
          
     
Phillips-Perron Test Equation   
Dependent Variable: D(LPEP,2)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 01/17/13   Time: 22:38   
Sample (adjusted): 1980Q3 2012Q4  
Included observations: 130 after adjustments  
     
     
Variable 
Coefficien
t Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     D(LPEP(-1)) -1.130636 0.087964 -12.85338 0.0000 
C 0.066721 0.040436 1.650047 0.1014 
@TREND(1980Q1) -0.000157 0.000526 -0.298548 0.7658 
     
     
R-squared 0.565387 
    Mean dependent 
var -5.95E-18 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.558542    S.D. dependent var 0.338395 
S.E. of regression 0.224837    Akaike info criterion -0.124071 
Sum squared resid 6.420091    Schwarz criterion -0.057897 
Log likelihood 11.06463 
    Hannan-Quinn 
criter. -0.097183 
F-statistic 82.60691    Durbin-Watson stat 2.014033 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Null Hypothesis: LGDP has a unit root 
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Bandwidth: 8 (Newey-West automatic) using Bartlett kernel 
     
        Adj. t-Stat   Prob.* 
     
     Phillips-Perron test statistic -2.510316  0.3228 
Test critical 
values: 1% level  -4.031899  
 5% level  -3.445590  
 10% level  -3.147710  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
     
Residual variance (no correction) 
 0.01204
2 
HAC corrected variance (Bartlett kernel) 
 0.01205
8 
     
          
     
Phillips-Perron Test Equation   
Dependent Variable: D(LGDP)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 01/17/13   Time: 22:33   
Sample (adjusted): 1980Q2 2011Q4  
Included observations: 127 after adjustments  
     
     
Variable 
Coefficien
t Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     LGDP(-1) -0.083839 0.033413 -2.509188 0.0134 
C 0.776493 0.291209 2.666444 0.0087 
@TREND(1980Q1) 0.005228 0.002067 2.528972 0.0127 
     
     
R-squared 0.049050 
    Mean dependent 
var 
0.05292
6 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.033712    S.D. dependent var 
0.11297
7 
S.E. of regression 0.111057    Akaike info criterion 
-
1.53421
3 
Sum squared resid 1.529366    Schwarz criterion 
-
1.46702
7 
Log likelihood 100.4225 
    Hannan-Quinn 
criter. 
-
1.50691
6 
F-statistic 3.197934    Durbin-Watson stat 2.17090
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5 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.044237    
     
      
 
 
 
Null Hypothesis: D(LGDP) has a unit root 
 
Null Hypothesis: LMINWAG has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Bandwidth: 1 (Newey-West automatic) using Bartlett kernel 
     
        Adj. t-Stat   Prob.* 
     
     Phillips-Perron test statistic -2.454943  0.3499 
Test critical 
values: 1% level  -4.029595  
 5% level  -3.444487  
 10% level  -3.147063  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
     
Residual variance (no correction) 
 0.08168
3 
HAC corrected variance (Bartlett kernel) 
 0.08275
0 
     
          
     
Phillips-Perron Test Equation   
Dependent Variable: D(LMINWAG)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 01/17/13   Time: 22:45   
Sample (adjusted): 1980Q2 2012Q4  
Included observations: 131 after adjustments  
     
     
Variable 
Coefficien
t Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     LMINWAG(-1) -0.080508 0.032954 -2.443058 0.0159 
C 0.296952 0.130641 2.273036 0.0247 
@TREND(1980Q1) 0.004048 0.001587 2.550401 0.0119 
     
     
R-squared 0.049029 
    Mean dependent 
var 
0.03793
8 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.034170    S.D. dependent var 
0.29420
2 
S.E. of regression 0.289132    Akaike info criterion 0.37876
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9 
Sum squared resid 10.70047    Schwarz criterion 
0.44461
3 
Log likelihood -21.80937 
    Hannan-Quinn 
criter. 
0.40552
4 
F-statistic 3.299662    Durbin-Watson stat 
1.97302
5 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.040058    
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Null Hypothesis: D(LMINWAG) has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Bandwidth: 3 (Newey-West automatic) using Bartlett kernel 
     
        Adj. t-Stat   Prob.* 
     
     Phillips-Perron test statistic -11.51885  0.0000 
Test critical 
values: 1% level  -4.030157  
 5% level  -3.444756  
 10% level  -3.147221  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
     
Residual variance (no correction) 
 0.08610
8 
HAC corrected variance (Bartlett kernel) 
 0.08306
2 
     
          
     
Phillips-Perron Test Equation   
Dependent Variable: D(LMINWAG,2)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 01/17/13   Time: 22:46   
Sample (adjusted): 1980Q3 2012Q4  
Included observations: 130 after adjustments  
     
     
Variable 
Coefficien
t Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     D(LMINWAG(-1)) -1.021790 0.088736 -11.51495 0.0000 
C 0.003056 0.052983 0.057675 0.9541 
@TREND(1980Q1) 0.000541 0.000696 0.778363 0.4378 
     
     
R-squared 0.510777 
    Mean dependent 
var 
0.00000
0 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.503073    S.D. dependent var 
0.42115
9 
S.E. of regression 0.296888    Akaike info criterion 
0.43188
3 
Sum squared resid 11.19410    Schwarz criterion 
0.49805
7 
Log likelihood -25.07240 
    Hannan-Quinn 
criter. 
0.45877
2 
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F-statistic 66.29777    Durbin-Watson stat 
2.00049
3 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Null Hypothesis: UNEMPRTSIS has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Bandwidth: 8 (Newey-West automatic) using Bartlett kernel 
     
        Adj. t-Stat   Prob.* 
     
     Phillips-Perron test statistic -2.499804  0.3279 
Test critical 
values: 1% level  -4.029595  
 5% level  -3.444487  
 10% level  -3.147063  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
     
Residual variance (no correction) 
 0.07215
8 
HAC corrected variance (Bartlett kernel) 
 0.07016
8 
     
          
     
Phillips-Perron Test Equation   
Dependent Variable: D(UNEMPRTSIS)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 01/17/13   Time: 22:47   
Sample (adjusted): 1980Q2 2012Q4  
Included observations: 131 after adjustments  
     
     
Variable 
Coefficien
t Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     UNEMPRTSIS(-1) -0.093157 0.036809 -2.530826 0.0126 
C 0.245757 0.094395 2.603508 0.0103 
@TREND(1980Q1) 0.001521 0.000948 1.603927 0.1112 
     
     
R-squared 0.049038 
    Mean dependent 
var 
0.02137
4 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.034179    S.D. dependent var 
0.27651
9 
S.E. of regression 0.271752    Akaike info criterion 
0.25478
3 
Sum squared resid 9.452708    Schwarz criterion 
0.32062
7 
Log likelihood -13.68825 
    Hannan-Quinn 
criter. 
0.28153
8 
F-statistic 3.300268    Durbin-Watson stat 1.92782
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3 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.040035    
     
      
Null Hypothesis: D(UNEMPRTSIS) has a unit root 
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Bandwidth: 15 (Newey-West automatic) using Bartlett kernel 
     
        Adj. t-Stat   Prob.* 
     
     Phillips-Perron test statistic -11.51717  0.0000 
Test critical 
values: 1% level  -4.030157  
 5% level  -3.444756  
 10% level  -3.147221  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
     
Residual variance (no correction) 
 0.07633
5 
HAC corrected variance (Bartlett kernel) 
 0.05408
2 
     
          
     
Phillips-Perron Test Equation   
Dependent Variable: D(UNEMPRTSIS,2)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 01/17/13   Time: 22:49   
Sample (adjusted): 1980Q3 2012Q4  
Included observations: 130 after adjustments  
     
     
Variable 
Coefficien
t Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     D(UNEMPRTSIS(-
1)) -1.007563 0.088726 -11.35589 0.0000 
C 0.041238 0.050011 0.824572 0.4112 
@TREND(1980Q1) -0.000294 0.000654 -0.449359 0.6539 
     
     
R-squared 0.503823 
    Mean dependent 
var 
-5.73E-
18 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.496009    S.D. dependent var 
0.39375
0 
S.E. of regression 0.279532    Akaike info criterion 
0.31140
7 
Sum squared resid 9.923548    Schwarz criterion 
0.37758
1 
Log likelihood -17.24146    Hannan-Quinn 0.33829
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criter. 6 
F-statistic 64.47841    Durbin-Watson stat 
2.00028
2 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Null Hypothesis: INF has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Bandwidth: 8 (Newey-West automatic) using Bartlett kernel 
     
        Adj. t-Stat   Prob.* 
     
     Phillips-Perron test statistic -7.117617  0.0000 
Test critical 
values: 1% level  -4.031309  
 5% level  -3.445308  
 10% level  -3.147545  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
     
Residual variance (no correction) 
 0.00194
7 
HAC corrected variance (Bartlett kernel) 
 0.00229
3 
     
          
     
Phillips-Perron Test Equation   
Dependent Variable: D(INF)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 01/17/13   Time: 22:55   
Sample (adjusted): 1980Q3 2012Q2  
Included observations: 128 after adjustments  
     
     
Variable 
Coefficien
t Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     INF(-1) -0.540322 0.079037 -6.836316 0.0000 
C 0.034051 0.009339 3.646079 0.0004 
@TREND(1980Q1) -0.000148 0.000108 -1.363601 0.1751 
     
     
R-squared 0.272305 
    Mean dependent 
var 9.06E-05 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.260661    S.D. dependent var 
0.05193
3 
 S.E. of regression 0.044654    Akaike info criterion 
-
3.35658
0 
Sum squared resid 0.249249    Schwarz criterion 
-
3.28973
5 
Log likelihood 217.8211 
    Hannan-Quinn 
criter. 
-
3.32942
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0 
F-statistic 23.38758    Durbin-Watson stat 
1.79431
0 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Null Hypothesis: D(INF) has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Bandwidth: 9 (Newey-West automatic) using Bartlett kernel 
     
        Adj. t-Stat   Prob.* 
     
     Phillips-Perron test statistic -16.98438  0.0000 
Test critical 
values: 1% level  -4.031899  
 5% level  -3.445590  
 10% level  -3.147710  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
     
Residual variance (no correction) 
 0.00257
5 
HAC corrected variance (Bartlett kernel) 
 0.00070
8 
     
          
     
Phillips-Perron Test Equation   
Dependent Variable: D(INF,2)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 01/17/13   Time: 22:58   
Sample (adjusted): 1980Q4 2012Q2  
Included observations: 127 after adjustments  
     
     
Variable 
Coefficien
t Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     D(INF(-1)) -1.133050 0.087832 -12.90023 0.0000 
C -0.001474 0.009385 -0.157080 0.8754 
@TREND(1980Q1) 1.28E-05 0.000124 0.102626 0.9184 
     
     
R-squared 0.573094 
    Mean dependent 
var 
-
0.00096
1 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.566209    S.D. dependent var 
0.07797
0 
S.E. of regression 0.051353    Akaike info criterion 
-
3.07683
9 
Sum squared resid 0.327007    Schwarz criterion 
-
3.00965
4 
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Log likelihood 198.3793 
    Hannan-Quinn 
criter. 
-
3.04954
2 
F-statistic 83.23114    Durbin-Watson stat 
2.08771
8 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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7.4 APPENDIX 4: RESULT OF JOHANSEN COINTEGRATION 
TEST 
 
Date: 01/20/13   Time: 19:10   
Sample (adjusted): 1981Q3 2011Q4   
Included observations: 122 after adjustments  
Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend  
Series: LPEP LGDP LMINWAG 
UNEMPRTSIS    
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 5  
     
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)  
     
     Hypothesize
d  Trace 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     None  0.192747  41.85915  47.85613  0.1627 
At most 1  0.070140  15.73677  29.79707  0.7306 
At most 2  0.051114  6.864776  15.49471  0.5934 
At most 3  0.003795  0.463813  3.841466  0.4958 
     
      Trace test indicates no cointegration at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
     
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
     
     Hypothesize
d  Max-Eigen 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     None  0.192747  26.12239  27.58434  0.0760 
At most 1  0.070140  8.871989  21.13162  0.8426 
At most 2  0.051114  6.400963  14.26460  0.5623 
At most 3  0.003795  0.463813  3.841466  0.4958 
     
      Max-eigenvalue test indicates no cointegration at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
     
 Unrestricted Cointegrating Coefficients (normalized by 
b'*S11*b=I):  
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LPEP LGDP LMINWAG UNEMPRTSIS  
-2.316064  2.448435 -0.619328  1.269024  
-2.094820  2.243533  0.321427 -1.566147  
 0.267476 -1.330515  1.383119 -0.084740  
 0.545763 -0.765987 -0.485541  0.376787  
     
          
 Unrestricted Adjustment Coefficients (alpha):   
     
     D(LPEP)  0.032645  0.043533 -0.002741  0.004523 
D(LGDP)  0.016781 -0.007802  0.002542  0.003908 
D(LMINWAG
)  0.021471 -0.012706 -0.056950 -0.000441 
D(UNEMPRT
SIS) -0.087978 -0.017031 -0.006668  0.009229 
     
          
1 Cointegrating 
Equation(s):  
Log 
likelihood  165.0681  
     
     Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in 
parentheses) 
LPEP LGDP LMINWAG UNEMPRTSIS  
 1.000000 -1.057153  0.267405 -0.547923  
  (0.09330)  (0.14142)  (0.18077)  
     
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in 
parentheses)  
D(LPEP) -0.075608    
  (0.04456)    
D(LGDP) -0.038867    
  (0.01823)    
D(LMINWAG
) -0.049728    
  (0.06028)    
D(UNEMPRT
SIS)  0.203762    
  (0.05667)    
     
          
2 Cointegrating 
Equation(s):  
Log 
likelihood  169.5041  
     
     Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in 
parentheses) 
LPEP LGDP LMINWAG UNEMPRTSIS  
 1.000000  0.000000  32.41953 -99.52695  
   (15.1010)  (30.5572)  
 0.000000  1.000000  30.41387 -93.62788  
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   (14.2461)  (28.8273)  
     
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in 
parentheses)  
D(LPEP) -0.166802  0.177597   
  (0.05853)  (0.06224)   
D(LGDP) -0.022523  0.023584   
  (0.02447)  (0.02602)   
D(LMINWAG
) -0.023111  0.024064   
  (0.08118)  (0.08633)   
D(UNEMPRT
SIS)  0.239438 -0.253617   
  (0.07623)  (0.08106)   
     
          
3 Cointegrating 
Equation(s):  
Log 
likelihood  172.7046  
     
     Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in 
parentheses) 
LPEP LGDP LMINWAG UNEMPRTSIS  
 1.000000  0.000000  0.000000 -3.730545  
    (0.84350)  
 0.000000  1.000000  0.000000 -3.757995  
    (0.86151)  
 0.000000  0.000000  1.000000 -2.954898  
    (0.55450)  
     
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in 
parentheses)  
D(LPEP) -0.167535  0.181244 -0.010017  
  (0.05874)  (0.06704)  (0.02903)  
D(LGDP) -0.021843  0.020202 -0.009385  
  (0.02454)  (0.02801)  (0.01213)  
D(LMINWAG
) -0.038344  0.099837 -0.096150  
  (0.07950)  (0.09074)  (0.03929)  
D(UNEMPRT
SIS)  0.237655 -0.244744  0.039790  
  (0.07648)  (0.08729)  (0.03780)  
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7.5 APPENDIX 5: RESULTS OF THE IMPULSE RESPONSE 
FUNCTION 
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7.6 APPENDIX 6: RESULT OF PAIR WISE GRANGER 
CAUSALITY TEST 
 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 01/20/13   Time: 18:33 
Sample: 1980Q1 2012Q4  
Lags: 5   
    
    
 Null Hypothesis: Obs 
F-
Statistic Prob.  
    
     LGDP does not Granger Cause LPEP  123  1.53747 0.1839 
 LPEP does not Granger Cause LGDP  7.45143 5.E-06 
    
     LMINWAG does not Granger Cause LPEP  127  0.15032 0.9796 
 LPEP does not Granger Cause LMINWAG  1.72982 0.1332 
    
     UNEMPRTSIS does not Granger Cause LPEP  127  1.38229 0.2360 
 LPEP does not Granger Cause UNEMPRTSIS  1.50747 0.1928 
    
     INF does not Granger Cause LPEP  124  2.66529 0.0257 
 LPEP does not Granger Cause INF  1.23759 0.2963 
    
     LMINWAG does not Granger Cause LGDP  123  0.33422 0.8913 
 LGDP does not Granger Cause LMINWAG  2.41827 0.0402 
    
     UNEMPRTSIS does not Granger Cause LGDP  123  3.31160 0.0079 
 LGDP does not Granger Cause UNEMPRTSIS  0.94859 0.4527 
    
     INF does not Granger Cause LGDP  122  1.79618 0.1194 
 LGDP does not Granger Cause INF  1.63115 0.1576 
    
     UNEMPRTSIS does not Granger Cause 
LMINWAG  127  6.86240 1.E-05 
 LMINWAG does not Granger Cause UNEMPRTSIS  0.87390 0.5010 
    
     INF does not Granger Cause LMINWAG  124  0.73568 0.5982 
 LMINWAG does not Granger Cause INF  0.60639 0.6951 
    
     INF does not Granger Cause UNEMPRTSIS  124  2.44242 0.0384 
 UNEMPRTSIS does not Granger Cause INF  0.35071 0.8809 
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7.7 APPENDIX 7: LAG LENGTH CRITARIA 
VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria     
Endogenous variables: INF LGDP LMINWAG LPEP UNEMPRTSIS    
Exogenous variables: C      
Date: 03/31/14   Time: 18:19     
Sample: 1980Q1 2012Q4     
Included observations: 121     
       
        Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
       
       0 -400.1344 NA   0.000557  6.696436  6.811964  6.743356 
1  292.0362  1315.696  9.05e-09 -4.331177  -3.638006*  -4.049654* 
2  326.2348  62.17926  7.79e-09 -4.483220 -3.212406 -3.967094 
3  352.6031  45.76320  7.66e-09 -4.505837 -2.657380 -3.755108 
4  373.5946  34.69672  8.27e-09 -4.439581 -2.013481 -3.454249 
5  425.3215   81.22407*   5.40e-09*  -4.881348* -1.877606 -3.661414 
6  445.4494  29.94230  6.00e-09 -4.800817 -1.219432 -3.346280 
7  460.8102  21.58127  7.28e-09 -4.641491 -0.482464 -2.952351 
8  481.9225  27.91707  8.13e-09 -4.577231  0.159439 -2.653489 
       
        * indicates lag order selected by the criterion    
 LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level)   
 FPE: Final prediction error     
 AIC: Akaike information criterion     
 SC: Schwarz information criterion     
 HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion    
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